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Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

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CHARLES WILLIAM EMIL MILLER

PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

WITH THE COÖPERATION OF

MAURICE BLOOMFIELD, HERMANN COLLITZ, TENNEY FRANK,  
WILFRED P. MUSTARD, D. M. ROBINSON

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# AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

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## I.—THE MEANING OF SĀNKHYA AND YOGA.<sup>1</sup>

loke 'smīn dvividhā niṣṭhā purā proktā mayā 'nagha  
jñānayogena sāṅkhyānām karmayogena yoginām.

"In this world a two-fold foundation (of religious salvation) has been expounded by Me of old: by the discipline of *knowledge* of the followers of Sāṅkhyā, and by the discipline of *action* of the followers of Yoga."—Bhagavad Gitā 3. 3.

Philosophy in India has always been practical in its motive. And its practical motive has been what we should call religious. Namely, it professes to teach a method of salvation; to tell man how he can be saved. If it seeks the truth, it is not for the sake of the truth as an abstract end in itself; it is for the sake of the salvation which that truth is believed to bring with it. "The truth shall make you free"—literally "*free*" (*mukta*) from the evils of the "round of existences." This is the case even with the latest of Hindu philosophies; they all profess to be schemes of salvation. It is more emphatically, more pointedly true of

<sup>1</sup> In this article, "Hopkins" without further specification refers to the essay on "Epic Philosophy," pages 85-190 of *The Great Epic of India*, by E. Washburn Hopkins; New York, 1901. "Deussen" without further specification refers to the translation of *Vier Philosophische Texte des Mahābhārata*, by Paul Deussen ("in Gemeinschaft mit Dr. Otto Strauss"); Leipzig, 1906. It is a pleasure to express here my deep indebtedness to these two works, which have made my investigation immeasurably easier than it would have been without them. Considerations of space make it necessary for me to refer to them specifically, for the most part, only when I differ from them; I hope these references will not suggest a failure on my part to appreciate the profound and lasting value of both works. References are to the Calcutta edition of the *Mahābhārata*, which is abbreviated "C."; the Bombay edition is occasionally referred to as "B."

earlier Hindu speculations—because in their time there had not yet developed<sup>2</sup> sharp differences of opinion as to what absolute “truth” is, such as developed in later times.

In early times especially, then, the question uppermost in the minds of Hindu thinkers was not “What is truth?,” but “How can man be saved?” In so far as differences existed between different thinkers or schools, these concerned methods for reaching the goal. The goal with all alike was salvation. And salvation was at first conceived in much the same way with all. But there might be different roads to it.

In the *Upaniṣads*, at least the earliest dozen of them, we hear little even of such differences as to method. In them the prevailing point of view is that *knowledge* of the truth brings salvation immediately. “Knowing Brahman, to Brahman he goes.”<sup>3</sup> He who knows the supreme truth, however it may be formulated, is thereby saved.<sup>4</sup> This point of view remains perhaps the most fundamental method in later Hinduism. Other methods force an entry by claiming to be “just as good as” the way of knowledge, altho they sometimes end by playing the rôle of the camel and crowding the “way of knowledge” rather completely out of the tent. In the *Bhagavad Gītā* we are assured that “as a kindled fire burns firewood to ashes, so the fire of knowledge burns all deeds to ashes” (4. 37), that is, frees man from continued existence, the fruit of deeds; and again, “Even if thou shouldst be the worst of all sinners, merely by the boat of knowledge thou shalt cross over (the ‘sea’ of) all evil” (4. 36). What knowledge? The knowledge of the supreme religious truth, which each text professes to teach. Thus in the *Gītā*, with its ardent personal theism, it is often knowledge of God. Whosoever *knows* the mystic truth of God’s nature is freed from rebirth and goes to God (4. 9, 10; 7. 19; 10. 3; 14. 1 ff.). But elsewhere in the *Gītā* it is knowledge of the absolute separate-

<sup>2</sup> At least among those who passed as orthodox. For the present we may ignore the heretical or “materialistic” thinkers of whom we hear something in the epic and even earlier.

<sup>3</sup> Kāuṣ. U. 1. 4; the same idea constantly recurs in the *Upaniṣads*.

<sup>4</sup> The earlier history of this idea of the saving power of knowledge is discussed in my article on “The Philosophic Materials of the Atharva Veda,” *Studies in Honor of Maurice Bloomfield* (New Haven, 1920), pp. 117-135.

ness of the soul and body, the independence of the soul from the body and all acts and qualities (5. 16, 17, cf. the preceding verses; 14. 22-25). In fact, the *Gītā*, like other contemporary works and like the *Upanisads*, is apt to promise emancipation to any one who "knows" any particularly profound truth which it may from time to time set forth.

The *Gītā*, however, is more catholic than most of the early *Upanisads*, in that it admits the possibility of gaining salvation by more than one method. Indeed, in spite of the encomiums on knowledge quoted from it above, it tends to prefer certain other methods. We must remember that there is no reason for thinking of this as an inconsistency. It is perfectly rational to suppose that people may go by different roads, and still reach the same goal—salvation, that is, *nirvāna*, union with Brahman or God, or however it may be defined.<sup>5</sup>

One marked difference as to method concerns the question, how far is ordinary, worldly life consistent with the attainment of salvation? Since actions, according to the doctrine of karma, must have their "fruits" for the doer, and so imply continued empiric existence (which is the antithesis of salvation or release); therefore, as the *Gītā* says, "some wise men say that (all) action is to be abandoned as evil" (18. 3). To avoid the results of action, they propose simply not to act. This quietism, *sannyāsa*, *vāirāgya*, is definitely identified in the *Gītā* with the "way of knowledge," and the combination is called *Sāṅkhyā*.<sup>6</sup> The verse 3. 3, quoted at the beginning of this paper, plainly

<sup>5</sup> In *Upaniśadic* and *epic philosophy*, while there are different tentative formulations of the supreme truth, they are not clearly or consciously set off against each other; they are hardly recognized as mutually inconsistent. Such school differences as existed among orthodox thinkers (cf. note 2 above) were based on differences as to method, not as to facts (cf. Dahlmann, *Sāṅkhyā-Philosophie*, pp. xv ff.), and there was no fixed relation between different definitions of salvation and different ways of reaching it. Cf. Mbh. 12. 11810, and my note 22, below.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Mbh. 12. 8804 ff., a treatise on the merits of the "way of knowledge" (*vidyā*), which in 8809 = *nivṛtti*, "abstention, inactivity," and which leads to the highest goal, in contrast with the "way of action" (*karman*, in 8809 = *pravṛtti*, "activity"), which leads to ever repeated rebirths. The name *Sāṅkhyā* does not occur here, but the method described and recommended is precisely what the *Gītā* calls *Sāṅkhyā*.

states that the "way (discipline) of knowledge" is the Sāṅkhyas' way; and in the next verse it is stated that abandonment, *sannyāsa*, of action (obviously the same as the Sāṅkhya "way of knowledge") is not, in the author's opinion, the best way of salvation; he prefers *karma-yoga*, the way of action. Again, in 5. 1, Arjuna asks which is better, abandonment of action (*sannyāsa karmanām*) or *yoga*? To which the reply is: "Both abandonment, *sannyāsa*, and discipline of action, *karma-yoga*, lead to salvation. But of these two discipline of action is better than abandonment of action" (5. 2). "Fools say that *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are different, not the wise. He who applies himself to only one of these obtains the complete fruits of both (5. 4). The station that is won by the Sāṅkhyas is won also by the Yogas; he who regards *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* as one has true vision" (5. 5)—because they both lead to the same end, salvation. Nevertheless, the Gītā goes on: "But abandonment (*sannyāsa*) is hard to obtain without discipline (*yoga*). The sage who is disciplined in discipline (*yoga-yukta*) speedily goes to Brahman" (5. 6). It seems obvious from this—and there is no passage in the Gītā that is at all inconsistent with this interpretation—that *Sāṅkhya* in the Gītā means the way of salvation by pure knowledge, the intellectual method, and that it is understood as implying quietism, renunciation of action. *Yoga*, on the other hand, is understood as disciplined, unselfish activity, which according to the Gītā is just as good as inactivity, in that it produces none of the evil results which action otherwise produces (5. 3 says "whosoever neither hates nor loves is to be regarded as having permanently abandoned [action]"). This method is elsewhere in the Gītā developed at great length (see e. g. 2. 47; 3. 19). Acting without interest in the results of action has no binding effect, and is indeed preferable to inaction, which is an impossible dream (3. 5, 18. 11, 18. 60 etc.). This method of unselfish or disciplined activity, with indifference to results, is what the Gītā always means by *Yoga* when it contrasts it with *Sāṅkhya*, the (quietistic) way of knowledge. *Yoga*, "discipline," is synonymous with *karma-yoga*, "discipline of action."<sup>7</sup> Both *Sāṅkhya* and *Yoga* are all right; both lead to

<sup>7</sup> For a more exact definition of "Yoga" see the last part of this article.

salvation; but the intellectual and inactive way is hard; therefore the other is to be preferred.

Still other methods of salvation were known at the time, and are mentioned in the *Gītā*. In 6. 46 the *yogin*, the adherent of the way of Yoga or disciplined activity, is declared to be superior to the *jñānin*, adherent of the way of knowledge (the Sāṅkhya way just described), and also to the *tapasvin*, adherent of asceticism, penance, and the *karmin*, adherent of the ritualistic method, who depends on (religious, sacrificial) "works" (*karma* is here understood in that restricted sense, as Garbe rightly indicates in his translation). Penance, *tapas*, is more than mere quietism, *sannyāsa*. The comparatively low position assigned to it and to ritualism in this verse does not mean that the *Gītā* denies their validity, any more than it denies the validity of the "way of knowledge," which is bracketed with them here, and which, as we have seen, is elsewhere definitely allowed as a way of salvation. Both penance and ritualism are referred to in complimentary ways in several passages in the *Gītā*, tho perhaps more frequent are comparatively uncomplimentary references. They are certainly not among the favorite methods of the *Gītā*. It is significant, however, that the way of devotion to God, *bhakti*, is not classed among the less desirable methods, either here or elsewhere in the *Gītā*. On the contrary, the very next verse (6. 47) exalts it as even higher than Yoga, or more precisely, as it is here put, as the highest and most perfect form of Yoga or disciplined activity: "Among all possessors of Yoga the most disciplined, *yuktatama*, is he that is devoted to Me." As it is elsewhere put (18. 56 f., 9. 27), he who not only acts unselfishly, but does all acts as acts of service to God, gains salvation most easily of all (cf. 8. 14). The "easiest" way of salvation is naturally the best: why not? Tho there are various ways to the goal, and you can get there by any of them, it is surely only reasonable to prefer the easiest!

Nowhere in the Bhagavad *Gītā* is the word Sāṅkhya used in any other sense than this. Nowhere is there a suggestion that it—or *Yoga*<sup>8</sup> either—means any particular system of metaphysical truth. In the *Gītā* Sāṅkhya and *Yoga* are not meta-

<sup>8</sup> I shall speak below of the various ways in which the word *Yoga* is used.

physical, speculative systems, not what we should call philosophies at all, but ways of gaining salvation; *that and nothing else*.

Moreover, *that and nothing else* is what they are in all Indian literature until a late time,—until far down into the Christian era.

It seems to me that all previous studies in this field have suffered from the initial error of failing to inquire of the Hindu texts (of this period) themselves exactly what they mean by the words “Sāṅkhya” and “Yoga.” The usual method is first to study the Sāṅkhya Kārikās (admittedly dating from not before the 5th century A. D., and admittedly the earliest “systematic” Sāṅkhya treatise); then to look in earlier texts for ideas resembling its ideas, and to call these ideas “early forms” (or “distortions”) of the “Sāṅkhya system,” taking for granted the *existence* of a “Sāṅkhya system” (in the sense of a speculative metaphysics) at this time.<sup>9</sup> The fact that the term Sāṅkhya is often associated in the early texts with ideas which are utterly at variance with those of the later Sāṅkhya system has not, to be sure, escaped the notice of previous writers. Of course not; for it is one of the most striking and self-evident of facts. Hopkins’s intimate acquaintance with the philosophy of the Mahābhārata led him to the flat-footed conclusion that “Sāṅkhya is . . . an authority claimed for the most divergent teaching” (p. 138). Whether it follows from this that it is also “merely a name to appeal to, and stands in this regard on a footing with Veda” (*l. c.*), i. e. that it really means, or need mean, nothing at all when the Epic refers to “Sāṅkhya,” is another question. I hope to show in this paper that a more likely inference from the state of the facts is that the term Sāṅkhya did not, in and of itself, imply *any* “teaching” at all in the sense of any speculative formulation of metaphysical truth, but merely the opinion that man could gain salvation by *knowing* the supreme truth, however formulated.

<sup>9</sup> Only Deussen (*Allgem. Gesch. d. Phil.*, I. 3, p. 15 ff.) says that Sāṅkhya and Yoga were “originally” not systems, but methods of salvation. This correct view is unfortunately vitiated, first, by the fact that Deussen fails to see clearly just what is meant by the two methods (he overlooks the two most significant passages in the Gītā, 3. 3 and 5. 1 ff.); and secondly by his erroneous concession (p. 18) that Sāṅkhya and Yoga developed into “systems” in the epic itself.

That Sāṅkhya is the “way of (salvation by) knowledge” is stated again and again with the utmost clearness, not only in the Bhagavad Gītā, but in other texts of the same period. This has been duly recorded by some scholars, notably by Hopkins (101f.). I cannot but feel that the principal reason for the general failure to take this definition at its face value is the underlying assumption that somehow or other Sāṅkhya in early texts must mean something like the metaphysical system set forth in the late Sāṅkhya Kārikās. Now, I admit that it would be wrong-headed to neglect entirely the “Sāṅkhya system” of the Kārikās in a final evaluation of what “Sāṅkhya” means in earlier times. Before I finish, I shall take up this question (pages 32 ff. below) and set forth my views as to the relation between the early “Sāṅkhya” and the Kārikā “Sāṅkhya.” But for the present it seems to me methodologically more sound to close our eyes to that later Sāṅkhya of the Kārikās, and to see if we cannot get a clear and consistent definition of the term Sāṅkhya as used in the earliest texts where it occurs at all, namely, in the Mahābhārata and the later Upaniṣads. These will be admitted by all to be earlier, by a number of centuries, than the Kārikās. I hasten to grant that this does not *prove* that their use of the term “Sāṅkhya” is more original. All I assume for the present is that they represent a fairly circumscribed period in Hindu literature, which deserves—not, to be sure, to be treated as a definite unit, but—to be separated from the Kārikās and considered, in the first instance, absolutely independently of them, and as *comparatively speaking* a unit in distinction from them.

#### *Early Sāṅkhya not atheistic.*

So far as I know, it has been almost universally assumed that early Sāṅkhya, like that of later times, denies the existence of any Supreme Soul (Brahman, or God). This has been questioned only by Dahlmann (*Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*, 5 ff. *et passim*), to my knowledge. And Dahlmann cannot be said to have proved his point. He hardly attempts to do so, merely stating, rather dogmatically it seems to me, that “epic Sāṅkhya” is not atheistic. It does not surprise me that he has found few, if any, followers on this point. Even Oldenberg, who is one of

those most inclined to emphasize differences between earlier and later Sāṅkhya, speaks of the former as not recognizing an *iśvara* (God), without giving any proofs however.<sup>10</sup> If this were really the case, it would militate strongly against my interpretation. Here would be a definite metaphysical doctrine, which would set Sāṅkhya off against other "systems," particularly Yoga. This is in fact the most striking difference in metaphysics between the later Sāṅkhya and the later Yoga, which is theistic; and the difference is assumed by all, except Dahlmann, to apply also to early times. So notably Hopkins, 104 ff. It is, to be sure, admitted (e. g. by Hopkins, 137) that there are passages in the epic which represent Sāṅkhya as teaching a belief in Brahman, or God. But these expressions are explained as distortions or misrepresentations of the original Sāṅkhya view.

Where, then, do we find that "original" atheistic view expressed? I believe: *nowhere*. A study of the epic and other early materials (mostly collected by Hopkins) has convinced me that there is not a single passage in which disbelief in Brahman or God is attributed to Sāṅkhya.

There are, however, a few passages which have been interpreted as attributing such views to Sāṅkhya. Hopkins (104) regards Mbh. 12. 11039 as the clearest of these. We must consider this crucial passage at length.

In 12. 11037 Yudhiṣṭhīra asks Bhīṣma to explain the difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga. Bhīṣma replies: (11038) "Both Sāṅkhyas and Yogas praise their own as the best means (*kārana*)."

(11039) *anīśvaraḥ katham mucyed ity evam śatrukarṣana  
vadanti kāraṇam śrāiṣṭham<sup>11</sup> yogāḥ samyag maniṣināḥ.*

(11040) *vadanti kāraṇam cedam sāṅkhyāḥ samyag dvijātayah.*

[I shall interpret these lines below. The text proceeds:] "Who-so understands all courses (methods, or goals, *gatiḥ*) in the world, and renounces the objects of sense, (11041) after leaving the body is assuredly saved; thus and not otherwise the great sages say is the Sāṅkhya view of salvation (*mokṣadarśana*) . . . (11043) The Yogas rely on immediate (mystic) perception

<sup>10</sup> *NGGW*, ph.-hist. Kl., 1917, 231.

<sup>11</sup> Read *śreṣṭham?* B has *kāraṇaśrāiṣṭham*.

(*pratyakṣahetavo*, cf. Hopkins, 105, note 1, and my remarks page 42, note 49); the Sāṅkhyas rest on accepted teaching (*śāstraviniścayāḥ*). And both of these opinions I consider true.

. . . (11044) Followed according to instructions, both of them lead to the supreme goal. (11045) Common to both are purity together with penance and compassion to all creatures; the maintenance of strict vows is common to both; the opinions (*darśanāin*) are not the same in them.”

Hopkins, with (I believe) all previous interpreters but Dahlmann, thinks (a) that 11039a means “how can one be saved without God?”; (b) that this question is attributed exclusively to the Yogas as distinguished from the Sāṅkhyas; and (c) that it implies that the latter are atheists.<sup>12</sup> Hopkins also says: “It is to be noticed that this (11045) is the end of the explanation. There is not the slightest hint that the *aniśvara* or atheistic Sāṅkhyas believe in God.” This statement is a bit hasty, I think. Let us see what follows. In 11046 Yudhiṣṭhīra, not a little puzzled, inquires: “If vows, purity and compassion, and also the fruits (of the two methods), are common to both, tell me why the views are not the same?” Remember that his original question (11037) was for the *difference* between the two. Evidently he feels that so far no essential difference has been mentioned, but only resemblances; for the fact that the Yogas rely on immediate perception, the Sāṅkhyas on instruction, deals merely with the kind of evidence used by each. If Bhīṣma had already told him that the Sāṅkhyas were atheistic, the Yogas theistic, would he have put such a question as this? Surely that would be a sufficiently striking difference of *darśana*!—Let us proceed. The real answer to Yudhiṣṭhīra’s original question, repeated in 11046, comes now. In 11047-98 Bhīṣma describes what Yoga means (the supernatural powers of the Yогin; concentration [*samādhāna*] and fixation [*dhāraṇā*], etc.; not a word of *knowledge*). At the end of this, in 11099, Yudhiṣṭhīra says: “You have told me all about the Yoga-way (-*mārga*); now tell me about the method (*vidhi*) that is in Sāṅkhya. For you know all the *knowledge* that is in the three worlds.” Then in 11100 ff. comes the exposition of the Sāṅkhya method, in

<sup>12</sup> Dahlmann, *Sāṅkhya-Philosophie* 169 ff., agrees on a and b, but dissents from c. I dissent on all three points, as will presently appear.

which the *Leitmotif* is knowledge all the way thru; knowledge of the most varied assortment of things: first of the *viśayas* (11102 ff.), and the suffering that invariably comes to those devoted to them (11108); "those who are endowed with knowledge, *jñāna-vijñāna*, gain salvation" (11114); then knowledge of the construction of the material body and mind, and the separateness of the soul therefrom, also *knowledge of the nature of God* (11120), of the worthlessness and transitoriness of the world (11155 ff.), and of many other things. In 11158 "the wise Sāṅkhyas abandon the love of children (or creatures, *prajā*) by means of the great, all-pervading *knowledge-method of the Sāṅkhyas* (*jñānayogena sāṅkhyena*)," etc.; in 11159-60 they "cut by the sword of knowledge (*jñānaśastreṇa*) and the weapon of penance (*tapodanḍena*)" the connexions with *rajas*, *tamas*, and even *sattva*, the best of the three material *guṇas*, which is after all "born of contact with the body," and so (11160-8) they cross over the "sea of suffering" by the "discipline (or method) of knowledge" (*jñānayoga*) and are carried thru several mythic stages (11169 ff.) to the Paramātman, whence they do not return (11175); in 11193 this imperishable supreme Ātman "has the nature of Nārāyaṇa," that is God (*nārāyaṇatmānam*); "freed from good and evil and entered into that *anāmaya*, *aguna* Paramātman, one does not return" (11194); so (11197) "the Sāṅkhyas of great knowledge go to the supreme goal by this knowledge; there is no other knowledge like it"; and (11198) "Have no doubt of this: the Sāṅkhya-knowledge is rated the supreme; it is the eternal, steadfast, full, everlasting Brahman"—described ecstatically and at great length in the following verses, in thoroly Upaniṣadic terms. In 11203 "Sāṅkhya is the form (incarnation, *mūrti*) of this Formless One (Brahman)." In 11211 Nārāyaṇa (God) supports (*dhārayate*) this ancient, supreme Sāṅkhya-knowledge.

In all this there is certainly not a hint of atheism. On the contrary, there are abundant allusions to belief in both a personal God and an impersonal, Upaniṣadic Brahman or Supreme Soul. And—be it added—this is quite the usual way in which Sāṅkhya is described in the epic. For no one can deny that it is at least *frequently* made to imply a belief in either the impersonal Brahman or a personal God (no clear distinction is

usually made between the two). Now, I should hesitate to separate the description of Yoga in 11047 ff. and of Sāṅkhya in 11100 ff. from 11037-45, as Professor Hopkins does. These passages profess to contain the answer to 11046, which seems to me clearly Yudhiṣṭhīra's reminder of his still unanswered question in 11037. I see no reason for refusing to accept the text at its face value, except an unwillingness to admit that Sāṅkhya is not atheistic.

To return to the crucial 11039-40. If 11039 means that the Yogas accuse the Sāṅkhyas of atheism, it is seen to be inconsistent not only with most (I believe, all) other statements on the subject in the epic, but specifically with the account given of the Sāṅkhya in the sequel to this particular passage. But if it does not mean this, what does it mean? Dahlmann (*l. c.*, p. 169) thinks it means "The Yogas say, 'How can one be saved without (the help of) God?'" He identifies Yoga with the way of devotion, *bhakti*. Sāṅkhya, he says, is not indeed atheistic, but seeks salvation by pure theoretic knowledge, while Yoga seeks it by reliance on the personal help of God. His interpretation has won no adherents to my knowledge, and seems to me unacceptable. My belief is that *aniśvaraḥ* in 11039 means simply the Soul, and that the passage should be translated:

"The wise Yogas declare in clear form the best means (*kārana*) how the soul may be saved. And the Sāṅkhya brahmans (too) declare in clear form this means" (that is, the means "how the soul may be saved"; *idam* is to be taken as referring back to 11039, not forward with Hopkins and Deussen; the same question expresses the aim of both Sāṅkhya and Yoga).

In other words, both Sāṅkhya and Yoga are simply ways of gaining salvation for the soul. This is all that the passage means.

*aniśvara* means "having no lord, supreme." Like *an-uttama* etc., it is a mere synonym for *para*, *parama*, and (like any word of similar meaning) may be applied not only to the Supreme Soul (Brahman, or God), but also to the human soul, which is regarded as ultimately one with the Supreme Soul, not only in the Upaniṣads but also in epic philosophy. For instance, the Gītā (15. 8) applies the word *iśvara*, "Lord," to the human soul, which enters and leaves the body, and which in the preceding

verse has been called the *jīvabhūta* and differentiated from God, of whom it is there said to be a "part." The words *īśvara* and *anīśvara*, like *uttama* and *anuttama*, are synonyms; "the lord" and "that which has no lord" both mean the same thing. In Mbh. 12. 11408 the "twenty-fifth" (the human soul) is also called *anīśvara*, "the supreme" (cf. next paragraph). The same epithet applies distinctly to the individual as distinguished from the universal soul in 12. 8957, where Deussen renders "keinen Höhern über sich wissend."<sup>13</sup> Finally, as an absolutely conclusive proof that *anīśvara* can mean "supreme," I refer to Kumārasaṁbhava 2. 9, where it (with *nirīśvara* as a v. l.) is an epithet of Brahmā.

Hopkins (126) understands *anīśvara* at Mbh. 12. 11408 (just referred to) essentially as I do; but nevertheless finds in this passage too an implication that Sāṅkhyā denies a Supreme Soul. I cannot agree with him. In fact, it seems to me that the preceding half of the same verse clearly attributes to Sāṅkhyā (whose views are here being set forth) a belief in an *īśvara* (God? see note 15 below). This description of Sāṅkhyā begins with 11393: "Now I will explain the Sāṅkhyā-knowledge." This is made to include knowledge of the evolvents of Prakṛti (11394-7) and how they devolve back again into the unmanifest Prakṛti, which is therefore "unity in dissolution, plurality when it is creative" (11398-11400). The Soul (*mahān ātmā*, 11403) is the overseer, *adhisthātar* (11401, 4) or the *kṣetrajña* (11405-6) of Prakṛti, the *kṣetra*; it is called *purusa* when it enters into the evolvents of the unmanifest, *avyakta* — (the unitary, unevolved) *prakṛti* (11405); it is also called the 25th principle (11406). Those who have knowledge distinguish soul from Prakṛti, material nature (11406). "Knowledge (*jñāna*) and the object of knowledge (*jñeyā*) are two different things; knowledge is the unmanifest (= *prakṛti*), the object of knowledge is the 25th (the soul)." <sup>14</sup> The next verse, 11408, is the crucial one. It reads:

<sup>13</sup> Hopkins, 106: "not having (the senses as) a master." I do not get this idea from the word; it would seem to me to need to be proved by other passages, which are not adduced, and which I am unable to discover. Dahlmann's translation, criticized by Hopkins, *l. c.*, is quite untenable.

<sup>14</sup> This verse, 11407, forces Deussen to the use of exclamation-points,

avyaktam kṣetram ity uktam tathā sattvam tatheśvarah  
anīśvaram atattvam ca tattvam tat pañcaviśakam.

“Unmanifest the field (= *prakṛti*) is declared to be, likewise *sattva*, likewise the Lord;<sup>15</sup> lordless (supreme) and un-principled (or, a non-principle) is that 25th principle (soul).” Then in 11409 it is repeated that all this is what the Sāṅkhyas say. And by this *knowledge* they are saved and are not reborn (11412-4); while others, lacking this knowledge, are reborn again and again (11415-6).—Now Hopkins says that in 11408 “the view of a Lord-principle is distinctly opposed.” He renders the verse: “It is said that the Unmanifest comprehends not only the field of knowledge . . . but also *sattva* and Lord; the Sāṅkhya-system holds, however, that the twenty-fifth principle has no Lord and is itself the topic that is apart from topics.” In other words, he sees in *ity uktam*, 11408a, a quotation of a rejected, non-Sāṅkhya view, and thus he reads the *īśvara* out of “Sāṅkhya.” But there is no “however” in the Sanskrit, and I see no trace of opposition between 11408ab and the surrounding (Sāṅkhya) doctrines. On the contrary: the

and indeed sounds startling at first. Cf. 11426, where the second half of 11407 is repeated verbatim, with this addition: “Likewise knowledge is the unmanifest, the knower (*vijñātā*) is the 25th (the soul).” The explanation seems to me to be this: knowledge is here felt as a process, a sort of action, and so material. (For the soul is absolutely inactive; it “neither acts nor suffers.”) The object of knowledge is the soul, for it must be “known” in order that salvation may be gained. But the soul is also the knower. It must know itself; and yet the actual process of knowledge, like any *process*, pertains to matter. The paradox is furthered by the strong tendency to contrast *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* with each other in every possible way; what the one is, the other is not; almost any contrasting pair of terms may be allotted to them, one apiece.

<sup>15</sup> On *sattva* and God as “unmanifest” cf. Hopkins, 121, with footnotes. *Sattva* frequently occupies a special position, superior to *rajas* and *tamas*, in epic speculation; it is often thought of as a kind of abstract (“unmanifest”) state of existence. Indeed, it has pretensions to serve as an equivalent for the material *avyakta*, the primal *Prakṛti* itself, as the principle opposed to the soul, *puruṣa*, *kṣetrajña*; it is clearly so used in 12. 7103 and 9020; and cf. 12. 8678. God (if *īśvara* means God, of which more presently) is of course (at least in his supernal form) also “unmanifest”; even the *human* soul is *avyakta* (*Gitā* 2. 25 etc.). Since the Sāṅkhyas do not think of denying God,

phrase *ity uktam* is used regularly, and particularly in this very passage, of doctrines that are accepted by the speaker. In stanzas 11404-7 we find doctrines, recognized by all as Sāṅkhya, introduced successively by *iti procyate*, *iti cocyate*, *iti kathyate*, *ucyate*, *ity uktam*, *ucyate*, *ity uktam* again. Then in the very next verse, 11408, we find another *ity uktam*; can it be that it suddenly introduces a view rejected by the author as non-Sāṅkhya? Surely there would be no reason for thinking so, had it not been considered desirable to remove the *iśvara* from a statement of Sāṅkhya doctrine.

*The earliest occurrences of the word Sāṅkhya.*

I have said that a study of the actual use of the word Sāṅkhya in the earliest period seems to me to make it clear that to the authors of that period the word meant not any metaphysical system, but a way of salvation, namely by knowledge; and that any other terms (such as Yoga), with which it may be bracketed or contrasted, mean other *ways of salvation*—not other metaphysical systems. This idea seems to me to act like the “clearing-nut” on the muddy waters of epic speculation. Many scholars (notably Garbe) have been inclined to throw up their hands in despair over what they consider the “confusion,” the *Wirrwarr*, of the “systems” of philosophy in the later Upaniṣads and the epic. It seems not to have occurred to them that the texts themselves do not profess to teach, under the names of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, “systems” in our sense—logically developed structures of metaphysical truth. Yet this is what the texts tell us quite plainly. They seem confused to westerners

it is entirely natural to find Him mentioned when a list of “unmanifest” things is being given. Nor is this, from the point of view of epic speculation (illustrated over and over again in the Gītā), at all inconsistent with calling the (individual) soul “supreme”; the word *aniśvara* is chosen to express this idea precisely because the word *iśvara* immediately precedes; no Hindu could miss such a chance for a verbal paradox. Just so the same line says the soul is an *atattvam tattvam*, a “principle that is (or has) no principle.”—It is possible, however, that *iśvara* here does not mean God at all, but simply the individual soul, as in Gītā 15. 8, quoted above. In that case this passage could not be used to prove that Sāṅkhya is (or may be) theistic; but still less could it be used to prove that it is atheistic.

only, or mainly, because their aims are not those which westerners assume they should be. If and in so far as there tends to be a general agreement of direction in the metaphysical beliefs which are associated with the term Sāṅkhya, this means only that to that extent the metaphysical beliefs of all Hindus of the period, or at least of all whose beliefs are recorded as orthodox and acceptable in the Sanskrit texts of the period, tended in that direction. *Any* formula of metaphysical truth, provided that *knowledge* thereof was conceived to tend towards salvation, might be called "Sāṅkhya." What may be opposed to Sāṅkhya is not any theory of abstract truth, but a view that salvation is to be gained by some other method than knowledge, e. g. by devotion to God, or by Yoga (which we shall try to define later).

Let us now see just how the word Sāṅkhya is used in early texts; and first of all in the Upaniṣads.

If we limit ourselves to the six or seven earliest Upaniṣads, the answer is easy: it is not used at all. Even if we include the second half-dozen, completing the baker's dozen included in Hume's translation,<sup>16</sup> we find only a single occurrence of the word. This is Śvet. U. 6. 13, which may then be considered probably the oldest record of the word Sāṅkhya. It reads:

nityo nityānām cetanāś cetanānām  
eko bahūnām yo vidadhāti kāmān  
tat kāraṇām sāṅkhyayogādhigamyām  
jñātvā devam mucyate sarvapāśaiḥ.

"The eternal of eternals, the intelligent of intelligents, the one of many, who brings desires to pass—by knowing that divine Cause, which is attainable by Sāṅkhya and Yoga, one is freed from all bonds."

It could hardly be stated more plainly that both Sāṅkhya and Yoga are ways of salvation. Incidentally it is clear that salvation (by either Sāṅkhya or Yoga) is here conceived as attainment of the first Cause, which is rather definitely conceived in personal terms (called *deva*, and referred to by masculine adjectives and pronouns, in spite of the neuter gender of *kāraṇa*, which would make neuter epithets more natural). Thus in our

<sup>16</sup> *The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, Oxford Univ. Press, 1921.

very first meeting with the word we find the state of things which has been interpreted as a "confusion of Sāṅkhya and Vedānta" or a "departure from the original Sāṅkhya"—these interpretations being due to the assumption, utterly baseless as it seems to me, that Sāṅkhya originally denied a world-soul. The truth is, I think, that even if the term implied any definite beliefs at all, which I think it did not, a denial of the world-soul can certainly not have been one of them.<sup>17</sup> Is it not strange that from the very beginning, and for many centuries, we find only the "confusions" and "blends" and "distortions" of the "original" systems, which crop out in their pristine purity only four or five centuries P. C., or (in the case of Vedānta, cf. below, page 33) perhaps even later?

The Śvet. U. does not attempt to tell us the difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga; it assumes that as known. Hardly more informing, but equally favorable to my view, are the other references in still later Upaniṣads (all of which may probably be assumed to be not much, if any, older than the average of the Mahābhārata; they belong really with the epic references). Garbha U. 4 speaks of Sāṅkhya and Yoga as destroying evil and bringing salvation. Prāṇagnihotra U. 1 says "salvation is possible even without the Agnihotra (i. e. without orthodox ritual performances) and without Sāṅkhya and Yoga;" again, obviously, just ways of salvation. Cūlikā U. 14 speaks of the "guna-less soul, *puruṣa*, of the Sāṅkhya"—implying that part of the supreme "knowledge" by which Sāṅkhya aims at salvation is the knowledge of the separateness of soul from body (which is often stated at great length in the epic); this is, of course, far from implying that that is all there is to "Sāṅkhya knowledge." Finally, the very late Muktikā U. (which con-

<sup>17</sup> My interpretation dissolves completely all the "difficulties" found in the Śvet. U. passage by Deussen (*Sechzig Upanishads*, 290 f.), and makes it equally unnecessary to suppose with Hopkins, *JAOS* 22. 382 f., that we have in it a theistic "Sāṅkhya-Yoga" system, different from the "atheistic" Sāṅkhya (and also from the Yoga?). The frequent statements that "Sāṅkhya and Yoga are one" mean that they both lead to the same goal, salvation; and usually the very passages which make that statement also make clear the difference of *method* between the two. I do not think there is any "Sāṅkhya-Yoga system" in any other sense, either early or late.

tains a list of 108 Upanisads, ending with itself, and which presents Rāma as a divine incarnation) mentions (1. 16, and prose at the end of 1) Sāṅkhyā and Yoga among methods by which men (*muniśreṣṭhāḥ, kecit, anye*) think salvation may be gained (*muktir . . . iti cakṣire . . . sāṅkhyayogena, bhaktiyogena*, etc.; *kāivalyamuktir uktā* etc.), along with *bhakti* and others.

The Kāuṭiliya Arthaśāstra (1. 2; ed. 1909, p. 6 f.) names Sāṅkhyā, Yoga, and Lokāyata as constituting Ānvikṣakī, "Philosophy," which is described as "an illumination of all sciences, a means for all works, a support for all duties (*dharma*)."<sup>18</sup> This sort of magniloquence cannot be taken very seriously; it certainly tells us little about the real objects and character of "Philosophy," and nothing at all about the difference between the three terms which it groups under that heading. We may therefore dismiss it, without seriously considering the question whether the Kāuṭiliya is really a work of the time of Candra-gupta Māurya, or whether, as some authorities (including Winternitz, *Gesch. d. ind. Lit.*, 3. 518 ff., especially 523) believe, it dates from a much later time—in which case it would hardly be very pertinent to our present investigation.

Otherwise, the only early occurrences of the name Sāṅkhyā, so far as I know, are in the Mahābhārata itself.

First, as to the Bhagavad Gītā. Here it seems to me there can be no question that Sāṅkhyā is the way of salvation by knowledge (*jñāna*), and nothing else. The most crucial passages, 3. 3 and 5. 1-6, have been treated above. The Gītā contains three other occurrences of the word Sāṅkhyā. In 2. 39 we read: "This point of view (*buddhi*) has been declared for you in the Sāṅkhyā; but hear this in the Yoga." The (preceding) Sāṅkhyā view must refer to the dissertation on the separateness of soul from body, knowledge of which is necessary to salvation; the passage ended at 2. 30, the intervening verses being parenthetical;<sup>18</sup> they have no relation to either Sāṅkhyā or Yoga, according to *any* definition. The same is true of the immediately following verses, which must likewise be parenthetical; they contain an attack on ritualism. The treatment of Yoga (as regularly in the Gītā, the way of salvation by disciplined

<sup>18</sup> N. B.: *parenthetical*, not necessarily interpolated.

activity, dutiful action with indifference to results) begins with 2. 47, and continues thruout the rest of the chapter.

Gītā 13. 24: "Some by meditation (*dhyāna*) behold the Self (*ātman*) by the Self (or, by themselves) in the Self; others by the Sāṅkhya discipline, and others by the discipline of action (*anye sāṅkhyena yogena karmayogena cāpare*)."<sup>1</sup> The discipline of action, *karma-yoga*, is what is otherwise known in the Gītā as Yoga for short, viz. the method just mentioned by me in the last paragraph. Sāṅkhya is not defined in this passage. But obviously it is ways of salvation that we are dealing with; all those mentioned are regarded as possible methods of reaching the common goal, "seeing the Self," which produces release.

Lastly, in Gītā 18. 13 the Sāṅkhya doctrine (*kṛtānta*) is quoted as authority for the five "causes" (*kāraṇa*) or elements in the performance of any action, which are named in the next verse as the material basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*), the doer (*kartar*), the various organs or means of action (*karaṇa*), the various movements (*ceṣṭā*), and fate (*dāiva*). Now the later, systematic Sāṅkhya knows nothing of any such group as this; and so Śankara and Madhusūdana (quoted by Garbe *ad loc.*) felt forced to assume that Sāṅkhya here means Vedānta! Garbe says: "Was in diesen Versen gesagt ist, lässt sich gut auf der Basis des [later] Sāṅkhya begreifen." Perhaps. But it is equally easy to understand it merely as (here regarded as) a part of that supreme "knowledge" which is accepted by the Sāṅkhyas as the true means of salvation. As I have said above, the Sāṅkhyas are the people who tend to promise salvation to any one who *knows any* truth that for the moment is regarded as specially profound or important. Of course it is not always the same truth in different passages. Some such truths are, or seem to us to be, inconsistent with each other. But he who *knows*—is saved. If you do not believe that, you are not a Sāṅkhya. The importance for salvation of the truth here stated seems to be indicated in 18. 16, 17; the doer, *kartar*, is not the Self; he who realizes this is saved.

So much for the Gītā. It would be impossible here to discuss all passages in the Mbh. which mention Sāṅkhya. I believe, however, that there are few, if any, significant passages outside of the Gītā and the important Mokṣadharma section of the twelfth

book. And in the following I shall limit myself to this latter section, treating all passages in it which seem to me to throw any light on the meaning of Sāṅkhyā and especially on the difference between Sāṅkhyā and Yoga.

A good example is the passage discussed above, 12. 11100 ff., in which the constant *Leitmotif* of knowledge is modulated in the most various ways; and it is emphatically knowledge which brings salvation, while in the companion piece (11047-98) on Yoga nothing is said of knowledge; other methods are followed. I have referred also to 12. 11393 ff., another description of Sāṅkhyā, culminating in the promise of salvation by true knowledge (11415 f.). Again in 12. 9877-9913 we find a description of knowledge of the difference between matter and soul, with the evolvents of the former; this knowledge is identified as Sāṅkhyā and as leading to Brahman — salvation in 9912 f.: "When the body is destroyed, the Embodied (soul) attains the state of Brahman (*brahmatvam upagacchati*); for (the above-described) Sāṅkhyā-knowledge (-*jñāna*) is designed to destroy good and evil (deeds, which result in further existence); for in the destruction thereof, (and so) in becoming Brahman (*brahmabhāve*), they see the highest goal (release)."

*Epic "Sāṅkhyā" is Brahmaistic.*

Interesting is 12. 11347 ff. Here it is first said that "Sāṅkhyā and Yoga are one," and in 11348-11367 views are set forth which are declared to be accepted by *both* of them. These views include the absolute distinction between Soul and Material Nature (*prakṛti*), which is emphatically insisted upon. Prakṛti, tho having no characteristics (*liṅga*) itself (as *avyakta*, the primal unmanifest matter), is known by its evolvents, which have characteristics, just as the invisible Seasons of the year are known by the fruits and flowers produced by each. The Soul is absolutely distinct from Material Nature and its qualities; it is eternal, infinite, free from suffering, and only owing to delusion seems to be mixed up in the qualities of Material Nature (11356). The Soul, to gain salvation, must free himself from these qualities; then he will see the Highest (*para*), which is declared by Sāṅkhyā and Yoga to be higher than *buddhi* (the highest material evolvent), and is realized by get-

ting rid of the Unawakened (*abuddha*; 11358-9). The Unawakened is the unmanifest (*avyakta*, the primal Material Nature), the qualityless (*aguṇa*) is the lord (*iśvara*), and this qualityless lord is the eternal overseer (*adhisthātar*; 11360). The wise who are skilled in Sāṅkhya and Yoga and seek the highest perceive the 25th (the soul) after Material Nature and its qualities (11361).<sup>19</sup> "Unity is the imperishable; plurality is the perishable" (*ekatvam akṣaram, nānātvam kṣaram*; 11364); that is, the world of plurality is (not unreal, or false, but) finite, and rests on the basis of a greater, more fundamental unity, which is not finite but eternal. "When, standing upon (= rising superior to) the twenty-five (principles, including soul as well as material nature; *pañcaviniśatinīśtha*) he (the soul) moves forward in the straight and clear way (*samyak pravartate*), then he sees unity and no plurality (literally, unity is his view and plurality is not-[his]-view; 11365)." <sup>20</sup> A distinction must be made between the 25 principles (*tattvāni*; note that the soul is the 25th of these; they are obviously the "perishable plurality" mentioned in 11364) and that which is unprincipled (*nistattva*) and above all the 25, eternal, and above the whole crowd of the finite creation (11367). Of course the individual soul is ultimately and really one with the One; but whether in any higher sense than everything else (even matter), is not made clear at this point.

Now, all this—which is fundamentally Upaniṣadic Brahmanism (to adopt a convenient term first used, I believe, by Hopkins, 101, note 3)—is repeatedly declared to be accepted by both Sāṅkhya and Yoga. For it deals only with what the goal of man should be—not with the way of reaching it. To be saved, man must get rid of Prakṛti and "see the Highest."

<sup>19</sup> I am unable to agree with Professor Hopkins, 125, in seeing a contrast between 11361 and 11359; and I hardly think that *sarvaśah* (in 11359) can mean "as a whole," implying (as that English phrase does; this is the whole basis of Hopkins's interpretation) that some are excluded. On the contrary *sarvaśah* seems to me to mean "absolutely all together," without any exception.

<sup>20</sup> A somewhat different interpretation in Hopkins, 124. The "plurality" referred to seems to me not, or not merely, a plurality of individual souls; it is exactly the same as in the Kaṭha U. 4. 11, very appositely quoted by Hopkins in a footnote—"the separateness . . . of any part of Brahman from the whole." Cf. below, pages 26 ff., 32.

On this both methods, and in fact *all* methods of salvation approved in the Mbh., agree. But how can one best attain this end? It is on this that Sāṅkhya and Yoga differ; and our passage now proceeds at once to explain the difference, in response to the interlocutor's definite request, 11372. The method of Yoga (by *dhyāna*, with *prāṇāyāma* and *ekāgratā manasah*, etc., see below) is described in 11374-92; that of Sāṅkhya, by *knowledge*, in 11393-11417 (above, pp. 12-14). In all the passage 11346-67, stating the fundamental basis of both Sāṅkhya and Yoga, there was not a word of knowledge, or *dhyāna*, or *prāṇāyāma*, or any other *means* of accomplishing the end. Only the end itself—what salvation is—was described.

*“The truth” is taught by Sāṅkhya, but accepted also by Yoga.*

Since Sāṅkhya believes in salvation by pure knowledge, in the theory that by simply knowing the absolute truth one may gain salvation, it is natural that what is regarded as the absolute truth should be thought of as in a special sense the property of Sāṅkhya. The importance of truth is much greater if knowledge thereof is the direct and immediate means of salvation, than if some other method is to be tried. Other methods, such as Yoga, do not necessarily, or usually, conceive truth as anything different from truth à la Sāṅkhya; they merely teach other methods of gaining salvation than pure knowledge alone. So in 12. 11348-67 Yoga as well as Sāṅkhya accepts (as we have just seen) the truth there set forth, but bases on it a different procedure (11373 ff.) from that advocated by Sāṅkhya (11393 ff.). This is made perhaps even clearer in the latter part of the same passage, 11461 ff. The speaker says (11461) he has now declared both Sāṅkhya (in 11393 ff.) and Yoga (11373 ff.); the same teaching (as to truth; *sāstra*) that is declared by Sāṅkhya is also the view (*darśana*) of Yoga. But (11462) knowledge (*jñāna*) is the Sāṅkhyas' means of enlightenment (= release; *prabodhanakara*). And (11463) “in this (Sāṅkhya) teaching, as well as in the Veda, are the forerunners (*purahsarāḥ*; B. °*rah*) of the Yogas;”<sup>21</sup> that is, Yoga accepts the facts as set forth in the Sāṅkhya and the Veda (which presumably means particularly the *Upaniṣads*).

<sup>21</sup> I understand this verse essentially as Hopkins does, 134; otherwise Deussen.

*Sāṅkhya does not reject the One (Supreme) Soul.*

The sequel to this passage (adhyāya 310 of C., 308 of B.) needs special consideration because it develops the idea of the "twenty-sixth" principle, which Hopkins, 133 ff., identifies with the "personal Lord" and says is denied in Sāṅkhya, but upheld in Yoga. I am unable to agree with him as to this distinction. It seems to me that the passage in question is straight Sāṅkhya. This I deduce from the following evidence. (1) Sāṅkhya is named as an authority in it (in 11483, verse 17 of the adhyāya; for Hopkins's interpretation of this see below, note 25), while Yoga is not. (2) Knowledge is constantly stressed thruout the adhyāya, while the usual Yoga methods (*ekāgratā manasah*, *prāṇāyāma*, etc.) are not mentioned.—I do not doubt that the truths here set forth are understood as acceptable to Yoga too;<sup>22</sup> but the method here implied is the Sāṅkhya method.<sup>23</sup>

As to the "26th" principle, it is merely a convenient means of distinguishing the enlightened soul from the soul that is as yet unenlightened (*budhyamāna*, seeking enlightenment). In 11476 we are definitely told that when the (formerly unenlightened, *budhyamāna*) soul (the 25th) reaches enlightenment

<sup>22</sup> In fact, a later statement of the same theory, 11778-80 and 11793-11806, attributes it definitely to both Sāṅkhya and Yoga (11780, 11802, 11810). Again, as repeatedly above, they assume the same facts, but while Sāṅkhya bases salvation on the mere knowledge of these truths, Yoga uses other methods.—Hopkins, 138, says that at this place (B. 318. 86 = C. 11810) these doctrines are represented "as being newly inculcated, and especially designed for those who desire emancipation, in contrast to the Sāṅhyas and Yogas, who are content with their own doctrines." But 11810 seems hardly to support this: *sāṅkhyāḥ sarve sāṅkyadharme ratāś ca, tadvad yogā* (C. *yogo*) *yogadharme ratāś ca, ye cāpy anye mokṣakāmā manusyāś, teṣām etad darśanam jñānadṛṣṭam.* "Both all Sāṅhyas . . . and likewise Yogas . . . and also all other men who desire salvation—this view is that perceived in the knowledge of (all of) them." That is, Sāṅhyas, Yogas, and all others, who seek salvation by any method whatsoever, accept these truths. They differ only as to the means of reaching the common goal.

<sup>23</sup> Hopkins, 133, says this adhyāya comes "after the speaker says he has disposed of the Sāṅkhya system" (and refers to Yoga alone). So far as I can see the only basis for this statement is 11461, where "the speaker" says that he has explained both Sāṅkhya and Yoga. (He refers to 11393 ff. and 11373 ff. respectively.)

(*buddhi*), "then as 26th he goes to *buddha*-hood." Of course this 26th, the enlightened soul, is especially thought of as "Lord," *iśvara*, for it is only as the 26th, in a state of enlightenment, that the soul attains its true freedom and realizes its true unity with the One. But there is no difference between the 26th and the 25th except the stage of enlightenment attained. As Oldenberg aptly says (*NGGW*, 1917, 237) the soul's place in the enumeration of principles is split in two, to provide recognition for a certain qualified difference between the unenlightened and the enlightened soul—without in the least denying their ultimate identity with each other and with the Universal One, the World-Soul (which, when the distinction is made at all, is of course thought of in connexion with the 26th rather than with the 25th; that goes without saying).

To show the basis for this, and incidentally to show that what we are dealing with is Sāṅkhya rather than Yoga, we must examine some parts of the passage in question. We begin with the end of the preceding adhyāya (C. 309, B. 307), with the verse immediately following 11463, quoted above. (11464) "No principle higher than the 25th (the soul) is declared, O king. But the supreme principle of the Sāṅkhya has been correctly described as (11465) the (soul) that is enlightened, and that from a state-of-not-perfect-enlightenment becomes enlightened (*buddham apratibuddhatvād budhyamānam ca*) in truth (or, in regard to the principles, *tattvataḥ*). The (soul) becoming-enlightened and that-is-enlightened is declared to be (also) the substance of Yoga teaching" (so that there is, as stated, no difference in the Sāṅkhya and Yoga views of truth).<sup>24</sup> Here ends the adhyāya C. 309 (B. 307). The first verse (11466)

<sup>24</sup> Hopkins, 134, takes 11465ab as referring to Yoga, not to Sāṅkhya (as I do with Deussen); and he identifies *buddha*, "the enlightened (soul)," with the "Lord-spirit" exclusively, for which I can see no ground. All Hindu systems surely believe in the possibility of *buddha*-hood for individuals. Of course, the individual that becomes *buddha* thereby realizes his true unity with Brahman or the "Lord-spirit," a unity which has existed all along, had he but been able to realize it. In any case, this would not from the epic point of view constitute a difference between Sāṅkhya and Yoga, since as Hopkins points out, 134 note 1, the "personal God" is identified with "the 25th" in epic Sāṅkhya. In other words, the 25th, the 26th, and the World-Soul are really one.

of the next adhyāya promises an explanation of the terms just used. The soul, as *budhyamāna*, which may perhaps be rendered "seeking enlightenment" (really "becoming enlightened," or also "being conscious," cf. below; Deussen, "der des Erwachens Fähige"), "makes himself many" and creates all beings; as such (in the pluralistic, empiric universe) he is not enlightened (11467), tho absolutely different from Material Nature, which is permanently unenlightenable (*aprati<sup>bu</sup>dhyaka*, 11469, with B. [C. °*buddhaka*]; cf. 11804 f. for the triple distinction between "the unenlightened [*prakṛti*], the becoming-enlightened [25th, unenlightened soul], and the enlightened [26th, perfected soul]"). When the soul realizes this difference between himself and Material Nature, he becomes free from the latter (11475), and, enlightened by supreme, pure, spotless *knowledge*, he attains as 26th to the state of enlightenment (11476). "Seized with the knowledge 'I am the 26th,' wise, free from age and death (11481), by the mere abstract power (of this knowledge) he undoubtedly goes to identity (with the Supreme; he is then the 26th; 11482)."

- (11482cd) *ṣadviñśena prabuddhena budhyamāno* (C. *buddha°*)  
    'py *abuddhimān*
- (11483) *etan nānātvam ity uktam sāṅkhyāśrutinidarśanāt cetanena sametasya pañcaviñśatikasya ha*
- (11484) *ekatvaṁ vā bhavaty asya yadā buddhyā na* (C. *nu*)  
    *budhyate.*

These lines I render: "Tho being awakened (or, by a kind of word-play, being conscious) by the awakened 26th, it (the perfected soul) is lacking in consciousness; (for) this (viz. consciousness) is (implies) plurality; so it is declared by the expositions of Sāṅkhya and holy revelation. Of this 25th, united with pure intelligence (*cetana*), unity results only when it is not conscious with consciousness (*buddhi*)."  
Here, as elsewhere in this chapter, we find a sort of pun on the two meanings of the root *budh*: (1) to become enlightened, and (2) to be conscious (of something; the object is *prakṛti* and its evolvents). This consciousness is a material process (cf. pp. 12 f., note 14), function of the organ *buddhi*, an evolvent of *prakṛti*. As such it must be got rid of by the enlightened soul. And further,

there can be no consciousness after attainment of perfection (=oneness), because after perfect enlightenment the soul is completely merged in the One; there is only the One unity, no longer any plurality, no difference of subject and object, and consequently no consciousness. It is exactly the same theory that is set forth by Yājñavalkya to Maitreyi, Br̥h. Ār. U. (M.) 4. 5. 13-25 (which might be the very *śruti* meant by 11483b): only in the finite, pluralistic, unenlightened world does "one see another, one hear another" etc.; but "when all has become just the soul, by what should he see what?" etc. (So also Mbh. 12. 7973; see below, p. 30.) There is no question of God vs. multiplicity of individual spirits here. It is the old, Upaniṣadic notion of a plurality in the empiric, finite world, but an underlying unity, realized by the enlightened, in which there is no longer any plurality, nor any consciousness, the attribute of plurality.<sup>25</sup>

Again in 11550-11647 we have a long series of metaphysical speculations, stated (11550cd) to be assumed by both Sāṅkhyā and Yoga. It includes, along with many other things, the usual theory of the evolvents of Material Nature, and the Soul as separate therefrom. At the end, the interlocutor asks (11653) for separate statements of what "Sāṅkhyā-knowledge" and Yoga mean. Accordingly, in 11655-11673, Sāṅkhyā is set forth. As long as the soul (11660) thru ignorance associates with the qualities of Prakṛti, and fails to know itself as different from them, it is not released. Such souls go to hell again and again (11672), but the Sāṅkhyas, by reasoning out this supreme reasoning, go to One-ness (*kevalatām gatāḥ*, 11673). In 11665 we have another reference to the Upaniṣadic (Brahmaistic)

<sup>25</sup> Hopkins, 135, sees in 11483a an allusion to separateness, i. e. plurality, of spirits, as a Sāṅkhyā view, rejected in this passage. He translates: "That separateness of spirits [N. B.: there is no "of spirits" in the Sanskrit] which is part of the exposition of Sāṅkhyā [N. B.: Hopkins omits *śruti*, which would seem to mean the Veda; is "plurality of spirits" then Vedic as well as Sāṅkhyā? and does this passage reject the Veda, as well as Sāṅkhyā, as an authority? If one, then the other also] is really (explained by) the conditioned spirit when not fully enlightened by the (fully) enlightened 26th." It seems to me that "unity" and "plurality" here are used in the strictly Upaniṣadic sense described above; and that the Sāṅkhyā, as well as *śruti*, is quoted as an authority, and accepted, not rejected.

doctrine of the unity underlying all empiric plurality, as in 11483 f. above.<sup>26</sup> There follows a treatment of the Yoga-method (11679-11702), preceded by the statement that "there is no knowledge (*jñāna*) like Sāṅkhyā, no power (*bala*) like Yoga; both go to the same (end, *ekacaryāu*), both are declared to be deathless" (11676); only foolish men separate them, they are really one (11677); "the same which Yogas behold, that Sāṅkhyas also behold" (11678), namely, the Highest, to behold which means salvation, whether you attain it by "knowledge" or by some other method (such as Yoga). The "power" of the Yoga doubtless refers to the supernatural powers (*āśvarya*) associated with the Yoga-method; see pages 45 f. below.

I have now considered nearly all the passages which have been used to show that the epic Sāṅkhyā teaches plurality of individual souls and denies a single, universal soul; and have tried to show that there is no basis for this theory. Not only is Sāṅkhyā constantly associated with a belief in a World-Soul (Brahman) or God; but there is no passage, I believe, in the epic which attributes the contrary belief to it. There remains to be considered one passage, which has been interpreted as presenting the later Sāṅkhyā view of independent individual souls, not only by Hopkins (123 f.), but even by Oldenberg (*Upani-shaden und Buddhismus*, 1st ed., 254; 2nd ed., 219 f.), despite his general inclination to distinguish between epic and later Sāṅkhyā. This is 12. 13713 ff. In 13713 the question is definitely raised: "Are there many souls (*puruṣa*), or only one, and

<sup>26</sup> Hopkins, 123, again sees a reference to "plurality of spirits" as a Sāṅkhyā view. The verse 11665 reads: *avyaktāikatvam ity āhur nānātvam puruṣās tathā, sarvabhūtādayāvantah kevalam jñānam ās-thitāḥ*. This seems to me to mean: "'It is (reaches) a unity in the Unmanifest (the esoteric);' so they explain the plurality (of the manifest, empiric universe),—men (*puruṣās*) who, having compassion for all beings, resort to pure knowledge." The preceding verse has just said that enlightened sages recognize "the eternal in the transitory, the unmanifest in the manifest," that is, the One in the many. The whole passage is definitely Brahmaistic. Hopkins: "Those who have the religion of compassion . . . say that there is unity in the Unmanifest but a plurality of spirits." "A plurality of spirits" would seem to me rather to require something like *puruṣanānātvam* or *nānātvam puruṣāṇām*. In any case the context seems to me clearly to indicate the interpretation offered by me.

which is the noblest soul among them, or what is declared to be the source (of them)?" The reply is: (13714) "There are many souls in the world according to the teachings of Sāṅkhyā and Yoga; they do not admit that there is only one soul." This sounds, one must grant, like a statement of later Sāṅkhyā. But the passage must be considered as a whole. It goes on: (13715) "And<sup>27</sup> as there is declared to be one source (*yoni*) of the many souls, thus I shall explain that universal (*viśvam*) soul, that is above the qualities (of matter) . . . (13718) Sages, Kapila and others, taking thought on the Supreme Soul (*adhyātma*),<sup>28</sup> have composed scientific texts with rules and exceptions (i. e. in great detail). But (13719) what Vyāsa has declared in summary fashion,<sup>29</sup> namely unity of the Puruṣa(s), from that I will make a statement, by the grace of the Almighty (Vyāsa?)." This is then explained by quoting an alleged conversation between God Brahmā and Rudra, in which Rudra (repeating essentially the question of 13713) asks (13735), how is it that there are many Puruṣas, and yet a supreme One? (That there are *many* is not denied; but in a higher sense there is also One, the source and the final goal of the many, and in Him the many are after all One.) Brahmā replies: "As for the many souls of which you speak, that is quite true; (yet) it (this plurality) is to be regarded as surpassed (transcended, by a higher synthesis), and (thus) not so (i. e. ultimately not 'many'), at the same time" (*evam etad, atikrāntam draṣṭavyam nāivam ity api*, 13737). "But I shall declare to you the basis (*ādhāra*) of the One Soul, how it is declared to be the source (*yoni*) of

<sup>27</sup> Hopkins in his interpretation inserts here a parenthesis: "(But this is a mere assumption)"; i. e. he takes 13715 as opposed to the doctrine mentioned in 13714. The conjunction *ca* seems rather to indicate that 13715 is felt as consistent with 13714. The view now to be set forth is (as stated in definite terms below, 13763) thoroly "Sāṅkhyā and Yoga" and does not, indeed, "admit that there is *only* a universal soul"—but rather that the Universal Soul is the source of the individual souls, and that they, when perfected, return to It and are merged in It.

<sup>28</sup> This phrase is not favorable to a denial of the universal soul by Kapila.

<sup>29</sup> *samāsatas tu*; the position of *tu* indicates that the contrast is between the summary doctrines of Vyāsa and the lengthy expositions of the others; no contrast between the doctrines themselves is intended.

the many souls (13738). So, becoming free from the qualities (of matter), they enter into that supreme, universal, greatest, eternal Soul, that is free from the qualities" (13739). This Supreme Soul cannot be seen even by Brahmā or Rudra, who are *saguna* (13741); He dwells bodiless in all bodies, but is not stained by the actions of the bodies (13742), remaining free, universal, and independent (13744), as He (13748) is characterized by one-ness and greatness, and He is the One Soul; He alone, the eternal, bears the epithet Great Soul (*mahā-p.*). Some call Him the Supreme Self (*paramātman*), others the One Self, or simply the Self (*ekātman*, *ātman*; 13753). This Paramātman is eternally free from the qualities; for *He is to be known as Nārāyaṇa* (Viṣṇu, God), since He is the universal-self soul (*sarvātmā puruṣo*, 13754). "He is not stained by the fruits (of action), as a lotus-petal by water. But that other (the individual soul) is characterized by action, and is associated with bondage and release" (13755).<sup>30</sup> "For (as individual soul) he is associated with the mass of the seventeen (evolvents of material nature) also; thus the soul is declared for you as manifold" (13756). The Soul is the supreme *dhāman* of the world, the conscious and the object of consciousness, the thinker and the thought, the eater and the eatable, the seer and the seen, the taster and the object of taste, and so both the subject and the object of all other senses, the "knower and the object of knowledge," the "qualitative and the free from quality" (*saguṇāṁ nirguṇāṁ ca!* that is, matter and soul alike! 13757-8). In other words, this is the most fundamental Upaniṣadic Brahmanism (N. B. not "Vedānta"! matter is not unreal). And the section ends with this verse (13763): "This I have explained fully for you in response to your question; I have described fully (the doctrine) that is in Sāṅkhya-knowledge and in Yoga."

To me it seems clear that, considering this passage as a whole, we cannot understand 13714 as Hopkins and Oldenberg understand it. What Sāṅkhya and Yoga<sup>31</sup> are here stated to believe

<sup>30</sup> *karmātmā tv aparo yo 'sāu mokṣabandhāḥ sa yujyate.* Deussen: "Aber als Werkbehafteter ist er ein anderer, der Erlösung und Bindung unterworfen." I believe, with Deussen, that the passage understands the individual soul as ultimately and really identical with the universal.

<sup>31</sup> Note that Yoga too is represented as holding the same view as

is that there are, indeed, many individual souls, empirically speaking; but that these are all emanations of, and shall (when perfected) return to, One Universal Soul, which is Everything that is. This is made quite clear in 13737, which must be understood as a commentary on 13714. To take 13714 out of its context is unjustifiable; all the more if, as I have tried to show, not a single other recorded passage in the epic is consistent with the denial of the World Soul in Sankhya. Compare 12. 8764, below, page 31.

*Sankhya associated with Quietism or Asceticism.*

We saw above (pages 3 f.) that in the Bhagavad Gītā Sankhya is not only the "way of knowledge," but is also assumed to imply renunciation of actions—quietism. The stock argument for quietism is that all acts cause further existence, by the law of karma; therefore one should, so far as possible, cease to act. There is however no necessary, inherent connexion between quietism and the "way of knowledge"; and we are not compelled to suppose that Sankhya was invariably understood in this way. Yet, if pure knowledge is to be our means of salvation, it is natural enough to advise an inactive life, given up to meditation, in pursuit of that knowledge. At any rate we find various epic passages, besides those in the Gītā, in which quietism is associated with Sankhya. So the famous Pañcaśikha section, 12. 7886 ff., which is identified as a statement of the way of salvation according to Sankhya (7900). The speaker first deals with certain heretics: the materialists (*nāstika*, 7908), whose view that there is no soul or "self" apart from the body is stated in 7903-9 and refuted in 7910-11; then some unnamed others (Nilakantha says, probably rightly, that Buddhists are meant), whose opinion is that rebirth is determined by karma and that this is based on ignorance, but that there is no soul (7912-4), and who are refuted in 7915 ff. But not content with

Sankhya. This is passed over in silence by Hopkins and Oldenberg, but it seems to me that it should have caused them some misgivings. Either the attribution of these doctrines to Yoga is meaningless verbiage (in which case the same may be just as true of Sankhya); or else H. and O., on their hypothesis, must assume that a denial of a supreme soul is attributed to Yoga, which is inconsistent even with the later Yoga, a theistic system.

this, Pañcasikha also rejects the position of old-fashioned Vedic ritualism (7922-6). After he has completely bewildered his interlocutor and forced him to ask "What, then, is the truth?" (7933), he proceeds at last to set forth his own theory, which, be it remembered, was stated in 7900 to be Sāṅkhyā. First he describes the material constituents of the body, which of course includes the psychological organs, *manas* and *buddhi*. But (7944) all this is not the soul; if one thinks it is, his sufferings never cease, while (7945) "when it is seen that 'this is not-soul,' that 'these are not I and not mine,' then there is no basis on which could rest continuance of suffering for him." "Hear now the supreme Teaching of Renunciation (*tyāga-śāstra*), which when declared shall result in emancipation (*mokṣa*) for you. For it is just renunciation of all actions, yes, even of 'disciplined'<sup>32</sup> ones, that is always considered grievous torment by the falsely trained" (7946-7). "This one-and-only way of renunciation-of-all (-action; *sarvatyāgasya*) is taught as leading to freedom from suffering; any other way leads to misery" (7949). Salvation is conceived in regular Upaniṣadic, Brahmanistic terms. Souls that are freed merge in the One like rivers in the ocean, and lose their individuality (*vyaktir jahati*, 7972). In that state there can be no consciousness (*samjnā*), "since the soul is mingled (with the all) and embraced (by it) on all sides" (7973); cf. above, page 25. The climax of the passage, 7974, reverts to the theme of knowledge: *imām ca yo veda a vimoksabuddhim, ātmānam anvicchati cāpramattah, na lipyate karmaphalāir anīstāih, pattram bisasyeva jalena siktam*. Strictly in accord with the usual definition of Sāṅkhyā, it is *knowledge* (here, primarily, of the distinction between soul and body) that is to bring salvation. But this knowledge implies "renunciation" of action—quietism.

A similar idea is distinctly held by the author of 12. 8679-85. "Restraint (of the senses) from the objects of sense know to be the mark of Sāṅkhyas" (8679). In the following verses the quietist is described: he avoids anger, hate, lies; he returns good for evil; "alike (*sama*) to all beings, he goes to Brahmā"

<sup>32</sup> *tyāga eva hi sarveśāṁ yuktānām api karmaṇām*; it sounds like a direct attack on the theory of Yoga, salvation by "disciplined (unselfish) action," advocated in the Gītā!

(8681); indifferent to all, desireless, firm in *brahmacarya*, not injuring all beings, "such an adherent of Sāṅkhya is released" (8685). That knowledge is the method of Sāṅkhya is not definitely stated in these verses, but it is nevertheless implied, as Hopkins says (114), and the following verses make it abundantly clear; they contain an elaborate glorification of knowledge, *jñāna* (see particularly 8688 and 8696 f.).

Knowledge and renunciation (here called by the stronger term *tapas*, penance) are again bracketed in connexion with Sāṅkhya at 12. 8738; *nānyatra* *vidyātapasor* *nānyatrendriyani-grahāt*, *nānyatra* *sarvasamtyāgāt* *siddhim vindati* *kaścana*. Indeed, as in the passage just mentioned, quietism is more stressed than knowledge in this particular verse. But the passage which it introduces (12. 8738-67), and which is definitely stated in 8768 to be Sāṅkhya, makes the standard equation, Sāṅkhya = way of knowledge, abundantly clear. The knowledge meant is again, as usual, strictly Upaniṣadic, Brahmaistic doctrine. The constituents of the body are explained; the soul is enclosed (*vṛta*) in the body; the enlightened soul identifies himself with the soul of all beings and with the Paramātman; in it are all worlds, and there is nothing outside of it (8760). It is both perishable (as individual soul, "in all beings"), and imperishable (as the "divine immortal" One, 8764); another way of putting the idea discussed above (page 27 f.) that the soul is both many and at the same time One. Finally, by knowledge attaining (*vidvān prāpya*) this Imperishable All-highest, one gets rid of life and rebirth (8767). "In response to your question I have now (in the preceding) explained to you correctly what is connected with *Sāṅkhya-knowledge*" (8768).

In 12. 11880 renunciation is the "prime means of salvation," but it "springs from knowledge alone" (*vāirāgyam punar etasya mokṣasya paramo vidhiḥ, jñānād eva ca vāirāgyam jāyate yena mucyate*). That is, he who has right knowledge naturally and inevitably develops *vāirāgya*, from which comes salvation; knowledge is after all the fundamental source of *mokṣa*. This appears to be meant as Sāṅkhya doctrine (I shall discuss the passage in which it appears below), and it doubtless indicates the standard Sāṅkhya view as to the relations of "knowledge" and "quietism" as methods of salvation. It is so to speak a commentary, *bhāṣya*, which explains all the passages just quoted.

On the other hand, the Sāṅkhya method has no monopoly of *vāirāgya* or *sannyāsa*. The two are by no means universally associated. And it seems clear that the association, when it occurs, is distinctly incidental, and does not concern the fundamental or primary meaning of Sāṅkhya.

*Relation of epic Brahmaism to later Sāṅkhya and Vedānta.*

It appears, then, that Sāṅkhya means in the Upaniṣads and the Epic simply the way of salvation by knowledge, and does not imply any system of metaphysical truth whatever. In so far as its adherents tend to agree on certain metaphysical beliefs, namely a sort of developed form of Upaniṣadic Brahmaism, this simply means that all orthodox Hindus of the day tended to accept those beliefs. The chief development within this Brahmaism, as compared with the earlier Upaniṣads, consisted in an increasing attention paid to the constituent elements and the evolution of Material Nature, the non-soul, which in the earlier Upaniṣads had been rather ignored, not because its existence was denied, but because it did not interest the earlier thinkers, who were absorbed in the contemplation of the One Ultimate Reality, which they identified with the Soul. The epic thinkers too, tho they discussed Matter more than their predecessors, did so merely to emphasize its unimportance, its worthlessness. To them also the Soul was all that really counted. And the Soul was still ultimately One—was Brahman, or God. To be sure, in exoteric, empiric, worldly existence there are many souls; but it is only in its finite, “perishable” (*kṣara*, e. g. 12. 8764) form that the soul is plural. And this plurality lasts only until enlightenment is reached. The enlightened soul realizes its unity with the One that is All; for him there is no longer any plurality. This is not “Sāṅkhya” doctrine alone; it is accepted by *all* orthodox schools, as we have repeatedly seen. In fact, to speak of “schools” in this connexion is to run the risk of misleading; if we exclude heretics like the Buddhists and the materialists, we hear of essential differences of opinion only as to the best method of reaching salvation. And, by the by, each of the methodological “schools” generally recognizes the validity of the methods advocated by the others. The Sāṅkhya has, however, a sort of special interest in this Ultimate Truth,

because it is in knowledge of that Truth that Sāṅkhya finds the best way of salvation.

None of the specially characteristic points of doctrine of the later, classical systems of philosophy are found in this somewhat vague and indefinite body of ideas which we may call Epic Brahmaism.<sup>33</sup> And yet we can see clearly the starting-points of all the later systems: particularly of the later Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. In the epic, Material Nature is real, and distinct from the (individual) souls; the individual souls have a qualified, finite reality, but when emancipated realize their ultimate identity with the One (World-Soul or God); that One is, again, regularly conceived as in some sort of relation to Material Nature, say as its "overseer," so that Material Nature, tho real, is only to a qualified extent independent (it is for instance often thought of as the "body" of the World-Soul, His "lower" or "material nature").<sup>34</sup> It remained for the Vedānta school of Śankara to carry out to the bitter end the doctrine that there is really only One, namely Brahman, and—with relentless logic—to deduce from this not only the unreality of plural existence of individual souls (the epic comes fairly close to this, without quite reaching it), but also the unreality of all matter (which can be read into the epic only by serious distortions). Much earlier than Śankara, and apparently much earlier than the doctrine of *māyā* as he taught it, is the classical system of the Sāṅkhya Kārikās. This system developed equally clearly out of epic Brahmaism, but in a wholly different direction. It took as its starting-point the doctrine of the absolute independence of the individual souls on the one hand and material nature on the other. It emphasized the contrast between these two principles, and dwelt on the evolution of material nature,<sup>35</sup> as set over against the unchanging nature of the soul. Above all it got rid of the World-Soul (Brahman, or God) altogether; a

<sup>33</sup> On this I agree emphatically with Dahlmann, *Sāṅkhya-Philosophie*, p. xvi f.

<sup>34</sup> It is sometimes even said definitely that Material Nature springs from the World-Soul (e. g. 12. 13035). This subject will be treated more fully and adequately in my forthcoming book on the Bhagavad Gītā (Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1924).

<sup>35</sup> Keeping very close in details to older accounts found in the epic; cf. Dahlmann, *op. cit.*, p. 1 ff.

radical step for which, as I have tried to prove, there is no authority in the epic period.

The retention of the name "Sāṅkhya" by the adherents of this later system is easy to understand, and from their point of view seems entirely justifiable. They too were seeking a means of salvation, not simply the abstract truth as an end in itself (cf. the first paragraph of this article). They taught salvation by knowledge; knowledge of the ultimate truth, namely, the truth of the absolute independence of the soul from material nature. Their method was, then, precisely the method of the epic "Sāṅkhya." The metaphysical content of their doctrines was based upon a *part*—an important part—of the content of epic Brahmaism, which had been familiarly accepted by the followers of epic "Sāṅkhya," as well as by the other orthodox methodological schools of epic times. In so far as it differed from that, such differences did not in any way concern the use of the name Sāṅkhya, which applied not to metaphysical content, but to method. From the point of view of early times, the name Sāṅkhya might just as well be applied to Śankara's "Vedānta" as to the Sāṅkhya of the Kārikās; for Śankara, too, taught salvation by knowledge of the truth, and his "truth" was also based on (or developed out of) epic Brahmaism, altho his formulation was quite different from that of the Kārikās. That Śankara did not claim the name Sāṅkhya is doubtless due to the fact that long before his time the name had become associated with the classical system of the Kārikās, which taught metaphysical doctrines to which he was radically opposed. It was only after the formulation of the system of the Kārikās, and precisely as a result thereof, that the name Sāṅkhya came to be associated exclusively with the doctrines of plurality of souls and no world-soul.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that both the later Sāṅkhya and the later Vedānta, by their respective changes in the older Brahmaism, have introduced what must be clearly recognized as logical improvements, altho perhaps at the expense of "common sense." The epic speculations, like those of the Upaniṣads which they so closely resemble, are unsystematic. It is easy to find logical flaws in them. Matter is eternal and independent, yet somehow dependent on the One Supreme Soul; the individual souls are many, and yet there is in the last analysis but

One Soul; and so on. At least the most glaring of these logical inconsistencies are removed in the later systematic philosophies, by various means. They are thus made to appeal more to the closet philosopher. Yet one cannot help questioning whether their carefully built houses of cards (which after all break down at one point or another—I suppose like all philosophic systems, east or west!) do not lose in freshness, simplicity, earnestness, and vigor more than they gain in refinement and subtlety.

*Literal meaning of the word “Sāṅkhya.”*

If I am right as to what “Sāṅkhya” was originally applied to, it is evident that the dispute as to the literal meaning of the word is settled. It cannot possibly mean “(the metaphysical system) characterized by numbers or enumeration, (the) numerical (system),”—alleged to have been applied to the (later) Sāṅkhya system because of its many numerical categories. In spite of the authority of Garbe,<sup>36</sup> Hopkins,<sup>37</sup> Oldenberg,<sup>38</sup> and Winternitz,<sup>39</sup> this view seems to me *a priori* improbable, even from the standpoint of the later Sāṅkhya system. Are numerical categories more strikingly characteristic even of that later system than of other Hindu systems? I doubt it. All Hindu systems, of science and pseudo-science as well as philosophy, love numerical categories and revel in them. Can any Hindu systematic treatise on any subject be imagined that does not abound in numerical categories?<sup>40</sup> With what less “numerical” system would Sāṅkhya be contrasted in this sense? It is commonly set off against Yoga in particular. Yet the later Yoga system, so far from lacking numerical categories, takes over practically all the categories of the Sāṅkhya system and even

<sup>36</sup> Garbe is the originator of this interpretation, and still defends it in *Sāṅkhya Philosophie*<sup>2</sup>, 189 f.

<sup>37</sup> Page 127.

<sup>38</sup> *Lehre der Upanishaden und Anfänge des Buddhismus*<sup>1</sup>, page 203 (2 page 179).

<sup>39</sup> *Gesch. d. ind. Lit.*, 3, page 448, note 2. Jacobi also (*GGA* 1919, 28 f.) thinks that Sāṅkhya means “dealing with enumeration,” tho in a different sense, which I cannot take space to discuss here. Formerly (*GGA* 1895, 209) Jacobi accepted the view which I express below.

<sup>40</sup> Jacobi (*GGA* 1895, 209) remarks very truly that Jainism, Buddhism, and other sects of the time go much farther than Sāṅkhya in devotion to numbered categories.

adds to them. Where is the point, then, in calling Sāṅkhyā the "numerical system"?

But of course the conclusive reply to this interpretation, in my opinion, is that Sāṅkhyā did not originally mean *any* system of philosophy, numerical or other, but simply and solely a way of gaining salvation, namely by knowledge. If this is so, of course the word can only mean what all authorities before Garbe<sup>41</sup> took it to mean—"dealing with speculation, calculation" in the sense of reasoning, philosophy. Sāṅkhyā is the philosophical, reflective, speculative, intellectual *method*. That is why it is called, for instance in the Gītā, *jñāna-yoga*, "way or discipline of knowledge." It implied in itself nothing as to what truth is, but only an adherence to the intellectual method, a hope for salvation thru knowledge of the truth alone, rather than thru some other means, such as performance of actions or devotion to God. It seems to be universally admitted that the word and its cognates (the nouns *samkhyā* and [*pari-*]*samkhyāna*, the verb [*pari-*]*samkhyā*) have such meanings in the epic and other early literature. Even Garbe grants this (*op. cit.* 189 f.), tho he considers it a "transferred" use of the words. E. g. in Yājñ. Dh. Ś. 3. 158 *śarīraparisamkhyāna* means "reflection about the body." In Mbh. 12. 11934 *samkhyā* (and its synonym *sāṅkhyā*, three verses before) is not a philosophical term at all but one of the five "qualities of speech," and a precise definition is given of it:

doṣāṇāṁ ca guṇāṇāṁ ca pramāṇāṁ pravibhāgataḥ  
kamecid artham abhipretya sā samkhyety upadhbaryatām.

"The weighing of strong and weak points severally, as one presses forward to some conclusion, this should be understood as *samkhyā* (or, three verses before, *sāṅkhyā*), reasoning, calculation." (Hopkins, 95, "reckoning".) As an adjective, *sāṅkhyā* would then seem to mean "(the method of salvation)

<sup>41</sup> For references to early expressions of this view see Garbe, *op. cit.*, 189 note 2. For Hindu authorities holding the same view see Fitz Edward Hall, *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, Preface, page 4, note. Cf. Amara I. 1, 4, 11 *carcā samkhyā vicāraṇā*; Śāśvata 538 *ekatvādāu vicāraṇe samkhyā*. Since, and in spite of, Garbe's interpretation the older view has been maintained by Deussen, *Allgem. Gesch. d. Phil.*, I. 3, page 15, and Charpentier, *ZDMG* 65. 847.

based on reckoning or calculation" in the sense of the weighing of arguments, reflective reasoning. It was originally the *only* method which claimed a rationalistic, an intellectual, basis. Of course it is not necessary to deny the possibility that the word and its relatives may occasionally be used with conscious and semi-punning allusion to the meaning "number,"<sup>42</sup> which is unquestionably one of the early meanings of the word *samkhyā*. A Hindu would not be a Hindu if he did not play on various meanings of a word, when he gets the chance. But if I interpret correctly the evidence adduced above, the original meaning cannot possibly be "dealing with numbers or numerical categories," even if that interpretation were otherwise a natural one, which it seems to me it is not.

#### *The early meaning of Yoga.*

We have arrived at a quite clear and sharp definition of the term *Sankhya*. Can we hope to do as well with the complementary term *Yoga*?<sup>43</sup>

As all Sanskritists know, the word *yoga* is a very fluid one, used in a great variety of senses, philosophical and other. It may mean simply "method, means"; and it is used in that sense in many philosophic passages of the epic, notably in the *Gītā* 3. 3, quoted at the beginning of this article (cf. also page 4). Here the adherents of *Sankhya* follow the *yoga* (method, discipline) of knowledge, while the adherents of *Yoga* follow the *yoga* of action. Obviously two entirely different meanings are given to the word *yoga* in this one verse. Another meaning is "exertion, diligence, zeal"; used especially to describe a regular, disciplined course of procedure leading to a definite end (in the *Gītā* and other philosophic passages, ordinarily to the end of emancipation). In this sense it is quite natural that it

<sup>42</sup> It seems to me to be so used at 12. 11410, to which Garbe refers (*l. c.*) as proof for his theory of the meaning of the word. I am unable to see why Garbe refers also to 12. 11393, 11409 and 11673 for further proof. These verses seem to me to contain no allusion, even punningly, to the "number" idea. In fact it is surprizing how seldom we find this word-play, considering the Hindu propensity for punning. If Garbe were right we should expect to find it constantly recurring.

<sup>43</sup> On *Yoga* in the epic see especially Hopkins, "Yoga-technique in the Great Epic," *JAOS* 22. 333-379 (in addition to his essay in *The Great Epic*).

should have been applied to a system of restraint of the senses and other more or less ascetic practices (later including breath-exercises), conceived as leading either to emancipation or to some supernatural attainment; in popular usage, to any magic power. In the *Gītā*, however (to which we shall for the moment limit our consideration), it ordinarily designates no such system as this, but rather a very different course of procedure, namely the method of salvation characterized by participation in action without interest in the fruits of action. Hence the fuller expression *karma-yoga*, which as we saw from 3. 3 is synonymous with Yoga alone in this connexion. Worldly action is meant; it is particularly exemplified by the duty to fight enjoined upon Arjuna. Fighting is surely far enough from restraint of senses or breath-exercises. Action characterized by indifference is the central principle of the *Gītā*'s Yoga; but the "action" feature is just as important as the "indifference" feature. The word *yoga* definitely implies *activity* as used in the *Gītā*, where it is constantly colored by association (perhaps more or less subconscious) with the other meaning of the word, "energetic performance, exertion." It is thus opposed to the system or "discipline" of the *Sāṅkhya*, namely the *jñāna-yoga* (the use of the same word *yoga* is confusing) or "way" or "discipline" of knowledge, with definite implication in the *Gītā* (and in some other places, see pages 29 ff.) of *sannyāsa*, abandonment of action.

We shall see presently that other parts of the epic understand Yoga as something quite different from this "disciplined (but worldly) activity," and something more suggestive of its later, classical meaning. We shall speak of them presently. In every case, however, Yoga is—like *Sāṅkhya*—not a "system" of belief or of metaphysics. It is always a way, a method, of getting something, usually salvation (tho sometimes, especially in more popular usage, a lower goal is aimed at). And it seems to me that the common denominator of all the epic definitions of Yoga is *disciplined activity, earnest striving*—by *active* (not rationalistic or intellectual) means. It is distinctly not "union."<sup>44</sup> In English we may describe the *goal* of Yoga (or

"That *yoga* does not mean "union" in philosophic language in the *Mbh.* and contemporary texts is a conclusion which I reached inde-

of Sāṅkhyā either) as "union" (with Brahman or God). But it is a striking fact that the word *yoga* and its cognates are *not* ordinarily used of this. Instead, the emancipated soul "goes to" (*adhi-gam*), "attains" (*āp, prāp*), or "sees" (*paś*) Brahman; or if he is said to attain "oneness, sameness" with Brahman, the word used is not *yoga* but e. g. *sāmyatā* (12. 8789 *gacched akṣarasāmyatām*). Cf. Hopkins, *JAOS* 22. 334: "The union-idea of the author of the Mundaka [Upaniṣad] is expressed not by *yoga* but by *sāmya*"; an acute observation, which, it seems to me, applies equally well to the epic. *Yoga* is not the goal but a method of reaching it. As distinguished from Sāṅkhyā, the method of knowledge, it means the active method, the method of exertion. Sāṅkhyā seeks salvation by *knowing* something; Yoga by *doing* something.

Pendently from my study of the texts themselves. Subsequently I was pleased to find that according to excellent authority the word does not mean this even later. Charpentier, *ZDMG* 65. 846 f., says: "Dass das Wort nicht, wie die populäre Auffassung es wollte, 'Verbindung' (der Seele mit Īśvara) bedeutet, ist klar und wird ja in Sarvadarś. S. 129 abgewiesen." So also, according to Charpentier, Tuxen in his book on *Yoga* (Copenhagen, 1911; I regret that I have no access to this highly praised work). Tuxen follows the late commentator Vyāsa in defining *yoga* as equivalent to *samādhi*. Charpentier however suggests that it "eigentlich von der Bedeutung 'Anstrengung' ausgehend, das ganze 'praktische' Treiben bezeichnet und am ehesten etwa mit 'Praxis' zu übersetzen wäre. Denn der praktische Teil ist es doch, der für das System bezeichnend ist—das Theoretische gehört dem Sāṅkhyā." I am glad to find myself in perfect agreement with Charpentier as to the meaning of the word *yoga*. I should also accept his second sentence as far as concerns the classical *Yoga* "system." It would apply approximately to the early *Yoga* of the epic, if we understand by "System" not a system of metaphysical truth, but a method of salvation.—Dahmann (*Sāṅkhyā-Philosophie, passim*) came near the truth in many ways with his theory that epic Sāṅkhyā and *Yoga* are two parts of the same philosophical system, one the theoretical part, the other the practical. But he, like virtually all others, made the fundamental error of interpreting the terms as names for a systematic philosophy. It seems to me that he exaggerates somewhat the unity and systematization of the philosophic speculations in the epic; but I dissent much more emphatically from his view that Sāṅkhyā (or "Sāṅkhyā-Yoga") is a name for the "system" (if we can call it that) of epic Brahmaism, or for any system of metaphysical truth. "Die Sāṅkhyā-Philosophie," as applied to the epic, is itself a misnomer, as I hope to have shown.

*Yoga in the Mokṣadharma section.*

In the Mokṣadharma section of Mbh. 12 we have several descriptions of Yoga, usually contrasted with Sāṅkhya. They agree with each other in all essentials. In most of them knowledge, the *Leitmotif* of the Sāṅkhya passages described above, is conspicuously absent. Once or twice it is mentioned in passing, in rigmarole lists of virtues or general desiderata, evidently without any deeper significance. In addition to 12. 7129-50, 8769-8803, 11373-92, I would call attention especially to 12. 11679-11702, one of the best and clearest statements. It follows a description of Sāṅkhya (11655-73), called "Sāṅkhya-knowledge" and contrasted with "Yoga-power" (11675 f.) or "Yoga-activity" (*yoga-kṛtyam*, 11682; a very significant expression, used, as Hopkins says, *JAOS* 22. 341, "not infrequently" in the epic for Yoga-practice). This Yoga-activity is two-fold (11682): *saguṇa*, "qualified" (provided with the qualities, *gunas*; one might almost translate "material"), and *nirguṇa*, "unqualified, qualityless" (free from the *gunas*, or, as it were, "super-material"; perhaps "exoteric" and "esoteric" would approximately represent the two terms).

11683 *dhāraṇām cāiva manasah prāṇāyāmaś ca pārthiva  
ekāgratā ca manasah prāṇāyāmas tathāivā ca.<sup>45</sup>*

11684 *prāṇāyāmo hi saguṇo nirguṇām dhārayen manah.*

"(The two stages are:) fixation of the mind, and restraint of the vital powers ('breaths'); concentration of the mind, and restraint of the vital powers. For restraint of the vital powers

<sup>45</sup> This verse seems to have always been misunderstood. The commentator, followed by P. C. Roy and Hopkins (*JAOS* 22. 341), understands ab as referring to the *saguṇa* stage, cd to the *nirguṇa* stage, *prāṇāyāma* being common to both. But the following 11684b distinctly indicates that *dhāraṇām manasah* is *nirguṇa*, not *saguṇa*; and 11684a even more distinctly states that *prāṇāyāma* is *saguṇa* alone, not *nirguṇa*. This is confirmed by 11375 (page 41). Deussen refers the whole of 11683 to the *saguṇa* stage, which is shown to be impossible by 11375 (*ekāgratā manasah* there is *nirguna*) as well as by 11684b. Since 11684b *nirguṇām dhārayen manah* obviously refers to the stage just described as *dhāraṇām manasah*, this latter can only be the *nirguṇa* stage; and it is therefore a synonym of *ekāgratā manasah*, which is also *nirguna* according to 11375. It seems to me evident that 11683ab is repeated, in partly identical, partly varying, language, in 11683cd.

is qualified ('material, exoteric,' the lower stage). One should fix (concentrate) the mind, (making it) free from qualities." Compare with this 12. 11375, where we also find "the supreme power" of the Yogas (described as *dhyāna*, meditation) consisting of two stages, *prāṇāyāma* and *ekāgratā manasah*, of which the former is *saguna*, the latter *nirguna*. The *prāṇas* are not what we mean by "breath" but, in accordance with standard Upaniṣadic usage, the "vital powers" or functions of the human organism; specifically and particularly the senses.<sup>46</sup> The first or lower stage in the "disciplined activity" of Yoga, according to this definition, is control or restraint of the senses, bringing them to rest "in the mind (*manas*)," cf. 11689, 11377, 11381. But this stage is still "be-qualified," *saguna*;<sup>47</sup> in order to attain the higher, *nirguna*, "qualityless" stage one must now concentrate the mind (*dhārayen manah*, 11684; cf. *ekāgram dhārayen manah*, 7133; the noun is *dhāraṇām manasah*, 11683, or *ekāgratā manasah*, 11683, 11375), namely, in the *ahamkāra* (11689); then the *ahamkāra* must be fixed in the *buddhi*, and that in the primal Material Nature, *prakṛti* (11690). Or, more briefly, the process may be described simply as sinking the *manas* in the *buddhi* (11381) or in the self, *ātman* (8784), without mention of the *ahamkāra* or the primal *prakṛti* (yet the latter seems to be understood in 11381, for just below, in 11384, the adept is "returned into *prakṛti*," *prakṛtim āpannam*). In any case, when the final stage is reached, all the faculties have come to rest, and one sits like a stick of wood (7133, 11382) or a stone (11694) or a lamp burning in a wind-

<sup>46</sup> Nothing is said in any of these passages on Yoga about literal "restraint of breath," as practised by later yogins. On the contrary, the explanation of *prāṇāyāma* (as the first or *saguna* stage of Yoga [11683 f., 11375]) is clearly given in 11687 ff. and 11377 ff. respectively: viz., subduing of the *senses*. Of course, according to early Hindu theory, the vital functions or powers are "carried" by the "breaths" in the body; that is why the name *prāṇa* was given to the vital powers, as it constantly is in the very earliest Upaniṣads.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. 7139, in another description of Yoga; after the external senses have been brought to a complete rest, so that one no longer hears, feels, sees, tastes, or smells (7134 f.), which is the "first stage of meditation," then the "sixth" (inner) sense, i. e. the *manas*, "still stirs." Therefore, one must now proceed to reduce it also, the *manas*, to complete cessation (7142).

less place (11693, 11385). Then he does absolutely nothing but meditate (*dhyā*) on the "eternal Lord and the imperishable Brahman" (11691) and finally succeeds in beholding (*anu-pas*) Him (11386), in reaching equality (*sāmyatā*) with Him (8789). This is, of course, salvation.

The details of this scheme vary, to be sure. I have called attention in passing to some of the variants; it is hardly possible here to go into the matter further. For my present purpose the variations are unimportant.<sup>48</sup> They are just what we should expect in this period, when there are as yet no cut-and-dried systems, only somewhat vague tendencies. But the central idea of the method of salvation known here as Yoga comes out, after all, quite clearly and definitely. It consists in a course of what we may call, for short, self-hypnosis: a gradual numbing of the senses, beginning with the external ones and then passing to the internal organs, and culminating in a state of trance, in which the adept attains an immediate vision of the One,<sup>49</sup> and feels himself united with Him.

Superficially it might seem that the self-hypnotizing (if I may use that conveniently brief term) Yогin resembles a quietistic follower of Sāṅkhya (see pages 29 ff. above). But their methods are really absolutely different in principle. The Sāṅkhya quietist is simply doing nothing, because he thinks any form of activity is evil. (Cf. page 3, note 6.) He hopes for salvation thru knowledge alone, which to him implies cessation of all action. The Yогin of the Mokṣadharma sections has little interest in mere knowledge as such. He is intent on a very definite, quasi-mechanistic course of "disciplined *action*, effort," which is to bring him to salvation directly. His "action," to be sure, is not normal, worldly action. It involves control and gradual repression of the bodily powers. But this

<sup>48</sup> I pass over also some details which are presented with a reasonable approach to uniformity, but which do not seem important for my present theme, such as the five "hindrances to Yoga" (treated by Hopkins, JAOS 22. 339). On the "powers" (*āīsvarya*) see below, pages 45 f.

<sup>49</sup> This, I believe, is precisely what *pratyakṣahetavo* means in 12. 11043 (see above, page 9). The Yogas are there said to rely on "immediate perception" (of the Supreme), the Sāṅkhyas on "teaching," knowledge (*sāstra*).

is itself conceived as an active process; it is not a mere passive abstention from action. Without ever having tried it, one may venture the guess that it would indeed be a quite "strenuous" undertaking, involving a good deal of zealous application and "disciplined activity"!

*Two different interpretations of Yoga method.*

Now, a critic will say, all this is far enough from the disciplined and unselfish, *but normal*, activity (exemplified by fighting) which we found to be the usual definition of Yoga in the *Gītā*. Yes: but nevertheless it is a way of seeking salvation by a process of activity, by doing something, by "Praxis" (as Charpentier puts it, see note 44, page 39), by practice, by exertion. It fits the definition "disciplined activity" perfectly well. And that is clearly the way in which the term *Yoga* is understood in this connexion, as indicated by the word (*yoga-*) *krtya* (or, elsewhere, as in the *Gītā*, *karma*; cf. below, page 44), "Yoga-action," as distinguished from "Sāṅkhya-knowledge." Instead of seeking salvation by merely attaining knowledge of the supreme truth, which is expected to bring salvation immediately (as Sāṅkhya teaches), the followers of *Yoga* seek salvation by a regular, disciplined, zealous course of *action*. *Yoga* is not concerned with any metaphysical theorizing. It leaves that to Sāṅkhya, to which theorizing is necessarily important (page 21). *Yoga* does not deny the "truth" asserted by Sāṅkhya; we are even told at times that it accepts it. But its method of salvation lies not thru mere cognition of that truth, but thru a course of active discipline.

The subsumption under the name *Yoga* of these two different programs of "disciplined activity" is signalized by the fact that even in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, which ordinarily understands by *Yoga* the disinterested performance of worldly acts, the other interpretation is not unknown. And the *Gītā* shows no sign that it is conscious of any inconsistency between the two programs.<sup>50</sup> In its sixth chapter it gives us a description of the

<sup>50</sup> That is, at this point. In another passage, 13. 24 (quoted by me page 18), the *Gītā* seems to make a clear distinction between *dhyāna* (which, apparently, can only mean "self-hypnotism," cf. *Mbh.* 12. 11374, page 41 above) and Sāṅkhya and "*karma-yoga*" as methods of salvation.

Yogin which, while much less technical than those quoted above from the Mokṣadharma, decidedly suggests their methods of *dhyāna*, *prāṇāyāma*, and *dhāraṇā manasah*.<sup>51</sup>

On the other hand, the Mokṣadharma section, tho it knows also the Gītā's method of salvation by disinterested but worldly activity, does not seem to apply the name Yoga to it. Quite the contrary: in one passage at least it definitely distinguishes this method from both Yoga and Sāṅkhya. I refer to the conversation between King Janaka and Sulabhā, 12. 11871 ff. Janaka says he has studied under Pañcaśikha, who (tho called specifically a Sāṅkhya teacher in 11878) knows and has taught to Janaka three ways of salvation, viz., "Sāṅkhya-knowledge" (*sāṅkhya-jñāna*), Yoga, and the "Royal Method, method for kings" (*mahipālavidhi*; 11876). These are explained in 11889 ff. "For a threefold foundation (*trividhā niṣṭhā*, cf. Bh. G. 3. 3) in regard to salvation (*mokṣe*) has been recognized by various supreme knowers of salvation. Transcendental knowledge and complete abandonment of actions (*jñānam lokottaram yac ca sarvatyāgaś ca karmaṇām*) is expounded by some knowers of the science of salvation as the knowledge-basis (knowledge-method, i. e. of salvation, *jñānanīṣṭhā*; this, of course, is the Sāṅkhya method). Likewise other sages of subtle insight proclaim the action-basis (action-method, *karmaṇīṣṭhā*; the Yoga method). Abandoning both of these alike, knowledge and mere action, this third basis (of salvation) has been expounded by that noble teacher (*prahāyobhayam apy evain jñānam karma ca*

<sup>51</sup> See Bh. G. 6. 10-26. Note especially 11-12: *śucāu deśe* (cf. 12. 8792, 8795) *pratiṣṭhāpya sthiram āsanam ātmanah . . . tatrākāgrām manah kṛtvā* (cf. *ekāgratā manasah*, pp. 40 f.) *yatacittendriyakriyāḥ, upaviṣy-āsane yuñjyād yogam ātmavिशुद्धये*.—In 19 occurs the comparison of the Yogin to a lamp burning in a windless place, as above, p. 41. Again, 24: *manasāvendriyagrāmaṁ viniyamya samantataḥ*, (25) *śanāih-śanāir uparamed buddhyā dhṛtigrīhitayā, ātmasaṁsthān manah kṛtvā na kiñcid api cintayet*. The last phrase would hardly be used in the Mokṣadharma sections at all; instead of "thinking on nothing at all" he should "think on the Supreme Soul." The Gītā's expression is semi-popular (one is tempted to call it, in slang, a "give-away"; at least one fears that the activities of some of the "adepts" who were ostensibly thinking on the Supreme Soul may have been more accurately, if less courteously, characterized by the Gītā's expression). Rigid, logical consistency is, however, not to be expected here.

*kevalam, tr̄tiye 'yam samākhyātā niṣṭhā tena mahātmanā,* 11891)." The "third method," opposed to both Sāṅkhya (method of knowledge with abandonment of all action) and Yoga (method of disciplined activity, here clearly, as always in the Mokṣadharma, in the sense of "self-hypnosis," *prāṇāyāma* and *dhāraṇā manasah*), is of course the *mahiपālavidhi*, "method of (for) kings," referred to in 11876. In the following verses Janaka, who prefers it to the others, explains it at length. It agrees perfectly with the Gītā's usual definition of Yoga, viz., remaining in the world (specifically in the life of a prince, just as in Arjuna's case), and performing all acts required by the traditional duties of the station to which one is born, but with indifference to results. The same arguments are used that are found in the Gītā.—In the sequel Janaka's arguments for this method are refuted by Sulabhā, who declares that it is impossible for a king to be saved while keeping his kingdom. She demands renunciation in *deeds* as well as in thoughts. This makes me rather inclined to suspect that the passage is a definite polemic against the Bhagavad Gītā—as it certainly is a polemic against one of its cardinal doctrines. Our passage (which in 11889 has what looks suspiciously like an echo of Bh. G. 3. 3) says point-blank: the claim that the Yoga method may be interpreted as disinterested activity while remaining in worldly life, is false. This is not true Yoga, but a different method, and an unsound one; those who hope for salvation thru it are deluded.

There is, in any case, no doubt of the fact that the Gītā's interpretation of Yoga (tho etymologically it fits the word admirably) was not the usual one, either in epic times or later. It is obvious that the later, classical system of the Yoga-sūtras is based upon the method of salvation described in the Mokṣadharma sections. And the use of the words *yoga* and *yogin* in popular language in the epic itself (see Hopkins's study in *JAOS* 22, *passim*), referring to the possession of various supernatural or magic powers, shows that this interpretation was commoner in early times as well. For the supernatural powers (*aiśvarya*) connected with Yoga are, of course, only to be associated with self-hypnotism, trances, and the like; not with the life of a prince or warrior, even tho he be a dutiful and unselfish one. Even in the Mokṣadharma section (12. 11062) we are told

that "the Yoga (masculine, = *yogin*), attaining power (*bala*, cf. 12. 11676, "there is no knowledge like Sāṅkhyā, no power like Yoga"), may assume many thousands of selves (*ātmans*, i. e., may make himself thousandfold) and roam about the earth in all these guises"; in the following verses it is said that in one form he can enjoy the objects of sense, while simultaneously in another form he can perform the severest penance, etc. However, the author of this same passage regards such powers as comparatively trivial. In 11065, after disposing of these "powers," he says he will now explain the subtle (*sūkṣma*), i. e. superior, powers of the Yогин. This he does in 11066 ff.; they consist simply in the power of attaining salvation, or the highest goal. In fact, other passages definitely deprecate any interest in the supernatural powers. Cf. 12. 8685 f.: "Understand (now, after the Sāṅkhyā method has been described) how and by what means men reach salvation thru Yoga. He who, having *transcended* the supernatural powers of Yoga, ceases (from worldly or sensory activities), is released (*yogāśvaryam atikrānto yo niśkrāmati mucyate*)."<sup>1</sup> And, more clearly, 12. 7180: "The reciter who takes delight in undertakings to gain supernatural powers (*athāśvaryapravṛtteṣu jāpakas tatra rajyate*), that very thing means hell for him. By that means he does not gain emancipation (*sa eva nirayas tasya nāśāu tasmāt pramucyate*)."<sup>2</sup> The supernatural powers are at best trivial and incidental acquisitions on the way to the supreme goal. But naturally in the popular consciousness they loomed large, and were responsible for many a degradation of the Yoga method, not only in later times, but even in the time of the epic.

I cannot here take up more at length the question of certain other "methods of salvation" which are mentioned in the epic, such as ritualism, asceticism (*tapas*), and devotion to God (*bhakti*). They are sometimes clearly distinguished from both the Sāṅkhyā and the Yoga methods, sometimes more or less blended with one of them (usually Yoga, since the definition of Yoga is, as we have seen, elastic enough to include any program that can be regarded as a course of *action*). Compare Bhagavad Gītā 6. 46 f. and 13. 24 f. (pages 5 and 18 above).

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## II.—PHILOLOGICAL STUDIES.<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Ambrosian Mangers.

In the Iliad (8, 434) we read that Hera's steeds were tied by the Horae to ambrosian mangers, *i. e.* mangers full of sweet herbs (not fragrant hay; *cf.* DB 2, 312; Xen. *Anab.* 1, 5, 10; 4, 5, 33; Ov. *Met.* 6, 457).<sup>2</sup> Green forage is the natural food of horses. Ambrosia, which denoted originally the fragrant steam arising from the fat of the sacrifices (*Il.* 1, 317; 8, 549; 2, 423; *cf.* AJP 43, 246) and was afterwards used for *scented unguent*, perfume, denotes also *sweet herb* (Plin. 27, 28) just as Gr. *ároma* is used in this sense (Xen. *Anab.* 1, 5, 1). The scent of new-mown hay is due to coumarin; it is found *e. g.* in vernal grass, *anthoxanthum odoratum*, especially at flowering time, also in woodruff, *asperula odorata*, which is used to flavor the German may-drink. This punch is mentioned as early as 854 by a Benedictine monk of the monastery of Prüm in the district of Treves, where Charlemagne's grandson, Lothair I, died in 855. His remains were found there in 1860. *Lorraine < Lotharingia < Lotharii regnum* represents the inheritance of Lothair I's second son, Lothair II.

When Iris had taken Aphrodite, who had been wounded by Diomedes, to the Olympus, in Ares' chariot, she unharnessed the horses and cast before them ambrosian food (*Il.* 5, 369; *cf.* 13, 35) *i. e.* sweet-scented grasses. If it had been the food of the gods, imparting immortality, the poet would not have used the verb which is employed in the NT passages *Cast not your pearls before swine* and *It is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it to dogs* (Matt. 7, 6; 15, 26).

When Hera came to the former confluence of the Simois and Scamander near Troy (*cf.* Bædeker, *Konstantinopel und das westliche Kleinasiens*, p. 176) the steeds of her chariot ate the

<sup>1</sup> The following nine brief communications are abstracts of papers presented at the monthly meetings of the Johns Hopkins University Philological Association during the academic session 1922/3; Nos. 3 and 4 were presented on Dec. 21, and the others on Oct. 19, Nov. 16, Jan. 18, Feb. 15, Mar. 15, Ap. 19, May 17, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> For the abbreviations see vol. 43 of this JOURNAL, p. 238, note 2.

ambrosia which the Simois had caused to sprout for them (*Il.* 5, 777).<sup>3</sup> This means simply that the horses grazed (note *νέμεοθαι*) on the fragrant meadows watered by the Simois.<sup>4</sup> Sweet-smelling forage-plants are still plentiful about the streams of the Trojan plain (EB<sup>11</sup> 27, 315<sup>a</sup>).

When the Scamander bids the Simois join him in overwhelming Achilles with his flood, Hephaestus checked the two streams with his fire, so that the sweet-smelling marsh-plants were burning (*Il.* 21, 307) : *λωτός* (cf. *Il.* 2, 776; *Od.* 4, 603) is melilot, *i. e.* sweet clover; *melilotus alba* is called in German: *weisser Pferdeklee* or *Steinklee*; it contains coumarin and is very aromatic, especially when dry. *Θρύον* in the present passage does not denote the true bulrush (*scirpus lacustris*) but reed-grass, *i. e.* reed canary-grass, *phalaris arundinacea* (Plin. 27, 126). *Κύπευρον* is cypress-grass or galangal (*cyperus longus*). *Cyperus* and *carex* represent the largest genera of the grass-like herbs known as *cyperaceae*. The Egyptian papyrus is a species of *cyperus*. In Oregon a variety of *carex acuta* yields an excellent quality of hay. The tubers of *cyperus rotundus*, known as nut-grass, contain an oil which is much used in Upper India as a perfume.

All these plants are ambrosian, *i. e.* fragrant, so *ἀμβρόσιαι κάπαι* means *mangers full of fragrant forage*. Pindar's *φάτναι Ζηνὸς ἀρχαῖαι* (*O* 13, 92) throws no light on this question.

## 2. Wine and Blood.

The food of the gods was the fragrant steam arising from the sacrifices, and their drink consisted of the fumes of libations. *Il.* 5, 341 says *οὐ γὰρ σίτον ἔδονο', οὐ πίνονο' αἴθοπα οἶνον*

<sup>3</sup> The interpreters of this passage seem to have forgotten that we often have pluperfect aorists.

<sup>4</sup> K. Wernicke, of Halle, says in Pauly's RE 1, 1809<sup>t</sup> (1894) with reference to *Il.* 5, 368. 775; 13, 34; Ov. *Met.* 2, 119: *wenn ihre (der Götter) Rosse grasen, so lässt die Erde ihnen Unsterblichkeit als Weide aufspriessen*. The Ovidian *ambrosiae sucus* denotes *ἄρωμα χυλῶδες*, and *praesepia alta* are *faliscae clatratae*. According to Crönert's Passow, *ambrosia* denotes *duftendes Schönheitsmittel, Futter der Götterrosse, Götterspeise*; contrast the paper on *Manna, Nectar, and Ambrosia* in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 61, No. 3 (1922) pp. 229-236.

(cf. Ps. 50, 13; Judg. 13, 16; 6, 21; 1 K 18, 38; Lev. 9, 24; 2 Chr. 7, 1; 2 Macc. 1, 20-22. 31. 32. 36). The sacrificial fumes were supposed to impart youth and cheer. *Hebe* means *youth*, and *Ganymede* is connected with γάνυσθαι, to rejoice (cf. Judg. 9, 13; Ps. 104, 15; Eccl. 10, 19) while the second part of the name has been combined with μέθυ, our *mead*. Γάνυς denotes *refreshment*, drink; we find γάνυς ἀμπέλου, γάνυς βότρυος, γάνυς Διονύσου. Ganymede was afterwards identified with the eleventh sign of the zodiac, Aquarius, the water-bearer: he symbolizes, it may be supposed, the evaporation of water and other liquids. The ascension of Ganymede (who was supposed to have been carried off by Zeus in the form of an eagle; cf. KAT<sup>3</sup> 564) may represent the rising of the evaporated vapors to considerable heights above the surface of the earth.

Evaporation, which finally descends in rain, is alluded to in Job 36, 27 (c. 100 B.C.) which should be rendered as follows:

- 27 He sucks up the drops from the sea,  
they are stored for the flood of His rain,
- 28 Which the clouds cause to flow down  
and shower on many a man.

יְגַרְעַנְתִּים מִם יוֹקֵן לְאַד מַטָּרוֹ 27

אֲשֶׁר יְלַלוּ שָׁהִקִּים יְרַעְפֵו עַל אַדְמִרְכָּה 28

For the suffix in *mētarō*, His rain, cf. Matt. 5, 45; *izzaqâ*, lit. *they are bottled* < *zîqqâ*, skin-bottle (cf. JAOS 43, 120<sup>4</sup>).

The ancients did not clearly distinguish between vapor, steam, and smoke. In Latin, *vapor* denotes especially a *warm exhalation*; Latin poets use *vapor* for *fire*. We designate also fog and mist as vapors. We speak of a *fog burning off*, and we say not only *the kettle boils*, but also *the whirlpool boils* (AJSL 23, 241).

Ganymede supplanted Hebe in popular mythology when it was customary to have male attendants instead of female cup-bearers. *Il.* 1, 598 Hephaestus serves the gods with fragrant nectar, dipping it from a bowl: οὐοχόει γλυκὺν νέκταρ ἀπὸ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων. We apply the term *crater* now to the bowl-shaped outlet of a volcanic vent from which the vapors &c. ascend. Volcanoes do not emit true smoke. *Nectar* is the Semitic *nik̄tar*, vaporized (AJP 43, 245). The name Hephaestus may be con-

nected with *ἀπτεῖν*, to ignite (*ἀφθεῖς* means *set on fire* in Herod. 1, 19) and *ἀἴσσεῖν*, to whirl up. *Od.* 10, 99 we have *καπνὸς ἀπὸ χθονὸς ἀΐσσων*. Hephaestus was the god of volcanoes: the Etna was his smithy, the Cyclopes were his journeymen. As cup-bearer of the gods he symbolizes the ascending fumes of libations.

The fragrant steam of the fat pieces of the sacrifices was afterwards replaced by incense (*cf.* EB 4196, n. 2) while libations of wine represent a later substitute for the pouring out of the blood of the victims (*cf.* 1 Cor. 11, 23; EB 4209. 4213. 4203. 4218). In the ancient Jewish ritual, blood and fat were appropriated to JHVH (DB 4 322<sup>a</sup>, b). Fletcher (1609) uses *fume* for *incense*. Fr. *fumeux* may mean, not only *smoky*, but also *intoxicating* or *intoxicated*. Fr. *fumées du vin* denotes *alcoholic stupor* (JBL 36, 77) while *le fumet du vin* is used of the fragrance of wine, which we generally call *bouquet*.

Newly drawn blood exhales an odorous vapor (*halitus sanguinis*) which is visible on a cold day. Therefore blood is said to smoke. In the third stanza of Schiller's poem *Brutus und Cäsar* (1780) Brutus says: *Auf Philippi's eisernem Altare | raucht der Freiheit letztes Opferblut*, and in l. 81 of *Die Künstler* (1789) we find: *Da rauchte kein unschuldig Blut*. According to Grimm's *Wörterbuch*, this use of *rauchen* may be borrowed from the French; it is not found before the 18<sup>th</sup> cent. Racine says not only *faire fumer les autels*, but also *Jamais de plus de sang les autels n'ont fumé*. In the third part of Shakespeare's *Henry VI* (2, 3, 21) Richard says to Warwick:

So underneath the belly of their steeds,  
That stained their fetlocks in his smoking blood,  
The noble gentleman gave up the ghost;

and in *Richard III* Lady Anne says to Gloster, at the hearse of Henry VI (1, 2, 103):

In thy foul throat thou liest! Queen Margaret saw  
Thy murderous falchion smoking in his blood.

### 3. Shady Broom-plants.

The reading *broom-groves* (whose shadow the dismissed bachelor loves) in Shakespeare's *Tempest* (4, 1, 75) is correct (*cf.* MLN 38, 79). The notes on the illustrated German translation, edited by Gosche and Tschischwitz (Ber-

lin, 1874) p. xxxvi state that *broom-groves* means *Ginsterhaine*. When Elijah fled from the wrath of Jezabel to Beer-sheba in the extreme south of Judah, on the border of the cultivated land, 28 m SW of Hebron, he sat down under a desert-broom. The correct rendering *broom* is given in the margin of RV, not only in 1 K 19, 4, but also in Ps. 120, 4.

The broom-plant (Arab. *rátam*) is the largest and most conspicuous shrub in the deserts S of Palestine. It is said to be 7-10 feet high. The Father of Biblical Geography, Edward Robinson, stated (1841) in his *Biblical Researches* (1, 203) that his Arabs always selected the place of encampment, if possible, in the spot where the broom grew, in order to be sheltered by it at night from the wind; and during the day, when they often went in advance of the camels, he found them not unfrequently sitting or sleeping under a bush of *rátam* to protect them from the sun (EB 2647). This broom-plant, which grows in all the deserts of the Holy Land, the Sinaitic Peninsula, and Egypt, is often the only refuge from the blazing sun of the desert (DB 2, 825<sup>b</sup>).

Similarly the dwarf-pine (*Pinus pumilio* or *montana*) is a favorite shelter for the chamois, although it is only a few feet high. This recumbent bush, which abounds on the higher slopes of the Bavarian and Tyrolese Alps, is called there *Latschen*, while in the Giant Mountains, on the boundary of Silesia and Czechoslovakia, where it is found at an altitude of c. 4000 feet, it is known as *Knieholz* (EB<sup>11</sup> 21, 623; 23, 325<sup>a</sup>).

Plantagenet was a nickname of the ancestor of the Angevine line of English kings, Count Geoffrey of Anjou, who used to wear in his cap a sprig of the broom-plant (*planta genista*, Fr. *plante genêt*). He did not wear it as a plume on his helmet. In early summer the bright yellow flowers of the broom-plant are said to make the open country of Anjou and Maine (S of Normandy, E of Brittany) *a blaze of living gold* (EB<sup>11</sup> 21, 725b<sup>c</sup>). The blossoms of some of the varieties of the Palestinian broom are not yellow, but purplish white.

#### 4. The Egyptian Prototype of Ps. 104.

One of the most famous passages in the Bible is the pentastich in Ps. 104, 19-23, describing how by nightfall all the beasts of

the forest creep forth, the young lions roaring after their prey and seeking their meat from God, but at sunrise they retreat and lay them down in their dens, while man goes forth to his work and to his labor until evening. This psalm may have been composed c. B. C. 100, but we have an ancient Egyptian prototype, the great hymn to the Sun, which originated c. B. C. 1370. It has often been translated, e. g. in Breasted's *Ancient Documents*, and a rendering, by Griffith, is given in *The World's Best Literature*; cf. Gressmann, *Altorientalische Texte und Bilder* (Tübingen, 1909) vol. 1, p. 189; Gunkel, *Ausgewählte Psalmen*, fourth edition (Göttingen, 1917) pp. 155. 241; Kittel, *Die Psalmen* (Leipsic, 1922) pp. 452-454; G. Roeder, *Urkunden zur Religion des alten Ägypten* (Jena, 1915) p. 63; A. Scharff, *Ägyptische Sonnenlieder* (Berlin, 1922) p. 62; A Erman, *Die Literatur der Ägypter* (Leipsic, 1923) p. 358; H. Schäfer, *Religion und Kunst von El-Amarna* (Berlin, 1923) p. 56 (K. Sethe). I am indebted for some of these references to Dr. Ember who has also made some valuable suggestions with regard to the translation of the Egyptian text.

The lines of this ancient Egyptian hymn illustrating Ps. 104, 19-23 may be rendered as follows:

If thou goest down in the western heavens,  
    the land becomes dark like death,  
They sleep in their chambers with veiled heads,  
    no eye beholds the other. . .  
Every lion leaves his lair,  
    all reptiles begin to bite...  
At dawn thou risest again  
    and shinest as sun by day . . .  
They awake and stand on their feet  
    after thou hast made them rise.  
They wash, and put on their garments,  
    lift their arms in praise at thy shine.  
The whole land performs its labor,  
    all cattle rejoice on the pasture;  
The trees and herbage are verdant,  
    the birds fly forth from their nests  
        and raise their wings to praise thee.

The Hebrew text of Ps. 104, 19-23 should be restored as follows:

שְׁמֵשׁ וַיָּעֶף מִכּוֹאָו:	19	עֲשָׂתָה יְרֵחַ לְמוֹעֵרִים
בּוֹרְחָרְמֵשׁ כְּלִדְיוֹתָה יְעָרָה:	20	תַּשְׁתִּיחַשֵּׁךְ וַיְהִי לִילָה
לְבָקֵשׁ מָאֵל אַכְלָם:	21	הַכְּפִירִים שָׁאֲגָנִים לְטֻרָף
וּלְמַעֲנוֹנָחָם יְרִכְזָוָן:	22	פּוֹרָחַ הַשְׁמֵשׁ וַיַּאֲסִפוּ
וּלְעַבְרָתוֹ עַדְיָעָרָבָה:	23	וַיֵּצֵא אָרָם לְפָעָלוֹ

This pentastich may be rendered as follows:

- 19 Thou madest the moon for set times,  
didst assign to the sun his setting.
- 20 If Thou makest darkness, night falls  
when all beasts of the wilderness prowl;
- 21 The lions roar for their prey,  
claiming their food from God.
- 22 When Thou makest the sun rise, they retreat  
and stretch themselves out in their lairs,
- 23 While man goes forth to his work.  
and to his labor till even.

These lines are paraphrased in Théophile's poem *Le Matin* (1620): see *Modern Philology*, vol. 21 (Chicago, 1923) p. 2. There is a special commentary on this psalm by Theo. Fritz: *Comment. in Ps. civ* (Argent. 1821).

##### 5. Blood and Water.

The Johannine account of the crucifixion (which may have been composed in Asia Minor c. 135 B.C.) states that one of the soldiers with a spear pierced His side, and forthwith came out blood and water. This is physiologically impossible. The hypothesis (EB 961) that the point of the lance touched perhaps a discolored wheal, bleb, or exudation, such as scourging might have left, is unsatisfactory. John 19, 35 implies the preternatural character of the combination of blood and water. Both vv. 34 and 35 represent a subsequent insertion which may be later than 1 John 5, 6. The sequel of v. 33 is v. 36 (cf. JAOS 43, 125). Also v. 37 is secondary (cf. IJG<sup>5</sup> 276, n. 1; Est. 22, ad 14; JBL 32, 121, u): *they shall look upon him whom they pierced* (cf. Rev. 1, 7) is a quotation from Zech. 12, 10 where we must read *uě'-ălū 'al-'ăšēr duqqārū*, they will lament (cf. the gloss in v. 10<sup>b</sup>) over those who were stabbed

(contrast Nowack<sup>3</sup> and Sellin *ad loc.*) which refers to the assassination (Feb. 135 B. C.) of the Maccabee Simon and two of his sons at a banquet given by his treacherous son-in-law, the governor of Jericho (1 Mac. 16, 16). Nor can Ps. 22, 17 be combined with the crucifixion (BL 121, †). The quotation in John 19, 36 refers to the paschal lamb; according to Ex. 12, 9. 46; Num. 9, 12, the bones of it were not to be broken, *i. e.* it was to be roasted whole, like a barbecued ox, not legs, shoulders, &c. (*cf.* also Ps. 34, 21). Jesus was regarded as the paschal lamb.

*Hibbîtû* before *ēlāi* in Zech. 12, 10 is a gloss; it may be a corruption of *hēlîlû* or *hit'abbēlû*. For *ēlāi* we must read *ālû*; we find *ēlî* for *ālû*, they lamented, in Joel 1, 8 (AJP 43, 241). *Et* before *ăšér* in Zech. 12, 10 is miswritten for *ēl* = 'al (contrast *ēl-hoq* for *ēt-hoq* in Ps. 2, 7). *\*Ervξev* in John 19, 34 does not necessarily mean *pierced* (see, however, John 20, 17): *vúrtev* is used also of a person nudging someone with the elbow (*Od.* 14, 485).<sup>5</sup> Contrast J. Preuss, *Biblisch-talmudische Medizin* (Berlin, 1921) p. 241.

The soldier touched the body of Jesus with his spear in order to ascertain whether or not He was really dead. Troopers sometimes lance prostrate bodies of the enemy in order to make sure that they will not rise and attack them in the rear. If a man is alive he must have extraordinary will-power not to stir under such a test.

The object of the addition that blood and water came out of the side touched by the spear is to emphasize the divine nature of Jesus. In the Fourth Gospel Jesus is not a human being, but a deity; *cf.* W. Bousset und W. Heitmüller, *Die Schriften des NT*, third edition vol. 4 (Göttingen, 1918) p. 28, l. 3. When Diomedes' spear pierced the hand of Aphrodite, who had come to save her son Æneas, the blood that ran from her wound was not red blood, but *ichor*, which is used by Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle for lymph, *i. e.* blood without red corpuscles and diluted with water. According to *Il.* 5, 341 (*cf.* above, p. 48<sup>4</sup>) the gods eat no bread, nor do they drink

<sup>3</sup>Also Arab. *šákaza* means both to pierce (syn. *ṭá'ana*) with a lance and to poke with the finger, syn. *náxasahu* (*cf.* *náxaza* and *uáxaza*) *bi-l-icba'i*.

wine; therefore they are bloodless and are called immortal (*ἀναιμούεις εἰσι καὶ ἀθάνατοι καλέονται*). They were, however, not anemic, but hydremic: their blood was watery. In German, *Blutwasser* is used for *ἰχώρ*. The question whether *Il.* 5, 341/2 is a post-Homeric addition has no bearing on the present problem.<sup>2</sup>

#### 6. Eng. *to go phut* and Ger. *futsch*, Fr. *f . . t.*

AJP 43, 242 showed that the German prototype of our *to go flooie* or *blooey* (e. g. *it's all flooie or my luck went blooey at the wrong moment*) is not derived from the Yiddish *pleite gehn*, which has a different meaning, but corresponds to the Shakespearean *to go whistle*. The exact equivalent of Ger. *flöten gehn* is the old proverbial phrase *to go blow one's flute*. In *Vox Populi Vox Dei* (c. 1547) which is printed in W. C. Hazlitt's *Popular Poetry* (3, 284) we find:

When thei have any sute,  
They maye goo blowe their flute;  
This goithe the common brute.

*Sute* is the modern *suit*, pursuit, and *brute* the modern *bruit*, Fr. *bruit*, rumor, report; *this* = *thus*, and *goithe* = *goeth*. The Shakespearean *to go whistle* is synonymous with the Chaucerian *to blow the buck's horn*. In the *Miller's Tale* (c. 1386) we read *Absolom may blowe the bukkes horn*. Skeat in his notes on the *Canterbury Tales* (l. 1838) thinks this means *to console oneself with any frivolous employment*. According to OD, *to blow the buck's horn* signifies *to have his labor for his pains*, whereas CD explains it to mean *to lose one's troubles*, to go whistle. Skeat quotes Thomas Wright's remark, *I presume, this (phrase to blow the buck's horn) was a service that generally was unrewarded*.

*To go whistle* means orig. *to pass swiftly through the air like a whistling bullet*. Our echoic words for this sound are *whiz* or *zip* or *phit*. Gunpowder and cannons were manufactured in England as early as 1344, and an illustration of a gun is found in the Oxford MS *De officiis regum* of 1325 (EB<sup>11</sup> 12, 723<sup>b</sup>). The German words imitating the sound produced by the detonation of fire-arms are *piff*, *paff*, *puff* (cf. Fr. *paf*, *pouf*) and the denominative verb *verpuffen* is used in Goethe's *Faust*

(2862) in the sense of *to make go whistle* or *to fling away*. We use *to pop off* for *to disappear* or *depart suddenly*, also for *to die*. *Paffen* means in German: *to smoke*, just as we say *he puffed his pipe*. In French we have *bouffarde*, short tobacco-pipe, and *bouffard*, smoker, also *bouffée de tabac*, smoke. For *piff* and *paff* or *piffle* we may use also *buff*, e. g. *that is all buff*. An old phrase for *to say nothing* is *to say neither baff nor buff*. To *baff* is to *bark*; in Austria, *bäffen* has the same meaning. Our *to be baffled* corresponds originally to the Ger. *baff* or *paff sein*, i. e. *surprised at the sudden discharge of a gun*; cf. Ger. *wie angedonner*, *thunderstruck*.

OD quotes the phrases *The air was full of the phit-phit-phit of the bullets* (1898) and *The pert crack of the Lee-Metford, the 'phit' of whose bullet is lost in the whirr of a lead-coated stone from the Matabele arsenal* (1896). Instead of *phit* we find also *phut*, e. g. *Thudd! went the first gun, and phutt! came faintly back, as its shell burst in the zariba*, i. e. a Sudanese fenced camp (JAOS 37, 254). *To go phut* means *to go to the deuce*, to be lost. In a story, published in SEP, Jan. 6, 1923, p. 66<sup>a</sup>) the squire, who has lost his fortune by backing the wrong horses, says to his old butler: *I had made some little provision for you in my will, but I'm afraid that's gone phut—hey*. This explains the use of the Fr. *foutu* which is generally not pronounced in polite society and indicated in print by *f*.... In German, *futsch*, which Kluge combines with this objectionable French word, is used in the same way. The French word is, as a rule, derived from the verb corresponding to Lat. *futuere* which is used of sexual intercourse and which is identical with Gr. *φυρέω*, to plant, beget; *φυρόν* denotes *scion*, offspring, child. In Oriental literature the wife of a man is often called his *field* (JHUC 296, 30; JAOS 36, 419). I believe, however, that this ineffable Fr. *f*.... in phrases like *votre entreprise est f*.... or *cet homme est f*.... is an adaptation of the echoic *phut* imitating the sound of a whistling bullet. Cf. Sanders' *Wörterbuch* s. *ft*, *wutsch*, *witsch*.

*Flooie* or *blooey* is used also in the sense of *crazy*. We read e. g. *He sure was flooey in the dome—this guy Carey. Booze had certainly wrecked his common sense* (Arthur Somers Roche, *Find the Woman*, c. xxxxii, printed in the Baltimore

*American*, Oct. 29, 1922, p. 10, D, col. 3). The original meaning seems to be *to have a swelled head*, to be blown up, puffed up, inflated (Fr. *bouffi*). We say also *to blow up a scheme*.

#### 7. The Cuneiform Prototype of *Cipher* and *Zero*.

The terms *cipher* and *zero* are originally identical, just as *cattle* and *chattel* are doublets of *capital*, principal, stock, or *grotto* a doublet of *crypt*; in German we have *Krypt*, *Grotte*, and *Gruft*. Heb. *qîṣôr* (< *qaṭár* > *niqfár* > *véktar*, AJP 43, 245<sup>i</sup>) is a doublet of Heb. ‘*ašán*, smoke (JAOS 42, 375). Both *cipher* and *zero* (< *zefiro*) are ultimately derived from Ass. *šipru*, message (*Kings* 198, 47) < *šapâru*, to despatch, prop. *to cause to hasten*, Ass. *šapâru* being a Š of *pr*, to run, which we have in Arab. *fârra*, to flee; cf. *farraqâ*, to outrun (syn. *sâbaqa uyaṭaqáddama*) and *fârqâ'a*, to run very fast ('ádâ *šadîda*") as well as *nâfara*, to run away (*jâzi'a uya-tabâ'ada*).

Shophar, the name of the ancient Hebrew wind-instrument which is still used in the Jewish ritual, denotes orig. *wild ram* or *he-goat*. Just as we use *sheep* for *sheepskin*, or *calf* for *calfskin* (ZDMG 65, 108, 17; contrast JBL 38, 50) so the Hebrews employed *ḥôbél* both for *ram* and *ram's horn*. Heb. *šôpâr* = *šâpar* = Ass. *šapparu*, wild ram, orig. *swift* (WZKM 23, 362<sup>i</sup>). It may have been an ibex; the Semites made no clear distinction between sheep and goats. We call the *Mazama montana*, which is an antelope, the Rocky Mountain *goat*. The story of the fall of Jericho in the Book of Joshua is due to a misunderstanding of the term *qôl šôpâr*, sound of a horn, which denotes the subterraneous rumbling preceding or accompanying an earthquake (JBL 38, 143).

Both *cipher* and *zero* are generally supposed to be derived from Arab. *qifr*, zero, lit. *void*, emptiness (cf. the glossary of Oriental loanwords in French, appended to Littré's dictionary). But the etymological equivalent of *cipher* in German, *Ziffer*, denotes the numeral characters 1, 2, 3, &c. which we call *Arabic figures*, while the Arabs term them *raqm Hindî*, Indian characters. Arab. *raqm* signifies *writing* and *figure* (arithmetical character). *Raqimah* means *line*, writing, letter. Heb. *rîqmâ* denotes *embroidery* > It. *ricamamento*. To *cipher* means *to use numerical figures*. Doing simple sums is called

*ciphering*. A slate on which arithmetical problems are worked out is a *ciphering-slate*. We can say *to cipher up* the cost of an undertaking for *to figure out* the cost. *Number* may denote a written arithmetic figure, and Horace (*Epist. 1, 2, 27*) uses *numerus* in the sense of our *cipher*, Ger. *Null*, just as Aristophanes (*Nub. 1204*) has *ἀριθμός* in this sense (cf. Eurip. *Heracl.* 1000). Our term *figure-head* for a person without any real authority is taken from the ornamental figure at the head of a ship (Ger. *Gallionsfigur*, *Bugfigur*; cf. Fr. *galion*, large ship, It. *galeone*). The phrase *he is a figure*, on the other hand, means *he is a person of standing*, while we call a person of no weight a mere *cipher*, and in German you say *er ist eine Null* (cf. Fr. *c'est un zéro en chiffre*). Luther spelled *Ziffer* with *c*, and in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries *Ziffer* was used for *zero*.

Diophantus of Alexandria (c. 250 A. D.) used *ἀριθμός* as the term for the unknown quantity in an algebraic problem. His symbol, corresponding to our *x*, looks somewhat like *s*, but it may be a contraction of the first two letters of *ἀριθμός* (EB<sup>11</sup> 8, 288<sup>b</sup>; 1, 616<sup>b</sup>). There was no final sigma in the days of Diophantus; but the Arabian algebraists took the Diophantic symbol for a *s* and substituted their *š* for it. This letter may have been called *šai*, as in Coptic, although Pedro de Alcalá (1505) calls it *xin*; see Lagarde, *Petri Hispani de lingua Arabica libri duo*, p. 3; *Mitteil.* 1, 136. 170; 4, 375). *Z* is called in Arabic both *zâ'* and *zâi*. Pedro de Alcalá has *Zéy*, also *Ay* for '*ain*', and *Gáy* for *ğain*; for '*ain*', eye, Lagarde's edition (p. 327) gives *āin*. In Syriac the '*ain*' is called '*ê*', and *z: zain, zén, or zai*'. Lam. 1, 7; 2, 7; 3, 19; 4, 7, MSS of 6 have not only *zau*, but also *zau* and *ȝn*. Also in the Ethiopic alphabet *z* is called *zâi* or *zai* (BSS 132). *Šai* is the common Arabic word for *thing*; in modern Arabic it is often shortened to a simple *š*, e. g. *balâš*, for nothing <*bi-lâ-šâ'i ir*>, without a thing. The Italian algebraists substituted for it *cosa*. Rule of *coss* (= It. *regola della cosa*) was an early English name for *algebra*, and algebraists were called *cossists*. In Germany the term *Cossisten* was used during the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, occasionally also during the 17<sup>th</sup>. Sp. *x* was formerly pronounced *š* (EB<sup>11</sup> 25, 576<sup>am.</sup> 578<sup>as.</sup>; JHUC 30, 75). Arab. *šai* was therefore rendered *xei* (e. g. Lag. *Petr. Hisp.* p. 158, l. 20<sup>a</sup>) and our

*x* is an abbreviation of this term, just as the Arabs use their *š* for this purpose.

Ass. *šipru*, message, appears in Hebrew (with *s* = Ass. *š*; cf. JBL 36, 144, l. 13) as *sepr* which means *epistle*, letter, writing, book, just as Arab. *kitâb*, writing, is commonly used for *book*. The denominative Hebrew verb *saþár* denotes both *to write* and *to count*, enumerate, recount, just as our *tell*, signifies *to number*, count, enumerate, and *to recount*, narrate, relate. I have subsequently noticed that Sanders states, according to Adelung and others Ger. *Ziffer* is derived from an Arabic word corresponding to Heb. *saþár*, to count, write. In Arabic, *sáfar* means *travel*, voyage, campaign; but the primary connotation is something *sent out*; Arab. *sifârah* denotes *legation*, embassy, prop. *mission*.

Writing was originally a sort of cryptography. The characters of the ancient Scandinavian alphabets are called *runes*, and *rune* denotes orig. *secret* or *mystery* (cf. JAOS 43, 123<sup>4</sup>). We use *hieroglyph* for any figure or character supposed to have a mysterious or enigmatic significance. Therefore *cipher* may denote also *cryptography*, and *to decipher* means *to succeed in reading obscure characters*. The corresponding German word is *entziffern* < *Ziffer*, arithmetical figure, which is ultimately derived from Ass. *šipru*, message. Littré's statement, *De la signification de zéro, chiffre a passé à la signification générale de signe de numération*, is incorrect. Contrast ZDMG 57, 784.

### 8. The Poems of Isaiah.

The Hebrew prophets were patriotic statesmen and literary artists like Demosthenes (JBL 38, 147, l. 10 and 161<sup>4</sup>). According to EB 2188, 19, Isaiah was too great to be a literary artist. We might just as well say that Martin Luther, the creator of the present literary language of Germany, was too great a religious genius to be a literary artist (cf. JHUC 287, 43) or that Edmund Burke was too great a statesman to be a master of elaborate composition. Driver (LOT 227<sup>4</sup>) speaks of Isaiah's superb poetical genius.

The phrase *The word which Isaiah saw* appears in a new light if we compare the statement of the author of the cuneiform epic *Ša-gimir dadmê*, that the god Išu let him see by night in a

dream the lines of the poem, and when he awoke in the morning, he did not omit anything, nor did he add (Deut. 4, 2; 13, 1) a single word (KB 6, 70<sup>4</sup>; ZA 34, 90). In his account (published in *The New Orleans Star*, reprinted in the *Baltimore American*, Dec. 31, 1922, D 3, col. 4) of the writing of *Maryland! My Maryland!* J. R. Randall says that, in April, 1861, some powerful spirit seemed to impress him, and almost involuntarily he proceeded, about midnight, to write the song *Maryland! My Maryland!* The whole poem was dashed off rapidly when once begun. It was composed under what may be called a conflagration of the senses, if not an inspiration of the intellect. Mozart wrote the overture to *Don Giovanni* during the night preceding the first performance; he no doubt saw the whole orchestral score with his mind's eye.

Randall's martial song was adapted to the tune of the German college song *Lauriger Horatius*, which is the German folksong *O Tannebaum*, a modification of an old poem (mentioned about the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> cent.): *Ach Tannenbaum, ach Tannenbaum, du bist ein edles Reis.* There is a similar short poem by Uhland, written in 1809, *O Tannenbaum, du edles Reis, bist Sommer und Winter grün.* The oldest form of the tune of *Maryland! My Maryland!* is found in 1799 in a song praising the journeyman carpenters: *Es lebe hoch, es lebe hoch der Zimmermannsgeselle!*

Isaiah was more aristocratic than his younger Judean contemporary Micah who has been called The Prophet of the Poor (JBL 38, 162, l. 5) or his Israelitish contemporary Amos who was a gardener living in Judah after he had been banished from the Northern Kingdom (JBL 35, 287): he had constant access to the court and presence of the king, but he denounces the ruling caste as vigorously as did Micah and Amos (*cf. e. g.* Is. 1, 16, 17, 23, 26 and *Mic.* 17; also *Monist* 29, 298).

Few of the poems in the Book of Isaiah are genuine. It has been known for nearly 150 years that cc. 40-66 (*Deutero-Isaiah*) cannot be the work of Isaiah; c. 40 *e. g.* (see the translation in Drugulin's *Marksteine*; *cf.* JHUC 163, 57) must have been composed toward the end of the Exile (540) and several poems are Maccabean (170-70 B.C.). These later poems are found not only in cc. 40-66, but also in the first part of the book: Is.

9, 1-6; 11, 1-9 refer to Zerubbabel (AJP 40, 67-72; *Monist* 29, 296. 299) and cc. 24-27 are Maccabean; also 37, 22-34 is aimed at Antiochus Epiphanes (*cf.* v. 25 and 1 Mac. 1, 17; 2 Mac. 5, 1; see also *Mic.* 14, n. 4). Hugo Grotius (1644) referred several passages (*e. g.* 63, 1-6; *cf.* JHUC 163, 49) to Judas Macca-baeus, but he regarded them as Isaianic predictions (JHUC 163, 54<sup>a</sup>, l. 17). Nor can we say that Ibn Ezra (1145 A.D.) regarded cc. 40-66 as non-Isaianic (*cf.* Winter-Wünsche, *Jüd. Lit.* 2, 295; contrast Baudissin's *Einleitung*, p. 388). The final redaction of the book was not completed before 70 B.C. which is also the approximate date of the final redaction of the Psalter (ZDMG 58, 629, n. 2).

There are no Messianic prophecies in Isaiah or, for that matter, in any book of OT. Also the so-called eschatological passages have, as a rule, a definite historical background (AJP 43, 240).

Just as the crossing of the Red Sea at the time of the Exodus laid the foundation of the Mosaic Law, so the wonderful preservation of Jerusalem in the days of Isaiah (701 B.C.) established the religion of the prophets, which is regarded as the basis of Christianity (*Mic.* 14. 29, n. 33; TOCR 1, 268).

#### 9. The Adventures of Odysseus.

Vol. 3 of Brockhaus' new *Handbuch des Wissens* (1923) states that the *Odyssey* is based on yarns of Greek sailors who opened up the Black Sea to commerce and colonization; afterwards these stories were transferred to the west. The *Odyssey* undoubtedly influenced the later versions of the expedition of the Argonauts, but the adventures of Odysseus were not founded on this legend, although it was known in Homeric times. There is some connection, however, between Odysseus and the Black Sea. A great many etymologies of the name Odysseus have been proposed, but none of them is satisfactory. The combination of the name with ὁδυσσάμενος, angry,<sup>6</sup> so that the name would be connected with Lat. *odisse*, to hate (*Od.* 19, 407; *cf.* also 1, 62) is merely a popular etymology like the numerous inter-

<sup>6</sup> ὁδυσσάμενος may have been taken to mean ἀπέχθημα; *cf.* ἐχθροδαλμων and the active and passive uses of ἀπεχθῆς and ἀπέχθεσθαι.

pretations of names which we find in OT, e. g. the derivation of *adám*, man, from *ădamâ*, earth (contrast OC 33, 86) or *iššâ*, woman, from *iš*, man (OC 33, 37, n. 65). Nor does *Job* mean *object of enmity*, persecuted, or *turning to God*, penitent: it denotes a man who *came back*, which is an old Sumerian phrase for *regained his former condition* (JAOS 41, 184<sup>t</sup>).<sup>7</sup>

It is strange that, so far as I know, no one has ever thought of connecting Odysseus with the names of two Euxine ports, 'Οδησσός, which afterwards appears in the form 'Οδυσσός. One of these ports was on the western shore of the Black Sea and is now represented by the Bulgarian port Varna. The other was NE of Odessa on the northern shore. The old name Odessa was given to this Russian port on Aug. 22, 1794, by the Semiramis of the North, the Russian empress Catharine II. According to Strabo (149. 157) there was also a city 'Οδύσσεα in south-eastern Spain. 'Οδησσός may mean *emporium*;<sup>8</sup> it may be connected with the verb ὁδᾶ, to sell, orig. *to export*, which we find in three passages of the Euripidean satyric drama *Cyclops* (12. 98, 133). In l. 133 Odysseus says to the chief of the satyrs, Silenus, ὁδησον ἡμῖν σῖτον, sell us food. Τὰ ὁδαῖα means *goods*, articles of trade, cargo (*Od.* 8, 163, 15, 445). It is, of course, derived from ὁδός, way, just as Heb. ḥrēḥâ, caravan, is connected with ḥrāh, way; so the sarcastic characterization which the Phœacian<sup>9</sup> wrestler, Euryalus, gives of Odysseus would practically be correct: he says (*Od.* 8, 162-164) that Odysseus looked like an

ἀρχὸς ναυτάων οἵ τε πρηκτῆρες ἔασιν,  
φόρτου τε μνήμων καὶ ἐπίσκοπος εἴσιν ὁδαίων  
κερδέων θ' ἀρπαλέων.

'Οδός, way, is connected with Lat. *solea*, sole, sandal. Hesychius gives ἴλια, sole. It is interesting to note that the German denominative verb *sohlen* means *to fib*, to lie. The Ionians of

<sup>7</sup> Cf. also Arab. *tâba jismu'-l-maridi*.

<sup>8</sup> We can hardly assume that "Ολυνθός is a Thracian form of 'Οδυσσός (with νθ = ντ = ττ = σσ): we must remember that figs (as well as olives and oranges) grow on the northern shore of the Aegean.

<sup>9</sup> The ancients believed that the island of the Phœacians, which Homer calls Scheria, was Corcyra, the present Corfu, on the highway from Greece to the west.

Asia Minor, who were great seafarers, dropped their *h*'s very early; they had no *spiritus asper* (Brugmann-Thumb, 1913, § 108).

In Latin, Odysseus appears as *Ulixes* (ZDMG 61, 195; JBL 35, 322<sup>4</sup>). The Attic form was Ὀλυττεύς, the Corinthian: Ὁλυσεύς. We have the *l* also in the name of the westernmost of European capitals, Lisbon, a modification of the ancient name *Olisipo*, also written *Ulyssipo*, which was said to have been founded by Ulysses.

Odysseus is the typical representative of the old sailor race of ancient Greece, who encountered many adventures in all parts of the unknown seas. The best equivalent of Odysseus would be *adventurer*, i. e. one engaged in foreign trade and colonization. The commercial company (first established at Antwerp and chartered in England in 1406 by the first king of the House of Lancaster, Henry IV) who carried on trading and colonizing enterprises in North America and other parts of the world was known as Merchant Adventurers. William Tyndale, who translated the NT (1526) and the *Per teuch* (1530) into English, was Chaplain to the English Adventurers at Antwerp, and he was succeeded in this office by John Rogers who published in 1537, under the pseudonym of Thomas Matthew,<sup>10</sup> a complete English Bible which was a compilation from the renderings of Tyndale and Coverdale. In 1618 James I, under whose auspices AV was completed in 1611, granted a charter to the Company of Adventurers Trading into Africa.

Etymologies of ancient names are always precarious, but the interpretation of the name Odysseus as *Adventurer* is perhaps as good as any of the explanations that have been proposed.

PAUL HAUPT.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. C. G. Kenyon, *Our Bible and the Ancient MSS.* (London, 1895) p. 220; Richard Lovett, *The Printed English Bible* (London, 1894) p. 76; EB<sup>11</sup> 23, 456<sup>b</sup>.

### III.—AENEAS' CITY AT THE MOUTH OF THE TIBER.

In his deliberate efforts to reconstruct in imagination a plausible milieu for a heroic plot Vergil seems to have submitted himself to an unusually severe course of careful observation. When reading the description of the votive and thank offerings that hung about the old temple of Lavinium (VII, 184) :

captivi pendent currus curvaeque secures  
et cristae capitum et portarum ingentia claustra  
spiculaque clipeique ereptaque rostra carinis,

and a dozen other similar passages, one comes to comprehend the method by which Vergil gained his information in rummaging through temple stores of bygone ages. In his massive collection of Vergilian archaeology (*Virgile et les Origines d'Ostie*, Paris, 1919) Carcopino was wholly justified in looking for a precise and actual site for the city which Vergil in several passages of the Aeneid VII-XII says that Aeneas built near the mouth of the Tiber. By the mere chance that the war kept the noted French scholar away from Italy when certain important excavations were being made, he happened to publish a theory which proves now to be untenable, though based upon a sound feeling for Vergil's method of work and a logical calculation of probabilities. The "Troja," which he rightly assumes, he places hypothetically at a point on the Tiber where a tower of the Sullan wall has since been found, whereas the original walls of Ostia have now been discovered some five hundred yards nearer the sea, the very walls, in my opinion, which Vergil, with a slight license, intended the reader to have in mind when he mentioned Aeneas' first city in Latium.

In the *Notizie* of 1914, p. 426, Calza published the first traces found of this inner city. What he then had discovered was a remarkable gate 5.80 m. wide and protected on the inside by a rectangular enclosure 10.30 m. long. He rightly saw that it was an old city or fortress gate the corresponding walls of which must be looked for on the west and not on the east. In studying this peculiar structure in 1916 I discovered that it was made of the stone that was used in the first Concord temple of

366 B. C. and in the post-Gallic Palatine wall of about the same time. Since the stone proved to be native to the region of Fideneae, and was not used in any structure of Rome after the fourth century, I suggested that this Ostian fort was to be placed in the fourth century B. C. and that the structure may have been made out of the blocks of Fideneae's razed walls (*Am. Jour. Arch.* 1918, 182 ff.). Calza has now traced the four walls of this old fortress-city and published a good preliminary account of it in *Notizie* 1923, pp. 178-9. It proves to be only 193 x 126 meters in extent, and is situated about 200 meters from the river and about 400 meters from the line where the seacoast ran in Vergil's day. There are traces of buildings, as old as the walls themselves, in many places inside the cincture (*ibid.*, p. 179), so that Vergil's mention of *tecta* (VII, 160) and of an *urbs* (IX, 8, 48, 473, 639, etc.) is wholly appropriate. Indeed I do not feel certain that the forum was originally here, as Calza seems to think (*loc. cit.*, p. 179), for the forum pavement seems to belong to about 100 B. C. and it covers the foundations of many old houses. It is not improbable that Vergil learned from old men who could inform him that the forum was actually the site of former dwellings and temples.<sup>1</sup> Calza has acutely noticed the additional fact that the streets of the imperial city inside and outside these walls show unmistakably the traces of the older pomerium spaces. Since Vergil speaks repeatedly of the *fossæ* of Aeneas' camp (IX, 143, 314, 506, 567, etc.), this observation is of importance in showing that Vergil had ocular evidence for his assumption of moats as well as of walls.

How much of the old walls Vergil could actually see we do not definitely know. The east, west, and south gates were certainly in sight and probably in fair condition since these had been repaired with a harder stone in the second century B. C. Parts of the walls near these gates were probably also largely intact, since here and there they still exist, incorporated in Augustan and later structures. Most of the north wall (the one nearest the river) has disappeared down to a very low level.

<sup>1</sup> The older market place may have been where the Capitolium of the empire was built or possibly even between the river and the wall.

That part was presumably torn down before Vergil's day. In fact Vergil seems to assume that the fort extended to the river since he represents Turnus as escaping from the interior by way of the river (IX, 790, 815).

This structure, as we have said, belongs to the fourth century B. C. and not to the heroic period; but it is to be noted that the material is so friable and so poorly laid that it gave an appearance of far greater age than it actually had. Even Ennius (Ann. II. 22, Vahlen) attributed the old Ostian colony to Ancus Marcius, and he doubtless had this same wall in mind. Vergil, though a delver in antiquities, takes the liberties of a poet to the extent at least of making free use of sixth and seventh century material for his picture. He does so in the case of Carthage, Cumae, Ardea and the Etruscan towns and would naturally do so in the case of what was generally thought to be of regal age at Ostia.

We are now in a position to review what Vergil says of his "Troja,"<sup>2</sup> and it will be seen that it fits the position of this old colonial fort of Ostia. Aeneas turned the prows toward land soon after entering the Tiber (VII, 35-6), and learned by an omen that

*Advenisse diem quo debita moenia condant* (VII, 145).

After sending envoys to King Latinus, he personally marks the pomerium of his new fortress-city, and superintends the building:

Moliturque locum, primasque in litore sedes  
Castrorum in morem pinnis atque aggere cingit (VII, 158-9).

It is a city with homes (sedes) and has a wall with turrets. (The foundations of the old gates that have now come to view are so strong that there can be little doubt of their having supported towers.) When a few days later, the Latin army comes to besiege the town its walls are complete, and the government seems to be organized, for the inhabitants are henceforth spoken of as *cives*:

"Quis globus, O cives, caligine volvitur atra?  
Ferte citi ferrum, date tela, ascendite muros" (IX, 36-7).

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<sup>2</sup>Cf. X, 27, and VII, 158, with Servius' note: sciendum civitatem quam primo fecit Aeneas Troiam dictam secundum Catonem.

The city stood near the river, with the ships drawn up close to its walls:

Classem, quae *lateri castrorum adjuncta latebat,  
aggeribus saeptam circum et fluvialibus undis* (IX, 69-70).

The Latins attack the south side (the left side from the point of view of Rome):

Aeneadae duri murorum in parte sinistra  
Opposuere aciem (nam dextera cingitur amni)  
Ingentisque tenent fossas et turribus altis  
Stant maesti. (IX, 468-71)

In the tenth book Aeneas comes by ships from Caere with Etruscan reinforcements. It then appears that the camp is so near the sea that the Latins see the fleet coming and rush to the seashore to attack the enemy disembarking (X, 260-286). The landing is effected from the sea coast itself, not from the river:

Multi servare recursus  
Languentis *pelagi* et brevibus se credere saltu . . .  
Sed *mare* inoffensum crescenti adlabitur aestu (X, 288-91).

After a long contest on the beach the Trojans reach and relieve the besieged camp (X, 603-4) and push on beyond, fighting along the river bank (X, 833) until Mezentius falls. Then the Latins withdraw to Lavinium where the battle of the last two books takes place.

Many parallels from the Iliad have been pointed out in these last books of the Aeneid. It is, of course, not to be denied that Homeric lines occurred to Vergil's memory as he wrote. But if the reader will take his Aeneid down to Ostia and read the intense scenes of books VII-X among the old ruins of the walls that have now been excavated, he will discover that the poet constructed these scenes independently and composed them with a clear and consistent plan. Scholars have too long studied Vergil with lists of parallel passages in hand. If the reader will but reconstruct Vergil's life and surroundings, and try to visualize what Vergil saw and realize Vergil's experiences, he will find a sensitive and imaginative poet behind the lines.

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#### IV.—THE LETTERS ON THE BLOCKS OF THE SERVIAN WALL.

When Bruzza<sup>1</sup> first discussed the letters and marks that are found on many of the blocks of the "Servian Wall" at Rome it was generally supposed that the wall belonged to the regal period. Consequently scholars assumed that at least some of the marks might be Etruscan. Unfortunately little was then known about the Etruscan alphabet, and practically nothing about early Latin writing since the stele of the Forum and the Duenos Vase had not been found. When the discovery of some fifth-century tombs inside the wall on the Esquiline threw doubts on the supposed age of the "Servian Wall" scholars tacitly dropped every reference to a possible connection between these letters and the Etruscan alphabet. Forms that did not seem to be satisfactorily explained as Roman were interpreted as arbitrary marks.

A few years ago<sup>2</sup> I called attention to the fact that the material of which these walls were built was quarried in Veientine territory soon after Veii's fall. If this is so it would seem not improbable that the blocks were cut by Veientine captives and that the letters, which are quarry marks, are Veientine characters. Since we have as yet no inscriptions that are demonstrably of Veientine origin, and since Veii's language—spoken

<sup>1</sup> Annali Inst. 1876, 71 ff. There has never been an adequate discussion or even a complete record of them. Bruzza, who copied only those known in 1876, has been severely criticized for his inexact transcriptions. Jordan examined only a few using chiefly poor copies made by others (Hermes 1873, p. 482; 1876, pp. 127 and 461; Topographie I, p. 259). Richter, Über antike Steinmetzzeichen, 1885, has reproduced two photographs of the wall that lies near the railway station. This is very valuable since at least half of the marks recorded by the photographs are now illegible. But there is reason to suspect that the marks on the photographic negatives were reinforced before printing and that some inaccuracies thus crept in. Richter unfortunately did not take records from other parts of the wall. Notizie Scavi, 1907, p. 507 contains a good photograph of a few marks, and Graffunder reports a few new readings in Klio, 1911, p. 109. In this note I have used only what I have actually seen on the stones and on the photographs.

<sup>2</sup> Am. Jour. Arch. 1918, p. 182. The quarry is still to be seen in the Grotta Oscura region four kilometers north of Prima Porta not far from the Tiber.

in a region that lies between Rome and Falerii—may prove to be of importance not only in Etruscan but also in Italic philology, the attention of linguists ought perhaps to be called to these marks before they disappear.

In the first place it must be pointed out that these marks cannot be proved to be Latin letters. The normal open H and the square topped Γ are sometimes pointed to as indicating this, but Faliscan inscriptions have both of these forms (cf. for example C. I. E. 8256, 8343, 8240, 8340). It is also noteworthy that B D and O, which are lacking in Etruscan, do not appear on the blocks at Rome. To be sure, round letters are usually lacking on these blocks, but the triangular form of D and the square form of O are not unusual on early Italic inscriptions and might reasonably be expected if these marks were Roman. The most striking fact is that, while E occurs over twenty times, there is no certain case<sup>3</sup> of the equally facile F. Since the Faliscans used T for F it seems likely that the seventy or more instances of this character found on the "Servian" blocks should be read as F. The character may of course be the central Etruscan ↓ (= chi),<sup>4</sup> but at any rate it is not a Roman letter.

Similarly, by the side of T we find the signs Y and V on these blocks at Rome. The T may be Latin or Etruscan, but the other two signs, while found in Faliscan inscriptions for T, have as yet not been found in Latin ones. In the case of the other characters that certainly occur on these stones (A C E I K L N V X I [=Z] and the ligatures A/ and V) no valid conclusions can be drawn, since in the fourth century B. C. they were common to Rome and South Etruria.

The present excavations at Veii will probably produce some inscriptions, and new evidence may any day come to light at Rome. Meanwhile it would seem that Etruscologists might profitably make a reliable record of the characters still legible on the "Servian" blocks and show what connections they bear with the various alphabets of southern Etruria.

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<sup>3</sup> Bruzza reports two or three from the Palatine, but he probably misread the letter E. At least one finds in the letters still visible there traces of three horizontal lines.

<sup>4</sup> Since the blocks are as wide as they are high, they were laid without reference to the direction of the writing.

## V.—THE METRICAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE KOMMÓS IN THE AGAMEMNON OF AESCHYLUS.

The very essence of the *κομμός*, viewed as a lamentation for the dead, is the dirge, *ἰὼ ἰὼ βασιλεῦ βασιλεῦ κτλ.* (1489-1496), a series of five anapaestic lines followed by three lyric lines. This is impressively repeated (1513-1520) after an anapaestic stanza by Clytemnestra and a lyric stanza by the chorus. There is no doubt that this, which I shall call the *dirge proper*, is handled as a refrain in that portion of the *κομμός* where it occurs, the whole scheme here being orderly, inasmuch as it consists of the following:—(1) Strophe, 1481-1488; (2) Dirge Proper, 1489-1496; (3) Clytemnestra's Anapaests, 1497-1504; (4) Antistrophe, 1505-1512; (5) Dirge Proper, 1513-1520; (6) Clytemnestra's Anapaests, 1523-1529.

This complete metrical series (1481-1529) I conceive to be the central series, the kernel, of the *κομμός*. If one were to develop from this a series without repeated refrain, one would have:—(1) Strophe, (2) Equivalent to Dirge, (3) Anapaests, (4) Antistrophe, (5) Anapaests. This is exactly the arrangement in the two other portions of the *κομμός*. In other words the *κομμός* as a whole consists of an elaborate metrical series inset between two series, similar in character, but a little more simple. The whole scheme may be outlined thus:—

### Series 1.

Chorus. Strophe *α* (7 lines) 1448-1454

Chorus. *ἰὼ ἰὼ παράνοντος Ἐλένα κτλ.*, Anapaests (4 lines) } 1455-  
+ Lyric Verses (3 lines) } 1461

Clytemnestra. Anapaests (6 lines) 1462-1467

Chorus. Antistrophe *α* (7 lines) 1468-1474

Clytemnestra. Anapaests (6 lines) 1475-1480

### Series 2 (The Inset Series).

Chorus. Strophe *β* (8 lines) 1481-1488

Chorus. *ἰὼ ἰὼ βασιλεῦ βασιλεῦ κτλ.*, Anapaests (5 lines) +  
Lyric Verses (3 lines) 1489-1496

Clytemnestra. Anapaests (8 lines) 1497-1504

Chorus. Antistrophe *β* (8 lines) 1505-1512

Chorus. *ἰὼ ἰὼ κτλ.* (exact repetition) 1513-1520

Clytemnestra. Anapaests (8 lines) 1523-1530

## Series 3.

Chorus. Strophe  $\gamma$  (7 lines) 1530-1536<sup>1</sup>

Chorus.  $\dot{\imath}\omega\ \gamma\ddot{a}\ \gamma\ddot{a}$ ,  $\epsilon\bar{\imath}\theta'\ \xi\mu'$   $\dot{\epsilon}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\xi\omega\ \kappa\tau\lambda.$ , Anapaests (8 lines) +  
Lyric Verses (3 lines) 1537-1550

Clytemnestra. Anapaests (9 lines) 1551-1559<sup>1</sup>

Chorus. Antistrophe  $\gamma$  (7 lines) 1560-1566

Clytemnestra. Anapaests (11 lines) 1567-1576<sup>1</sup>

It seems to me that the arrangement is one of peculiar poetic beauty, exquisitely suited in its orderly irregularity to the psychological pitch of this remarkable scene of passionate grandeur. The *dirge proper* sounds twice from the heart of the choric poem, its strains preluded by the similar  $\dot{\imath}\omega\ \dot{\imath}\omega\ \pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\omega\ \epsilon\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha$  of the first series and echoed by the hoarse and despairing  $\dot{\imath}\omega\ \gamma\ddot{a}$ ,  $\gamma\ddot{a}$ ,  $\epsilon\bar{\imath}\theta'\ \xi\mu'$   $\dot{\epsilon}\delta\acute{\epsilon}\xi\omega$  of the choric anapaests of the third series. When the lines are thus conceived, there is not the urgent necessity which has harassed commentators to seek for exact responsions in the lyrics which complete these anapaestic systems. The formal strophe and antistrophe responsions in each series are exact, if one divide, as Goodwin does, the word  $\delta\acute{\iota}\phi\nu\acute{\iota}\omega\acute{\iota}\sigma\acute{\iota}$  between lines 1468 and 1469 and add, following Butler and Enger, a word of two syllables to line 1474. It should be noted that Sidgwick and Goodwin follow Seidler in deleting, as clearly spurious, lines 1521-2. I have accepted their judgment in this matter, as the outline of my scheme indicates.

Series 3, as a composite, may, in a sense, be regarded as a free responsion to Series 1. I believe it may be interpreted metrically in musical terms as the recurrence of a theme with slight variations on the first treatment.

It is interesting to compare this *κομμός* with the elaborate *κομμός* of the same poet's *Choephoroi* (306 ff.), which, in its intricate responsions, is as delicately wrought as a sonnet of sonnets, being in metrical structure an astounding masterpiece. Not less beautiful, but more rugged, is this passage from the *Agamemnon*. I believe that editors who have mercilessly torn it to shreds in their critical despair at its irregular prosody might have profited by comparing it to the Erechtheum, that temple which does not conform to our accepted canons of Greek architecture.

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<sup>1</sup> There is a confusion in numbering these lines. See Sidgwick's text (Oxford, 1902) and Goodwin's (Cambridge, Mass., 1906).

VI.—A SUGGESTED EMENDATION FOR AESCHYLUS,  
*AGAMEMNON*, LINE 1459.

The line occurs in a passage which editors “give up” as hopelessly corrupt, although the general sense of the context is apparent. My proposed emendation is of a single word, *πολύμναστον*. The context in full is:—

ἰὼ ἱὼ παράνους Ἐλένα  
μίᾳ τὰς πολλάς, τὰς πάνυ πολλὰς  
ψυχὰς ὀλέσασ' ὑπὸ Τροίᾳ.  
† νῦν δὲ τελείαν . . .  
πολύμναστον ἐπηνθίσω δι' αἵμ' ἄνιπτον,  
ἥτις ἦν τότ' ἐν δόμοις  
ἔρις ἔριδματος ἀνδρὸς οἰζύς †.

The text is that of the Oxford edition (A. Sidgwick), 1902. The line which I am discussing, Mr. Sidgwick in his annotated edition of the play (Oxford, 1905) translates: ‘Thou hast put on thee as a flower a memorable stain of blood indelible.’ Following Hermann, he omits δι’ before αἵμ’.

My suggestion is that, in place of *πολύμναστον*, the adjective *πολυμνάσταν* (Epic *πολυμνήστην*) be read, as peculiarly applicable to Helen. Reading the line with the δι’ of the MSS and postulating a reflexive in the mutilated line or lines immediately preceding, we should have this sense: ‘Through blood indelible thou hast put on thee as a flower the name of the much-wooed,’ more literally, ‘Thou hast bedecked thyself, the much-wooed, (or, as the much-wooed) through blood indelible.’

The change is a slight one. Metrically the alteration is perhaps greater than verbally, but, since responsions are irregular or confused in the κομμάτια to which this passage belongs, the metrical test is impossible.

The reflexive with a middle verb is not unusual. (Cf. Thuc. 1, 33, ἡ κακῶσαι ἡμᾶς ἡ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς βεβαιώσασθαι; Aeschin. 1, 132, κατασκοπούμενος ἔαυτόν. See Gildersleeve, Syntax of Class. Gk., 1900, § 153.)

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## VII.—NOTES ON THE RĀUHINEYACARITRA.

The first edition of the Rāuhineyacaritra, published at Jamnagar in 1908, is now out of print. This was the text from which I made the translation in the "Studies in Honor of Maurice Bloomfield." There is a second edition, published by the Ātmānanda Sabhā at Bhavnagar in 1916. This follows very closely the first edition and seems to be a reprint, with a few corrections. My references are all to this second edition.

The Rāuhineyacaritra seemed full of new material for the lexicons, but it was impossible to be certain until manuscripts were examined. I found two manuscripts in India and, through the courtesy of Dr. Thomas of the India Office, and of the library authorities in Berlin, was able to examine the one in the koenigl. Bibliothek. Apparently, none of these was the manuscript from which the original edition was made, but notwithstanding diligent search, I could find only two manuscripts in India; one in the Bhandarkar Institute for Oriental Research at Poona, and one in private hands in Bhavnagar, secured through the Ātmānanda Sabhā.

The Berlin MS is dated 1454 A. D. It is very well written with comparatively few clerical errors. It has an occasional survival of the archaic method of writing vowels, which is universal in the Poona MS. This one, therefore, must antedate 1454 A. D., and seems to be almost, if not quite, contemporaneous with the author, Devamūrti. The Jains could not give me his exact dates, but all agreed in attributing the date 1440 A. D. to his Vikramacaritra. The value given to the Poona MS by its age is decreased somewhat by the fact that it is very carelessly written and abounds in errors. The Bhavnagar MS is a late nineteenth century one, very accurate, but with few additional variants.

### New and Rare Words in the Rāuhineyacaritra.

4. vanaspatyā bhārāṣṭādaçasamkhyayā, Marathi athāra bhāra vanaspati, 'a comprehensive term for the herbs and plants on the globe.' Molesworth and Candy, Marathi-English Dict. p. 14.
5. ghūtkṛta = ghūtkāra, onomatopoeic word. 8. jāli = jāla,

'network.' All the MSS and the first ed. read *vaniçajāhi*<sup>o</sup>. 10. parvati, from parb, 'go.' 12. pra-kṛ, 'collect.' 13. navadvāra, slang for 'breach in the wall.' 15. avasvāpinī (doubtful form), = avasvāpanī (MSS reading), 'sleeping potion.' 19. viçopaka = viñçopaka, a coin, the twentieth part of a rupee. 19. dramaka. I was told that dramaka = drama-ma, which is the reading of my MSS: P.<sup>1</sup> drampa eko; Bh drama eko; B dramma eko. 26. guna = upāya, 'means.' 35. açāsit, aorist formation from çās. 38. ghana, 'having hard rind.' The 'fruit with hard rind' here = 'cocoanut.' 38. arjunaketu, 'monkey.' ketu = dhvaja, 'banner.' arjunadhvaja = epithet of Hanuman; kapidhvaja = epithet of Arjuna. 47. uc-cal, if read, must = simple cal. P and B read nocālitam. 59. dharāpītha, 'earth.' 84. mūlikā kāsthānām, appears to be simply 'bundle of wood.' 86. sthīyate. I referred (R. C. p. 171) to its exceptional use. All three of my mss. read prayojanam, instead of hi sthīyate. 96. rāsaka, doubtful. I suggested (R. C. p. 172) 'lamentations' from rās, 'to cry'; Dharma Suri suggested 'wanderings' from ras, 'to dance.' 99. The āsana of the first ed., which was such a difficult point (R. C. p. 172) has been solved by the MSS. P and B have çāsana; Bh prāsana. Second ed. prāçana. 101, 141. dhavalagṛha, 'palace.' 104, 127. kāndīçika, = kāndīçika, 'fugitive.' 113. nat, 'play tricks on.' So quoted by Apte. 115. samavasarāna, 'assembly-hall,' erected by the gods for a sage who has attained Kevala Jñāna. 122, 131. prayojana, 'advice, command.' 123. nyuñchana = Guj. luñchāna, a form of showing honor by doubling up the hands and placing them on the temples. 126. dharana, 'capture.' 130. dandanapāçika = dandanapāçaka, 'policeman.' Throughout the text. Apte quotes both forms. 142. vṛddhāyuvatī, 'old woman.' 142. ambikātvā, 'the role of a mother.' 148, 176, 313. paññakūla, 'fine cloth.' 156, 157, 179, 324. ksātra = khātra, 'breach, tunnel.' 157. bibhatsate, from bādh, 'to tie.' 162. caturaka = caturikā, catuṣka,

<sup>1</sup> Abbreviations:—P = MS in Bhandarkar Institute in Poona. Bh = MS in Bhavnagar. B = MS in the koenigl. Bibliothek in Berlin, MS. orient. fol. 775. Pārçva<sup>o</sup> = Bloomfield, Life and Stories of the Jaina Savior Pārçvanātha. Hertel = Hertel, Bharaṭakadvātrīmśikā, Leipzig, 1922.

'court-yard.' 173. mūrcha = Guj. mūcha, 'moustache.' mūrchayoç ca valam kṣipan, 'twirling the moustache.' 174. cat, 'falls.' cf. Pārçva<sup>o</sup> p. 221 and Hertel, p. 53. 186. anṛṇībhāva, 'freedom from debt.' 194. dhomkāra, onomatopoeic, used of the sound of drums. 215. banda = bandin, 'plunder.' 219. bandagrāhin = bandigrāha, 'thief.' 224. cirbhāta, 'cucumber,' as neuter. 244, 296. grāddha, 'a grade of Jain disciple.' See Pārçva<sup>o</sup> p. 166. 245, 259. niṣedhikā. A Jain devotee says nissahī (in the vernacular) three times when he enters the temple. This is to drive away all worldly thoughts. The root is sidh, 'to ward off.' In Hemacandra's Mahāvīracaritra, 142, the form naṣedhakī occurs. 252. bhadraka, 'a grade of Jain disciple.' Pārçva<sup>o</sup> p. 226. 258, 3. vi-naṭ = nat, 'to play tricks on.' 258. nrtya, 'trick.' 260. dakṣiṇā, doubtful. Does it = pradakṣiṇā, 'deasil,' or is it perhaps 'punishment' as one kind of 'fee?' 260. samavasṛti, 'shrine.' 264. tittara = tittira, 'partridge.' 266. paratā = Guj. paraḍā, pl. of paraḍo, 'pod of the babbūla.' 273. ghana = Guj. ghanu, 'many.' 287. doraka, 'cord.' 331. meṣa, 'shutting of the eyes.' 339. sumanasa = sumanas, 'flower.' 351. vārin (doubtful reading) = vāran, which P and B have. 364. chut, 'escape.' Cf. Pārçva<sup>o</sup> p. 232 and Hertel, p. 53. 367. nirṇī, 'lead astray' (?) P and B read vāhitah, 'mystified,' and nir-nīto must here have a similar meaning. 368. Ćvetāmbī, name of a city. 373. Kāutukabhaṇḍāra, name of a forest. 380. stambhinī = stambhanī, 'an arresting charm.' 445. pr̥ṣṭi, 'back.' 467. pañcanamaskṛti, 'salutation of the five spiritual dignitaries.'

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## VIII.—BANTU NOTES.

Aside from intrusive Semitic, there seem to be three main divisions of African languages: northern Hamitic, southern Bantu, and central Negritic or Sudanic. The Bantu languages are described as having a Hamitic-like basis combined with a Negritic vocabulary.<sup>1</sup> In dealing with these languages many special symbols are needed for exact transcriptions. Openness and closeness of vowel-quality are not indicated in the following notes; consonants requiring notice are *ŋ* = English final *ng*; *ñ* = Spanish *ñ*; *c* = Hungarian *ty*; *ç* = German *ch* in *echt*; *x γ*, velar fricatives; *ɸ β*, bilabial fricatives; *kʷ gʷ*, labiovelars with double stoppage, derived from *kʷ gʷ*. The small letter *w* marks labiovelarized consonants, which occur also in Arabic.<sup>2</sup> A subscript dot indicates reverted linguals.

A well-known member of the Negritic group is Ewe (*eße*), spoken in the region west of Nigeria. Ewe words apparently connected with Bantu equivalents are *eve* (2) = *bali*, *beli*, *bili*; *etō* (3) = *tatu*, *satu*; *ene* (4) = *na*, *ne*, *ena*, *ina*, *ine*, *nne*; *atō* (5) = *tano*, *sano*; *abo* (arm) = *boko*, *boxo*; *fu < xu < ku*<sup>3</sup> (bone) = *fufa*, *fupa*, *kupa*; *to* (ear) = *to*, *tu*, *tui*; *ta* (head) = *twa*, *twe*, *to*; *koti* (neck) = *koti*, *kosi*; *ade* (tongue) = *leme*, *lemi*, *lime*, *limi*; *ku*, *kʷe* (stone) = *go*, *gʷwe*, *gwe*, *bwe*, *bγe*; *ati* (tree) = *ti*, *te*; *si < tši < ki*<sup>4</sup> (water) = *ze*, *zi*, *ezi*, *dzi*, *nzi*, *dži*, *ŋge*, *angi*.

Ewe *ade* (6) resembles *etō* (3); *adre* (7) seems to be a compound of *ade* and *de* (1); *eñi* (8) resembles *ene* (4). Evidently *ade* may have some such basis as \**etet* (3 + 3), with *a* taken from *atō* (5); and *eñi* might have come from *ene ene* thru \**enien*, \**eñen*, \**eñin*. Some of the Bantu tongues express 6 as 3 + 3, and 4 + 4 is widely used for 8 in Bantu *nana*, *nane*, *nani*, *ñañi*. Meinhof assumes that the basis of 4 is *na*.<sup>5</sup> This theory

<sup>1</sup> Meinhof, *Introduction to the Study of African Languages*, p. 100 (London, 1915).

<sup>2</sup> Gairdner, *Egyptian Arabic*, p. 2 (Cambridge, 1917).

<sup>3</sup> Westermann, *Die Sudansprachen*, p. 162 (Hamburg, 1911).

<sup>4</sup> Westermann, *Die Sudansprachen*, p. 86.

<sup>5</sup> Meinhof, *Lautlehre der Bantusprachen*, p. 240 (Berlin, 1910).

fails to explain the forms with *e* or *i* instead of *a*. I think it is better to assume \**mina*, represented by *mi* in Negritic.<sup>6</sup> In Bantu the *m* of \**mina* has been changed to *w*, assimilated to *n*, or lost (as in Ewe *ene*): *wana*, *nna*, *ina*, *ena*, *na*. The first vowel is assimilated to the second in *wana*; otherwise it has often palatalized the second vowel, and sometimes changed *n* to *ñ*: *nne*, *ine*, *ne*, *nni*, *ini*, *ni*, *ña*, *ñe*, *ñi*.

Meinhof assumes \**mia*, with mediopalatal *ü*, as the root of Bantu *nwa*, *ñwa*, *ño*<sup>7</sup> (drink). Westermann assumes \**nü*, with mediopalatal *ü*, as the basis of Negritic *ano*, *enu*, *nu*, *inua*, *ña*<sup>8</sup> (mouth). I agree with Johnston in holding that the theory of mediopalatal *ü* (= Norwegian *u*) and *i* (= Rumanian *i*), considered as essential elements of early African speech, is not at all reasonable.<sup>9</sup> If we compare these Negritic words with the Bantu equivalents, *ana*, *ano*, *ena*, *na*, *no*, *nu*, *nuo*, *nua*, *nwa*, *mwa*, *ña*, *ño*, *ñu*, *ñua*, *ñwa*, and with the Bantu verbs just mentioned, it seems clear that their common basis is represented by *inua*, or by *inwa*, a Semi-Bantu form of the noun recorded by Johnston. The initial vowel has been assimilated to or towards the final *a*, in *ana*, *ano*, *ena*. A change of *nw* thru *nw* to *n* is probably implied by *ana*, *ena*, *na*. The *m* of *mwa* may have come from *nw*, formed without loss of the following *w*; or it may be derived from the influence of *lomo* (lip), which has become *omo* in some of the Bantu languages. The forms with *ñ* show the alterant power of *i* before a dental, in accordance with *ña* = *ina* (4). Herero *omu-na* (lip) and *ocqi-ño* (mouth) seem to contain two derivatives of the *nwa*-form: *na* < \**nwa* after *u*, and *ño* < *ñwa* after *i*. A few languages treat as radical the prefix of *ka-nwa*: *di-kanu*, *li-kano*, *ndi-kanwa*. The form *ka-mia* may represent \**ima* < \**inwa*; *m-ia* may be the same form, with *m* treated as a prefix.

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<sup>6</sup> Westermann, Die Sudansprachen, p. 114.

<sup>7</sup> Meinhof, Lautlehre, p. 239.

<sup>8</sup> Westermann, Die Sudansprachen, p. 170.

<sup>9</sup> Johnston, Bantu and Semi-Bantu Languages, p. 37 (Oxford, 1919).

## REPORTS.

### HERMES LVII (1922), parts 3 and 4.

Aphoristische Bemerkungen zu den Ekklesiazusen des Aristophanes (321-356). † C. Robert secures a more telling effect in numerous passages by a better assignment of lines among the speakers. He deals also with textual questions, and, among other interesting suggestions, gives his reasons for believing that the plot of the Ecclesiazusae rests on communistic ideas which Plato had expressed to A. in friendly intercourse, which A. combined with the conception of female rule as treated in the Lysistrata.

Philologische Kleinigkeiten (357-365). R. Reitzenstein thinks that Horace in ode II 13 pictures the blessed state of poets of former ages, suggesting a similar lot for himself; then, proceeding from the structure of this poem, R. interprets Horace's ode I 22 and Catullus XI with especial reference to their supposed humor.

ΙΩ ΚΑΛΛΙΘΥΕΣΣΑ (366-374). F. Jacoby supports by means of literary testimony, against C. Robert (cf. A. J. P. XLIII 274), the belief in the existence of an ancient Hera cult at Tiryns. Καλλίθυα was originally a distinct personage.

Perikles Samische Leichenrede (375-395). Leo Weber substantiates the supposition of Ed. Meyer (Forschungen II 219 ff.) that Herod. VII 161 and IX 27 depended on the funeral oration delivered by Pericles in honor of those who fell in the Samian war 439 B. C. Accordingly this type of oration was established long before the time of Gorgias' influence. The contents and structure of the Samian oration can be determined from Herodotus, Plato's Menexenos 237 b-239 d, Plut. Pericl. 8 etc. Further, a comparison of the reconstructed Samian oration with the famous funeral oration of Pericles, shows that, with due allowance for Thucydides' style, we can accept the latter no less as an historical document than the Samian speech. The changed times at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war account for the difference between the two orations. Two excursions follow. In I, he discusses the influence of the Epitaphii on the Persian speeches in Herod. III 80 ff.; in II, the Tegean speech in Herod. IX 26, which probably rests on local traditions.

Der Verfasser des Anonymus Londinensis (396-429). Max Wellmann gives the history of the Methodic School of medicine from its foundation by Themison of Laodicea at the end of the Roman republic. He finds a close agreement of the Anonymus

L. (cf. Hermes 28, 407 ff.) with the late Methodic School, and concludes that this document is a fragment of the *Eisagwgy* of Soranus of Ephesus, the only one of this school that was recognized by Galen.

Kleine Studien zur Marinegeschichte des Altertums (430-449). F. Graefe in this article (cf. Hermes LII (1917) 317 ff. LIV (1919) 219 and A. J. P. XLI 90 Misc.) cites passages from Thucydides, Polybius, Caesar, Livy, etc., which give accounts of how the ancients attacked hostile fleets or fortifications with burning ships, or flaming baskets, suspended on poles at the prow. The modern Greeks call the fire ship *μπουρλότον* (from French brûlot), which they used in 1821/29 with telling effect against the Turks. In the same way he shows how harbors were protected by means of chains, rafts, sunken ships etc. The sunken ship has been successfully employed as a means of defense in modern times; but when the attacking party tries to 'bottle up' the enemy in his harbor, it has met only with partial success or none at all, as at Santiago de Cuba (June 3, 1898) and at Port Arthur (1904). It is, therefore, interesting that only in one passage (Livy XXXVII 14 and 15) this device was proposed, but rejected.

Beiträge zur Wiederherstellung des Hyperides-Textes (450-464). O. J. Schröder restores gaps in speeches 1, 5 and 6 of Jensen's excellent edition of Hyperides (1917).

Zu Demosthenes (465-471). K. Münscher discusses the text of [Dem.] XLIV, [Dem.] LVIII and Dem. LVII and again objects to Thalheim's views.

Miscellen: Stephan Brassloff (472-475) discusses the papyrus Halensis I 219 ff. according to which an Alexandrian might not be the slave of another Alexandrian; hence there were not two classes of Alexandrians. This furnishes an interesting parallel to the Roman law that a person who voluntarily yielded his liberty was to be sold trans Tiberim. Tacitus, Germ. 24, and the Mosaic code are also discussed. Although the papyrus does not expressly state that an Alexandrian woman may not have a male slave, this was probably prohibited, as it was in Palestine.—J. J. E. Hondius (475-477) calls attention to a new inscription: *hίππαρχος ἀνέθε[κεν] ὁ πεισω[τράτο]* (Corr. Hell. XLIV (1920) 238) and concludes that both brothers shared the government (cf. Aθ. π. 18, 1), but that Hippias had the main government in his hands. However, we must wait for further inscriptions to decide this question (cf. A. J. P. XLIII 272).—F. Hiller v. Gaertringen (477-478) presents the restoration of an inscription by an Alcmeonid (Corr. Hell. XLIV (1920) 228 f.), which assists in restoring a similar inscription from Athens (Lolling-Wolters, Καταλ. Ἐπιγρ. Μονσ. 37, 13). These dedications were

probably intended to rival those of the Peisistratidae.—O. Weinreich (479-480) cites the first excerpt of Photius from Book VII of Ptolemy Chennos, which states that when Zeus was born, the babe laughed unceasingly for seven days. According to the prevailing myth the child cried. Ptolemy was a Peripatetic, which perhaps accounts for his juggling with the number seven (cf. Verg. ecl. IV 60 ff.).

Nikostratos der Platoniker (481-517). K. Praechter extracts important data for the history of Greek philosophy from the new revision of Dittenberger's *sylloge* (II<sup>3</sup> No. 868), where three Delphic decrees confer citizenship etc. on certain Platonic philosophers, including L. Calvenus Taurus of Berytus, Baccheius, adoptive son of Gaius, Gaius himself, and an Athenian Nicostratus. Taurus' name is thus established (cf. Calvisius Taurus in Gellius XVIII 10, 3), and his relatively orthodox and religious attitude emphasized by this recognition on the part of the Delphic priesthood. This applies also to Baccheius, who is, moreover, associated with Gaius, whose religious Platonism is known. Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. III 1<sup>4</sup> 715) classified Baccheius as a Stoic; but we see that he, like other teachers of Marcus Aurelius, was a Platonist. Finally, this Nicostratus can be identified with the Nicostratus whom Simplicius frequently mentions. Zeller, indeed, classified the latter as a Stoic, but Praechter shows that he was a Platonist from Athens and flourished c. 160-170 A. D., which agrees with the dates of the inscription. II. Praechter gives a documentary account of Nicostratus' relation to the Middle and New Platonism, and shows the existence of a twofold attitude of the Platonic school toward the categories of Aristotle: one line of eclectics, beginning with Antiochus of Ascalon, endeavored to harmonize Plato and Aristotle; it passed by Plotinus, but included Porphyrius and continued throughout neo-Platonism. The other line, rooted in the scepticism of the New Academy, held a negative attitude, whose criticism of the categories did much to improve the science of dialectics. This orthodox school included Lucius, Nicostratus, Atticus, and ended with Plotinus.

Die neuen Urkunden von Epidaurus (518-534). H. Swoboda contributes observations on the inscriptions discovered by Kavvadias during his excavations at Epidaurus 1916-1918, and published in *'Αρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς* 1918, τ 4. 115 ff. No. 1 (pp. 116 ff.) refers to a treaty between Epidaurus and Rome 111 or 112 B. C. No. 2 (pp. 124 ff.) is more important, since it contains a list of *Νομογράφοι* of the Achaean league, one from each of twelve cities, from others as many as two or three, which may be due to the recognition of larger populations. No. 3 (pp. 128 ff.) yields important data concerning the Hellenic league of

Antigonus Doson, which S. discusses. Kavvadias, not being familiar with an extensive literature, which S. cites, thinks that No. 3 also dealt with the Achaean league.

Opferspenden (535-550). P. Stengel, in answer to Eitrem's criticism (*Beiträge zur gr. Religionsgesch.* III, Kristiania, 1920), shows that *χέρνυψ* and *χερνίπτεσθαι* did not apply to washing the hands at sacred rites, but always to libations sprinkled with the hand, and belonged to the *κατάρχεσθαι* together with *προβάλλεσθαι οὐλοχύτας*. He interprets especially Arist. *Pax* 961 (960) in this sense in opposition to Eitrem. Likewise *λοντρά* applies to libations; bathing and washing hands were not part of the funeral ritual, as Eitrem thinks. He also discusses the obscure meaning of the *λοντροφόροι* on graves. Thereupon S. examines the meaning of *ἀσπονδοί θυοίαι* (*schol. Soph. Oed. Col.* 100), and concludes that although such offerings are not mentioned in the lists of extant inscriptions, we must accept the scholiast's statement.

Die Schrift des Gorgias "Über die Natur oder über das Nichtseiende" (551-562). W. Nestle interprets the three theses of Gorgias so as to show that their purpose was to reduce the doctrine of Parmenides to an absurdity, and supposes it to be probable that with this 'skit' Gorgias in his youth turned from philosophy to rhetoric. Moreover, N. argues plausibly to show Zeno's defense of Parmenides *πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αἰτὸν κωμῳδεῖν* (*Plat. Parm. 128 C*) may have been aimed at Gorgias, whose satire could easily have antedated Zeno's defense.

Vergil's Sechste Ekloge und die Ciris (563-587). K. Witte agrees in the main with Vollmer's interpretation of Verg. Ecl. VI (Rh. M. LXI [1906] 487). Vergil had promised to celebrate Varus' deeds in an epic poem (Ecl. IX 27-29), but in Ecl. VI he tells him that in obedience to Apollo he would confine himself to bucolic songs. Silenus is introduced to point out the wealth of this material. The Gallus song, introduced to honor him, is the only finished poem to which allusion is made. The Scylla myth is merely material. The Ciris poet criticizes Vergil's conception. The Epicurean theme (31-40) was of especial interest to Vergil (cf. Georg. II 475 ff.), as well as the Pasiphaë story (45-60), and as the former shows the influence of Lucretius, so the latter may have drawn on the Io of Calvus. All the other songs of Silenus can be explained from the text of Theocritus and commentaries on it. This interpretation of the poem shows its unity as a dedication to Varus. II. W. shows that the Ciris depends on Vergil, not only for numerous words, phrases and passages, but also for its structure.

Zur Ciris (588-599). A. Klotz shows the mechanical way in which the poet of the Ciris utilized Vergil's poetry, which

explains certain obscurities, some of which have been ascribed to lacunae. He also shows the probable dependence of this poet on Ovid. If this is so, then nearly all of the spondaic lines can be traced to classic models, which were utilized when the epyllion was antiquated, and poets were no longer facile in constructing them. The Ciris would suit the time of Tiberius, who, as Suetonius says (Tib. 70, 2), fecit et Graeca poemata imitatus Euphorionem et Rhianum et Parthenium.

Horazens 16. Epode und Vergils Bukolika (600-612). J. Kroll defends Skutsch's thesis that Vergil's fourth Eclogue depends on the 16. Epode of Horace (cf. Neue Jhrb. XXIII [1909] 28 ff. — Kl. Schriften 370 ff.) against Witte (Philol. Wochensch. XLI [1921] 1095 ff.). Kroll has shown Vergil's dependence on Horace in Ecl. I (cf. A. J. P. XXXIX 426 Misc.).

Die Urkunden von 411 (613-620). V. Ehrenberg shows the essential agreement of Arist. Aθ. π. 29, 5 with Thuc. VIII 65, 3; the usual comparison with Thuc. VIII 67, 3 shows mainly differences. He further compares Arist. Aθ. π. 31 with Thuc. VIII 67, 3, and concludes that Aristotle's description of the constitution of the 400 was derived from a document which was composed in order to justify the policy of the oligarchs. This purpose is especially evident in claiming as their plan (Aristotle ch. 30) the constitution of Theramenes 411/10. (Cf. A. J. P. XXXIX 216).

Miscellen: J. Hasebroek (621-623) calls attention to a *πύργος* in [Dem.] 47, 49 ff., which was evidently not a tower, but an industrial building adjoining the *oikía* and *αὐλή* (cf. A. J. P. XLI 387, XLII 345 Misc., and XLIII 273 Misc.), which is thus shown to have already existed in the IV century B. C.—A. Kurfess (623-625) approves of Münzer's interpretation of Cicero's Fannius letter (cf. A. J. P. XLIII 275), but holds against Münzer that scripsi (= ad te scripsi) is correct; in contrast scripsoram refers to Cic. Brutus 100 ff.—F. Bechtel (625-626) explains Umbr. parsest (VII b. 2) as a present tense. The following sentence has the present hertei. Pars est like mersest point to the old Umbr. ſrs.—W. Morel (626-627) emends Aesch. Agam. 1252: *ἢ κάρτ' <έν>αρ<γ>ῶν παρεκόπτες χρησμῶν ἐμῶν*, which he bases on Wilamowitz's text, with a suggestion from Aesch. Prom. 662.—The editor (627) states that the ms. of Die Neuen Urkunden von Epidauros (see above) was received at the end of May, 1922, before the publication of U. Wilcken's Über eine Inschrift aus dem Asklepieion von Epidauros, Sitz.-Ber. Akad. Berlin 1922, pp. 122 ff., and S. B. Koujeas' Κουὸν τῶν 'Ελλήνων κατ' ἐπιγραφὴν 'Επιδαύρου, 'Αρχαιολ. 'Εφημερίς, 1921, pp. 1-51, dated Aug. 21, 1922.

## ROMANIA, Vol. XLVIII, Nos. 3 and 4.

Pp. 321-334. Alexandre Rosetti, Les catéchismes roumains du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Fragmentary remains of various catechisms in the Roumanian language prove that Martin Luther's catechism was introduced into that country shortly after its original publication in Germany. In October, 1921, a manuscript was discovered in a Balkan village, which contained two printed fragments. The endeavor to identify these waifs has led the author of the present article to investigate the whole subject of early Roumanian catechisms.

Pp. 335-364. C. Brunel, Les premiers exemples de l'emploi du provençal dans les chartes. In southern Europe the notarial scribes first employed the vulgar tongue in the midst of Latin phrases when their ignorance did not enable them otherwise to express their thoughts. This state of affairs existed about the year 1000 A. D., and hence it was at this time that Provençal phrases first appeared in the charts of various localities, beginning with those situated in remote mountainous sections and gradually spreading to those on the main thoroughfares of travel. The subject is one of vast extent, and it will necessarily be many years before it can be adequately controlled in all its parts.

Pp. 365-402. Holger Petersen, Trois versions inédites de la *Vie de Saint Eustache* en vers français. M. Paul Meyer enumerated eleven versions in 1906, four of which have since been published, and to them the present editor adds three more; namely, those of Cheltenham, York and Brussels. The present instalment of his article contains a critical edition of the first of these, together with an introduction treating largely of the form of speech used by the poet.

Pp. 403-418. Albert Dauzat, Notes argotiques. The origin of the word Argot itself is here shown to have been Germanic, and it is proven to have been first used in Provençal, whence it later spread to northern France. This article is divided into three sections as follows: I. Etymologies; II. Formation du pronom personnel périphrastique; III. Interprétations et conjonctures diverses (Ballades argotiques de Villon).

Pp. 419-436. Mélanges:—Paul Marchot, Hastula et \* Hasta, "Asphodèle."—Adolphe Horning, Paul Marchot, Daru.—H. Yvon, Sur l'emploi du futur antérieur (*futurum exactum*) au lieu du passé composé (passé indéfini).—J. Morawski, Fragment d'un *Art d'aimer* perdu du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Pp. 437-443. Discussions:—Louis Gauchat, A propos de Apis en valais.

Pp. 444-457. Comptes rendus:—J. Anglade, Grammaire de

l'ancien provençal ou ancienne langue d'oc (A. Jeanroy).—J. Désormeaux, 1. Notes lexicographiques (J. Jud).—Angelica Hoffmann, Robert de le Piere, Robert le Clerc, Robert de Castel (Arthur Långfors).—Cinquantenaire de l'Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes, etc. (M. Roques).

Pp. 458-470. Périodiques.

Pp. 471-480. Chronique.

Pp. 481-558. J. Morawski, Les recueils d'anciens proverbes français analysés et classés. The author of this article intends to edit all the hitherto unpublished collections of Old French proverbs, and also an alphabetical list of all French proverbs prior to the fifteenth century. Some of the results of his investigations are herewith presented in this very long article. The twenty-five collections he has examined contain a trifle more than 2000 different proverbs, but it is evident that many others were also current in France in the Middle Ages, as numerous references are found in the literature of the period whose counterparts are not included in any of the collections studied. The greatest variety in the mode of treating proverbs is to be found in the various collections. Many of them cite Latin parallels, sometimes taken from the Bible; many give evidence of being mere schoolboy exercises, many give legal citations, many have profane explanations. It is evident, in short, that Mediaeval French proverbs offer a wide field of investigation to the modern scholar.

Pp. 559-570. Kr. Nyrop, Gueules, histoire d'un mot. I. Origine latine ou orientale? II. Etymologie et homonymie. III. Sens primitif de gueules. IV. Emploi héraldique. V. Péregrinations de gueules. A supposed Oriental origin of this word is rejected, although this etymology was currently accepted for centuries; the true origin of the word is certainly Western and appears to refer to bits of fur sewed on the borders of mediaeval cloaks.

Pp. 571-584. Noël Dupire, *Le Mystère de la Passion de Vallenciennes*. No serious attempt has hitherto been made to determine the authorship of this long play, but now it appears to have been the work of the well-known fifteenth-century poet Jean Molinet.

Pp. 585-598. Mélanges:—Ernest Langlois, Ongier.—S. Etienne, Note sur les vers 279-287 du *Jeu d'Adam*.—Max Prinet, Sur le nom de rasse de Brunehamel.

Pp. 599-606. Comptes rendus:—J. Jud, Zur Geschichte der bündnerromanischen Kirchensprache (M. R.).—A. Kolsen, I. Dichtungen der Troubadours auf Grund altprovencalischer Handschriften teils zum ersten Male kritisch herausgegeben, teils be-

richtigt und ergänzt; II. Zwei provenzalische Sircentese, nebst einer Anzahl Einzelstrophen (A. Jeanroy).—Kenneth McKenzie and William Oldfather, Ysopet-Avionet: the Latin and French texts (A. Jeanroy: "La classification des mss. a été . . . l'objet de longs développements . . . , mais elle est uniquement fondée sur les textes latins; elle devait être contrôlée par l'étude des textes français, sur la valeur relative desquels . . . les éditeurs paraissent avoir des idées assez vagues"; and M. R.: "Il aurait beaucoup à rectifier encore dans l'accentuation qui fausse le sens . . . ou altère les formes; l'usage du tréma est très irrégulier; l'absence de guillemets rend assez pénible l'intelligence de bien des dialogues déjà obscurcies par les erreurs de ponctuation.")

Pp. 607-621. Périodiques.

Pp. 622-632. Chronique.

P. 632. Errata.

GEORGE C. KEIDEL.

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### REVIEWS.

Olympic Victor Monuments and Greek Athletic Art. By WALTER WOODBURN HYDE. Published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington: Washington, 1921. Pp. xix, 406; 2 Plans, 30 Plates, 80 Figures in the Text. \$10.50.

Olympia, "mother of contests," is one of the most interesting places in Greece whether regarded from the point of view of history, of topography, of archaeology or of art. The excavations, ably conducted by German archaeologists, were most fruitful in their results, and among other achievements gave a new birth to several masterpieces of sculpture that quickly acquired world-wide repute. The progress of the excavation of all ancient sites is marked by the proportionate increase of problems of identification and association of the fragmentary remains with the topographical reports or occasional references preserved to us by the Greek and Roman writers, or recorded in ancient inscriptions. Fortunately in the case of Olympia Pausanias has given a detailed account of the precinct and its monuments as they appeared in the second century A. D. But a guide-book, however thorough, is never exhaustive, and Pausanias in his peregrinations invariably omits as much or more than he mentions. The purpose of the present book is to study the extant remains at Olympia in the light of the

records of Pausanias and others, and to improve the present state of our knowledge of Olympic monuments by the interpretation and co-ordination of archæological and literary evidence.

For some years Professor HYDE has been studying problems dealing with the offerings at Olympia and consequently this elaborate book rests on the basis of a thorough knowledge of the Altis and its dedications. It is a critical and interpretative work such as is too rarely produced by American students and is, indeed, a monument of profound archæological scholarship in America.

The work opens with a preliminary chapter on "early Greek games and prizes" in which are briefly presented the facts bearing on the origin and development of athletic contests. From Cretan representations of pugilists and bull-fights we pass to accounts in Homer of athletic games held as part of the funeral services of the distinguished dead, and thence to a discussion of the thesis that the four great national games of Greece were funerary in origin. By a process of natural development grew the custom of the dedication by victors of the offerings in honor of their victory, and the study of these dedications is more profitable at Olympia than elsewhere because of the extensive remains uncovered by the excavators.

Chapter II, therefore, inaugurates the main topic of the book with a detailed statement of the "general characteristics of victor statues at Olympia." The available evidence is cited to show that in general the statues were life-size, and that most of them were nude. An interesting section here is concerned with the statement of Pliny that a threefold victor at Olympia had the privilege of erecting a portrait statue. But whatever may be the value of Pliny's observation the fact is emphasized that we have no evidence for the existence of realistic portraiture before the beginning of the fourth century B. C. Consequently, with a few possible exceptions, the victor statues were made after the pattern of ideal types, and inevitably these types must approximate the attributes associated with various deities. As man conceives himself made in the image of god idealized man can never differ much in appearance from humanized god, and we have before us the difficult but fascinating problem of the assimilation of victor statues to types of gods and heroes. In this connection our author plausibly suggests the interpretation as assimilated victor statues of several monuments regarded as representations of gods. In the type of Hermes, for example, are the bronze youth found in the sea near Antikythera and the "Jason" of the Louvre; in the type of Apollo, rather than Apollo himself, is perhaps "Apollo-on-the-omphalos" in Athens, and numerous works approximate

the type of Herakles who was reputed the founder of the Olympic games and the athlete *par excellence*.

In chapters III, IV and V the statues are classified according to the motives variously represented. After a brief review of the characteristics of the products of four great schools of sculpture at Argos, Sikyon, Aegina and Athens, statues at rest are discussed in subsections arranged with reference to the motive suggested. Statues are classified as engaged in adoration and prayer, in the process of anointing their bodies or of scraping them with oil, as pouring libations or simply as resting after the contest. Statues in motion include representations of all the gymnastic and athletic activities. The division of the statues into the two main groups of those at rest and those in motion is, of course, purely arbitrary, but for purposes of classification it serves quite as well as any other method of grouping.

The most interesting and important material in the book is presented in chapter VI which is largely a repetition of articles previously published in the American Journal of Archæology. Professor HYDE has made a notable contribution to archæological science by his careful study of the characteristics of the style of Lysippos in connection with his identification of a superb marble head found at Olympia as the Philandridas of Lysippos. The head, a photograph of which is admirably reproduced as the frontispiece of the book, is similar in many respects to the head of Agias at Delphi, and HYDE presents strong arguments in favor of associating both with Lysippos. In support, then, of the contention that a marble work is an original from the hand of Lysippos there is considerable discussion both of the materials in which Lysippos worked and of the materials of the monuments dedicated at Olympia. In this connection a photograph is reproduced of a stone statue at Phigaleia which is identified by HYDE as the Olympic victor Arrhachion, and is regarded by him as one of the earliest victor monuments known. This statue of Arrhachion was seen by Pausanias at Phigaleia and may still be seen in the guards' house there.

The book concludes with a study of the positions of the victor statues in the Altis, in connection with which plans are given showing the Altis in the Greek and in the Roman periods. There is also a list of the victor monuments that were erected outside Olympia, and an adequate index is appended.

This ambitious work, which is published under the auspices of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, is satisfactorily printed on good paper, and is profusely illustrated with well-reproduced figures and plates. It is, therefore, the more regrettable that it contains so many typographical errors and misprints. Minor mistakes, however unavoidable, are always

unfortunate, but even more distressing is the misspelling of the names of distinguished scholars like Loeschcke and Poulsen, while perhaps most embarrassing of all blemishes is the confusion of the sex of a leading commentator on Pliny.

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A Sixth-Century Fragment of the Letters of Pliny the Younger:  
A Study of Six Leaves of an Uncial Manuscript preserved  
in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York. By E. A.  
LOWE and E. K. RAND. Published by the Carnegie Insti-  
tution of Washington: Washington, 1922. Quarto. Pp.  
67; 20 plates.

Classical philology is full of romantic discoveries. Our age will hardly witness a Poggio's exciting journey through neglected convent libraries, with its wealth of treasure-trove, nor will mankind soon stop warfare long enough to explore Herculaneum's book-collections; but on a lesser scale wonders are never ceasing, nor must we seek the Nile for all of them. In 1910, Pierpont Morgan bought from a Roman dealer six ancient uncial leaves, which lay peacefully in his magnificent New York library till 1915, when LOWE and RAND had the thrill of identifying them as a fragment of by far the oldest known MS of Pliny's Letters. Beginning with *cessit ut* (Plin. Ep. II. 20, 13), we have the rest of Book II, the table of contents of Book III, and Book III itself up to *viginti quibus* (III. 5, 4). One leaf bears an entry indicating that the MS was in Meaux, near Paris, about 1400; there is no other external evidence of the MS's origin or vicissitudes. The Carnegie Institution has generously furthered their publication on a scale now impossible in Europe; and with Merrill's new Teubner edition of the Letters (1922), we have an unusual chance to make and test critical deductions. Excellent facsimiles of the whole fragment allow us to check every statement; plates of B and F are added, as well as of Budaeus' corrected copy of Beroaldus' edition, and specimens of early uncial.

To LOWE falls the paleographical discussion. After a most careful and competent description of the twelve pages, he attempts the dating and location of the handsome uncial, with remarkably correct spelling, in which they are written. As always, he gives us a wealth of incidental erudition, here tabulated for the first time; witness the valuable notes on syllabification, and the list of dated uncial MSS (371-787 A. D.).

Here he accepts the traditional date of 371 for the Codex Vercellensis; the other oldest dated uncials would be the earlier part of Jerome's Chronicon of Eusebius (after 442), in the Bodleian, and the Berlin Computus Paschalis (about 447). I should add the Ambrosian MS of Gregory's Dialogues (about 750) to the list. After a valuable and illuminating presentation of the characteristics of the earliest uncials, he comes to the tentative conclusion that our MS (II) was written in Italy about 500 A. D.

Aldus, in his 1508 edition of the Letters—the first to contain the whole text—tells us that he used an ancient MS brought him from Paris. RAND's earnest and ingenious effort is to prove that our fragment is a part of this very MS (P). Before Aldus' day, P had been used by Budaeus to correct and amplify his copy of Beroaldus' edition, and this volume is still extant, in the Bodleian. RAND notes the close agreement of II with B and F (Laurentian MSS, doubtless written in France in the ninth and tenth centuries respectively), and tries to show that BF are derived from II, with probably a copy intervening. He finds (p. 50) 3 cases in our brief fragment where II and BF differ: *conferenda BF conferanda II; comprobasse BF comprouasse II; si imbutus BF sibi imbutus II*. I grant that an intelligent Carolingian corrector might make the first two changes; I find the third a bit hard, and would guess, like Merrill, that II is a copy of the progenitor of BF.

Although lacking access to several of the earliest editions, RAND attacks with great erudition the problem of Aldus' sources and his way of using them, and concludes with "a new confidence in the integrity of Aldus." In a foot-note to p. 37, he acknowledges Prof. E. T. Merrill's aid, and remarks: "Professor Merrill should not be held responsible for errors that remain or for my estimate of the Morgan fragment." *Praesaga verba!* Merrill's searching critique of our book in C. P. XVIII 97-119 certainly leaves us under no illusion on this score. With pitiless acumen, Merrill pounces on every inadvertent statement of our authors. LOWE's attribution of the MS to Italy is shown to be risky, through lack of evidence; and his dating of the MS within half a century is impugned for the same reason. But Merrill's heaviest calibre is reserved for RAND. Space fails us to recapitulate his arguments; but he emphasizes what RAND in his enthusiasm occasionally forgets, that the identification of II with the Parisinus is only an attractive hypothesis, since the fragment is too brief to furnish anything of the nature of stringent proof. RAND had also tried to show that Aldus followed II closely; Merrill recalls that Aldus had other MSS at command, among them very likely one of the copies of F, with a text like P (II). And yet Merrill's final paragraph, though

somewhat Delphic, implies that he too would like to identify our fragment with the lost Parisinus; certainly there is nothing to make that identification impossible.

The beginner in text criticism will do well to collate our fragment (from the plates) with Merrill's text, and study his introduction; then work carefully through RAND's essay and Merrill's review. He will have an admirable introduction to a typical problem of the science. We understand RAND has been making further studies of the early editions; perhaps we shall eventually have here classic material for a seminar on critical method (if any yet there be who worship at that shrine). Meanwhile let us congratulate the authors on their scholarly and most readable publication, which evidently represents many weary months of research, and thank the Morgan Library and the Carnegie Institution for their sumptuous gift to the classical student and the paleographer.

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P. Vergili Maronis Opera, recognovit G. Janell, editio maior,  
B. G. Teubner, 1920.

Vergil has long been unfortunate in his editors. Ribbeck's large edition, which we must still use for its full readings, was sadly marred by arbitrary transpositions and deletions, an overestimate of the value of the MS R and even of P, and a curious theory regarding cursive sources. Conington's uninspired comments, Henry's erratic dialectic, and Norden's vast accumulation of fanciful parallels have not brought us very close to the poet. Warde Fowler, who revealed a remarkable insight into Vergil's manner, approached his task late in life and left us precious fragments of a torso.

When Teubner promised a new text of Vergil, we hoped at least for a definitive edition, but it seems that the exigencies of the great war prevented the making of a new collation. Dr. Janell, the editor, has apparently contented himself with re-examining the photograph of F, and adopted old collations for the rest. His apparatus differs from that of the Ribbeck Teubner and the Oxford text of Hirtzel mainly in giving less attention to the minuscule MSS, and somewhat more to the readings of the scholiasts and grammarians, adding lemmata especially from the now accessible Claudius Donatus.

A few text readings may be cited by way of illustrating his tendencies. Janell takes no notice whatsoever of the prefatory four lines of the Aeneid which Donatus and Servius found in

early testimonia. In view of his general faith in early comments his decision in this case seems to me inconsistent. Even if we hesitate to follow the Oxford text in accepting them, we do at least expect to see them noticed in the apparatus. He also fails to refer to the reading *tempore* (I, 44) which Dan. Servius says that Probus read. At I, 427, he fails to report that P has *theatris* corrected to *theatri*, yet on the strength of M and Servius reads the latter. At I, 441, he attributes *umbrae* to *Serv. in lemm.*; whereas the lemma gives *umbra*, citing Probus for *umbrae*. Janell brackets the Helena episode of II, 567 ff., referring to the well-known discussions of Leo, Heinze and Norden. Here it would have been far more logical to follow Sabbadini, who prints the lines in italics with the remark: Hos versus vere Vergilianos puto a poeta ipso deletos. In III, 127, where Hirtzel boldly accepts Bentley's *consita* contrary to the text of M, F, P and Servius, Janell rightly retains *concita*. At VI, 96 he rightly follows the MSS in reading *quam* (well defended by Norden), where most recent editions have been misled by Seneca's MSS into accepting *qua*. At VI, 177 he rejects the usually accepted reading of P in favor of M. Misprints are numerous.

From these typical instances it will be seen that Janell is not always reliable in his reports, that he very conservatively follows the MSS (preferring M to P), and that he makes very little use of the scholia and lemmata that he has packed into his apparatus. It is difficult to see in what respect he has justified a new edition.

The introduction contains the *vitae* of Donatus, Servius and Probus, and three pages of testimonia. There is also an Index Nominum but the edition departs from the Ribbeck Teubner in omitting the Appendix Vergiliana.

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Virgil's Biographia Litteraria. By N. W. DEWITT. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1923. viii + 192 pp. \$4.20.

This is mainly a study of the poems of the minor Virgilian corpus. Beginning with a laudable respect for tradition, Professor DEWITT has convinced himself that all the poems of the group, save the anachronistic Elegiae in Maecenatem, stand or fall together. He even suggests that Virgil preserved them as his autobiography, and resolutely attempts to find a place for each of them in the poet's career.

The Culex is referred to Virgil's 17th year—written at Rome, though it really belongs to his Transpadane period. The Moretum, the Copa, the Priapeans and the Ciris are all referred to one short year at Naples, beginning with the spring of 45. The Aetna is assigned to the period between the autumn of 43 and the latter part of 42; the Dirae and Lydia, to the period of confiscations (42-40)—“a record of personal grief.” Lydia is the nymph of the Mincio, who “recalls by her name the Etruscan origin of Mantua.” On p. 103 it is suggested that Virgil had witnessed with his own eyes the eruptions of Aetna that preceded the murder of Julius. But does the “quoties . . . vidimus” of Geor. I 471, necessarily mean a personal experience, any more than the “quem vidimus ipsi” of Ecl. X 26?

As for the poems of the Catalepton, four of them are referred to the three years from 48 to 45: I (the six lines addressed to Tucca), VI, XII, XIII (three epigrams directed against an unnamed person, “who is almost certainly Antony”). For Virgil was always a Caesarian, or an Augustan, always a militant anti-Antonian. No. XIII belongs to the last months of 46. From this poem it is inferred that Virgil saw a year of military service—at Dyrrhachium and at Pharsalus. No. V was apparently written in the spring of 45; No. VII, soon after the spring of 44; II and X, later in 44; VIII, perhaps in the autumn of 42. No. III is made to refer to Antonius, about the year 30; No. IX is set “probably in 27”; No. XIV, “shortly before Virgil's last and fatal journey.” Nos. IV and XI, addressed to Octavius Musa, Virgil's fellow student, are not precisely dated.

The Eclogues also are discussed so far as they possess a biographical interest, and an attempt is made to determine their order and date. Ecl. II is the earliest; III is referred to the spring of 41; V, to soon after March, 40; IV, to Sept. 40; I, to perhaps the latter part of 40; VIII and IX, to the latter part of 39 (VI and VII are earlier than VIII); X, to 37. But is the autumn equinox “clearly denoted” by the line, *Aspice convexo nutantem pondere mundum?* Why ignore the obvious influence of Theocritus, and refer the five lines *Huc ades, o Galatea, etc.* to Messalla? And why does everyone who discusses the Eclogues ignore the passage in Propertius which implies that Virgil wrote some of them at Tarentum?

The reference to Caesar, p. 3, n. 3, should be B. G. I 39. P. 44, l. 17, ‘Virgil’ should be ‘Horace.’

W. P. MUSTARD.

A History of Magic and Experimental Science during the first thirteen Centuries of our Era. By LYNN THORNDYKE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. 2 vols. 877 + 1306 pp. \$10.00.

This is a detailed study of the history of magic and experimental science and their relations to Christian thought during the first thirteen centuries of our era. Under magic the writer includes all occult arts and sciences, superstitions and folklore, and special attention is given to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It is probably the most comprehensive treatment of the entire subject yet published. It is an excellent book, well written, well printed, well indexed.

It is divided into five sections: I. The Roman Empire (Pliny, Ptolemy, Galen, etc.); II. Early Christian Thought (Origen, Basil, Augustine, etc.); III. The Early Middle Ages (The Alexander Legend, Post-Classical Medicine, Latin Astrology and Divination, etc.); IV. The Twelfth Century (Adelard of Bath, Bernard Silvester, John of Salisbury, Alexander Neckam, etc.); V. The Thirteenth Century (Michael Scot, William of Auvergne, Bartholomew of England, Albertus Magnus, Roger Bacon, etc.).

In Vol. I, p. 42, the quotation from Pliny is mistranslated; Pliny's claim is that he alone of Romans has celebrated Nature in every particular. Vol. II, p. 132, "Rhenus a mari impetu emittitur" can hardly mean "the Rhine is sent forth by the force of the sea." Vol. II, p. 10, the quotation from the Georgics should have been verified. Vol. I, p. 97, the reference to Cicero in note 9 should be De Div. I. 111. In the verses quoted Vol. I, p. 398, "geminis" should be "gemmas." Isidore's Etymologiae should be quoted from Lindsay's edition, not from Migne. Vol. II, p. 905, the account of fish that paralyze the fisherman might be compared with Claudian's graphic description of the angler and the torpedo.

W. P. MUSTARD.

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L'Etna Poème. Texte établi et traduit par J. VESSEREAU. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1923. xxxiv + 82 pp. 9 frs.

People who have followed any of the recent discussion of the Appendix Vergiliana will be interested in a new edition of the Aetna. This is a revised edition of a good book published in 1905—revised to fit the plan of the new French series of Greek and Latin classics. It contains an introduction, the text, a

prose translation *en regard*, a few brief notes, and a long list of literary parallels. One further parallel might have been quoted—Horace, C. III 4, 58, on lines 61-62. Professor VESSEAU considers the various guesses as to the authorship of the poem, but finds nothing more convincing than the ancient tradition which makes it an early work of Vergil. As a possible date for its composition, he suggests 50-44 B. C. On p. 8, n. 3, the reference to the Philologus should be Vol. LVII, not VII; and the play of Seneca there discussed is the Hercules Furens, not the Hercules Oetaeus. On p. xv, l. 14, the important word 'non' is omitted.

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#### CORRESPONDENCE.

Bryn Mawr College,  
Bryn Mawr, Pa., Dec. 7, 1923.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY,  
Johns Hopkins University,  
Baltimore, Md.

In March of the present year a new classical organization, *La société des études latines*, was founded in Paris; and the first number of its journal, the *Revue des études latines* (for October, 1923), has just reached this country. In addition to reports of the first meetings of the society and papers read by members, this number contains two reports of great interest to classical students: the first an outline of several bibliographical projects by the editor, J. Marouzeau, the second a report of the progress already made in the systematic study of medieval Latin, which has been of late much discussed both in Europe and in this country, by H. Goelzer.

M. Marouzeau alludes to the confusion, the incompleteness, and the delays which have prevailed in all matters bibliographical during and since the war, and to the waste of labor in repeating reviews of certain books many times in different periodicals while others are wholly unmentioned. He suggests also that there is often duplication of research due to the fact that professors in one institution often do not know that the same work has been undertaken somewhere else, and suggests that there ought to be some methodical channel of information which might anticipate such difficulties. These facts (and many others of like nature) have led to the plan, first suggested

two or three years ago, for an international bibliography—an organization under centralized management and on a uniform plan of all the works in every field appearing in each country which would result not only in a complete list of titles but also analyses of content. Such an ideal cannot be realized at once, of course, since it is necessary to achieve it by international agreement. A committee of the *Société des nations* is already at work upon the preliminaries, however, and efforts have been and are being made to get in touch with the interested societies and institutions of other countries, and a series of conferences is being planned. One of the first of these conferences will be devoted to classical philology.

Meanwhile two less ambitious projects are to the fore. Every scholar knows how incomplete and tardy the reviews of literature in Bursian have been in recent years, and the French are planning to issue a complete bibliography of classical philological publications for the past ten years, each title to be accompanied by a brief analysis of content and a list of reviews. If this plan proves after further study to be feasible, the bibliography will be published as a supplement to the *Revue des études latines*, which will in the meantime publish in each number bibliographical reports on selected topics. This plan, therefore, is still for the future, but the second project is now being carried out. This is an extension and revision of the well-known bibliographical parts of the *Revue de philologie*. Last year a *Société de bibliographie classique* was founded, which with the aid of a grant from the *Confédération des soc. scientifiques françaises* has brought up to date and completed this section of the *Revue de philologie*. A double fascicle (1919-1920) of the part called *Revue des comptes-rendus* has just appeared and a similar one for 1921-1922 is in press. Moreover, a fascicle of the part called *Revue des revues*, containing not only the reports for 1921 but also a good part of those which were omitted during and after the war, will soon appear. These reports will hereafter be arranged by subject.

Thus the energy of France seems in a fair way to restore some degree of completeness and system to the field of bibliography which has for so long been sadly out of joint, and the classical philologists are leading the way.

M. Goelzer has some interesting things to say about the revision of Ducange which was decided upon in principle at a meeting under the auspices of the *Union académique internationale* in 1920—an association in which many nations, including the United States, are represented. The task is so enormous that it has been decided to begin and carry through at once only a part of it. This part is a dictionary of medieval Latin supplementary to Forcellini and covering the period from

about 425 to about 1000 A.D. This work must be a collaboration, and M. Goelzer has been made supervisor. The work is already under way and M. Goelzer gives some illustrations of its plan and method. He closes with a request that all scholars who wish to collaborate in such parts of the work as have not yet been assigned should write to him for information. His address is 32, rue Guillaume-Tell, Paris XVIIe.

A. L. WHEELER.

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Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 30, 1923.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY,  
Johns Hopkins University,  
Baltimore, Md.

A committee on Mediæval Latin studies with representatives from history, modern languages, philosophy and classics, now organized under the American Council of Learned Societies, has lately issued a bulletin reviewing its activities of the past two years and outlining its plans for the future. Any member of the American Philological Association who is interested and who has not received a copy, may secure one by writing to the secretary, George R. Coffman, 184 Widener Library, Cambridge, Mass.

GEORGE R. COFFMAN.

## BASIL LANNEAU GILDERSLEEVE

October 23, 1831—January 9, 1924

Professor Gildersleeve is no longer with us. On January 9, after a brief illness, he peacefully passed away. In 1915, he retired from professorial work. To the very end, except for a period of illness following in the wake of a surgical operation, he enjoyed extraordinary health. His mental vigor never abated. Unfortunately, his sight had begun to fail, and during the last few years ordinary print was illegible to him. But the devotion of relatives and friends and, more especially, the generosity of his daughter enabled him to avail himself of the eyes of others. With the aid of these eyes and by drawing on the rich stores of his memory, he held daily converse with his favorite authors and kept himself informed of developments in literature, philology and current history. He also took great pleasure in the composition of verse, and with this pastime he beguiled many a wakeful hour of the night.

Professor Gildersleeve was born in Charleston, S. C. His father, a Presbyterian evangelist, whose chief duty was the editing of a religious weekly, took charge of his early education. The boy had an absorbing passion for literature and composition. He began the study of Latin at a tender age, and at twelve had acquired some knowledge of Greek. When he was between twelve and thirteen, he passed out of his father's hands into those of Mr. William E. Bailey, a teacher of the classics, who prepared him for the College of Charleston. In 1845, when still a freshman, he was obliged to leave college and remove with his father to Richmond, Va. 'For a year or more' he was his father's clerk and bookkeeper, but relief from the 'sadly idle time' thus spent was obtained when in December 1846 he was sent to Jefferson College, Pa. In 1847, he was transferred to Princeton, where he was graduated in 1849. Nearly all of his time at college was devoted to the study of literature—English, French, Italian, German and Spanish. In the autumn of 1849, when not quite eighteen, he accepted the classical mastership in Dr. Maupin's private school at Richmond. Besides practising Greek and Latin prose composition, he became passionately fond of Goethe, to whose writings he had been introduced by the study of Carlyle. This, he says, was the epoch of his Teutonomania, the time when he read German, wrote German, listened to German, and even talked German. In the summer of 1853, he sailed for Germany. Of the three years of travel and study abroad, most of the time

was spent in Germany. In spite of insufficient preparation in the classics, and in spite of special aptitude and equipment for the pursuit of the study of literature, the young student, after some wavering, decided to devote himself to the classics. He studied at Berlin, Goettingen and Bonn, and there he heard, among others, Boeckh, Franz, K. F. Hermann, Schneidewin, Bernays, Welcker, and Ritschl. By dint of Herculean effort, he won the degree of Ph. D. after but five *semesters* of university study, and then returned to America.

The next three years were spent in study, writing and tutoring. They were years of bitter waiting. Gradually despairing of a classical career, the young doctor was launching out into literary life when, in the autumn of 1856, he was elected professor of Greek in the University of Virginia. Five years later the Civil War broke out. During the continuance of this war and for a year after, he bore also the burdens of the professorship of Latin. And not only this, but during the summer months he rendered military service, and it was while he was on the staff of General Gordon, in the summer of 1864, that he received a bullet wound which kept him on his back for five months and left him with a permanent limp. In 1866, he married Eliza Fisher Colston, of Virginia, who survives him. Many a time in after years he expressed gratitude for the singularly happy married life with which they had been blessed. The years spent at the University of Virginia were busy years. The first seven were years of preparation. Thereafter, the stress of the times forced the young scholar to resume his pen. He made editorial contributions to the Richmond *Examiner* (1863-1864), wrote magazine articles, and published a number of books: *Latin Grammar*, 1867, 1873; *Latin Primer, Reader, Exercise Book*, edition of Persius, 1875.

In December 1875, he accepted the invitation to the professorship of Greek in the newly founded Johns Hopkins University. He entered upon his duties at the opening of the academic year in the autumn of 1876. This was the beginning of the most brilliant period of his career. Writing in 1891, he said: "The greater freedom of action, the larger appliances, the wider and richer life, the opportunities for travel and for personal intercourse have stimulated production and have made my last fourteen years my most fruitful years in the eyes of the scholarly world." In 1877 appeared his edition of *Justin Martyr* (Apologies and Epistle to Diognetus). In 1880, at the suggestion of the late President Gilman, he founded the *American Journal of Philology*, of which he maintained the editorship for forty years. In those days, founding a scientific journal was no slight task, and keeping it alive was even a greater. In spite of this heavy additional burden, the editor and professor found time to engage in research, to write books,

and to review in the pages of the Journal large numbers of current publications. In 1885 appeared his edition of *Pindar* (The Olympian and Pythian Odes), which was one of his finest pieces of work. In 1890 was published a volume of *Essays and Studies*, the greater part of which had been previously published. This volume met with such immediate favor that it rapidly went out of print, and for many years copies of it have been at a premium. At the University of Virginia, the first draft of a Greek Syntax had been prepared. The scope of this was later extended, and an Historical Syntax was projected. In spite of the fact that examples had been collected for many years, syntactical formulae worked out, monographs published, and grammatical points discussed in innumerable reviews and brief mentions, the plan of the undertaking proved too vast for execution by a single man; but, with the present writer's collaboration, the first part of the *Syntax of Classical Greek* was brought out in 1900, and a second part appeared in 1911. In 1909, *Hellas and Hesperia*—three lectures on the Barbour-Page Foundation of the University of Virginia—was published, and this was followed in 1915 by *The Creed of the Old South*—a republication, with notes, of two articles that had previously appeared in the Atlantic Monthly. The number of monographs, reviews and brief mentions that issued from the pen of Professor Gildersleeve during the long tenure of his Johns Hopkins professorship is so great that there is not space here to enumerate them. The *Indiculus Syntacticus* (A.J.P. XXXVI 481-487) gives an idea of the vast extent of his syntactical contributions, and the *Index Scoliodromicus* (A.J.P. XLII 370-382) affords a glimpse of what was done by him in other than grammatical lines.

Professor Gildersleeve was no narrow specialist. He was wont to speak of himself as a humble syntactician—and syntactician he was, syntactician such as had never been before. But he was much more than that. The range of his interests was wide; his scholarship of the broadest. He not only lectured on Greek syntax and conducted exercises in Greek composition, but, at various times, gave courses in Greek rhythmics and metrics, hermeneutics and criticism, rhetoric, epigraphy, and other subjects; and he could be as enthusiastic about a question relating to biography, mythology, topography, or some other branch of classical antiquity, as about a question of syntax. Attention has above been called to his knowledge of Roman, English, German, French, Italian and Spanish literature. Of Greek authors, there were few with whom he did not have more than a bowing acquaintance. Though Aristophanes, the Attic orators, Thucydides and Plato formed the cycle of study of his seminary, he supplemented the study of these authors by lectures on Greek comedy, historiography, oratory and philoso-

phy, and found time to conduct courses in Homer, Pindar, the other lyric poets, the tragedians, Herodotus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Polybius, the critical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Pausanias, Lucian, Philostratus and others. The fact is that, while the study of syntax had a peculiar fascination for him, the literary interest was paramount, and, in wide and intimate knowledge of literature, he surpassed many of those who made the study of literature their sole occupation.

Few great scholars possess the faculty of artistic expression to a noteworthy degree. Professor Gildersleeve did. His pen matched his genius. It would be difficult to describe his style. If ever it was true of a writer that the style was the man, it was true of him. Clearness, simplicity, conciseness, precision, ease, elegance, daintiness, elaboration, beauty, swiftness, smoothness, ruggedness, allusiveness, brilliance, penetration, imagination, wit, humor, satire, poise, geniality, austerity, fearlessness, timidity, impetuosity, severity, generosity, pride, humility, loyalty, love of accuracy, hatred of sham—these are some of the qualities that characterized the style and the man. If comparison with one of the ancients were permitted, one might think of Demosthenes. But comparisons are odious. Certain it is that, when Professor Gildersleeve was at his best, his style was inimitable, and many of his writings are a joy forever.

It was inevitable that a man of such keenness of intellect, versatility of genius, wealth of knowledge, catholicity of taste, mobility of temperament and breadth of human experience should have been an inspiring teacher. The years spent as a student under Professor Gildersleeve were years of intellectual intoxication. Enthusiasm never waned. Inspiration was an incentive to study. The spur of reprimand and correction was not needed. And how deep was the affection and the reverence for the teacher! What a place he held in the hearts of his friends! How highly he was esteemed by his colleagues! No wonder that honors were showered on him at home and abroad. He was twice elected president of the American Philological Association. He was chosen honorary member of many foreign societies, created fellow of learned academies, and made the recipient of honorary degrees from many institutions of learning. He was everywhere called master by those who themselves were masters, and in the American classical pantheon he sat enthroned as Zeus.

C. W. E. MILLER.

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